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ABSTRACT
THE ‘SILENT ARRIVAL’:
THE SECOND WAVE OF THE GREAT MIGRATION
AND ITS AFFECTS ON BLACK NEW YORK, 1940-1950
By
Carla J. DuBose-Simons
Advisor: Judith Stein
This dissertation explores black New York in the 1940s with an emphasis on the
demographic, economic, and social effects the World War II migration of blacks to the city.
Using census data this study examines the basic characteristics of the migrants moving to New
York during the war years; characteristics such as state of origin, age, and sex. It also maps
where these migrants settled in the city revealing new areas of black settlement outside of
Harlem, the largest black neighborhood in the city.
Black New Yorkers, looking to escape the high rents, dilapidated living conditions, and
increasing crime rates left Harlem. Attracted to the integrated working-class neighborhood by
the abundance of newer housing, better schools, and fresher air, hundreds of Harlem’s families
settled in the Morrisania section of the Bronx. Thousands of new migrants chose to move to
Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn which was in close proximity to many of the city’s war industries
and where a small black community already existed. Many of Bedford-Stuyvesant’s white
residents opposed black settlement; some organizing campaigns to prevent blacks from moving
in and others fleeing the neighborhood. By the end of the 1940s white flight and black
settlement had transformed Bedford-Stuyvesant into New York City’s second largest black
neighborhood.
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One of the primary reasons southern blacks migrated to New York during World War II
was employment opportunities available in war industries. When New York factories began
converting to war production, many did not hire black workers and those that did placed them in
unskilled and janitorial positions. This dissertation explains the process by which blacks found
skilled and semi-skilled jobs in industries making ships, electrical instruments, and scientific
instruments.
Civil Rights organizations, most importantly the Brooklyn Urban League, pressured the
state and federal governments into taking steps to integrate war industries. These organizations
used the State War Council’s Committee on Discrimination and the Fair Employment Practices
Committee to open new occupations to African Americans and ensure the fair treatment of those
blacks employed in war industries. Initiatives for equal employment opportunities for blacks
were at the center of civil rights activism during the 1940s.
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For my nana Mary Wilson whose life story inspired my passion for the subject of this
dissertation and my father Daniel DuBose Jr. whose presence and pride I have continued to feel
during the completion of this achievement.
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1
Introduction

World War II was a pivotal point in American history as it, according to historian Neil
Wynn, marked the emergence of modern America.1 By creating a defense industry that pulled
black migrants from southern rural areas to northern and western industrialized centers, the
government produced changes in the places from which migrants left and those to which they
traveled. The migration produced new and expanding black communities in northern cities, new
jobs in war industries, and new racial antagonisms. The new black workers earned more than
they had and enjoyed more freedom to protest the discrimination that greeted them in their new
homes. Overcrowding of black communities and subsequent expansion of black residence into
other communities, competition over war industry employment, unequal access to skilled
employment, and race antagonisms were all effects of the World War II migration.
The World War II migration has not been documented as richly as the migration of
African Americans to northern cities during World War I. There are few works devoted solely to
studying the phenomenon and its consequences for both the southern areas from which the
migrants left and the cities to which they traveled.2 The majority of works that do address the
second wave of the Great Migration, focus on its social effects and not the demographic changes

1

Neil A Wynn, “’The ‘Good War’: The Second World War and Postwar American Society,” Journal of
Contemporary History, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Jul., 1996): 463-482.
2
Some studies that do look at the migration as the main subject are Peter Gottlieb’s “Rethinking the Great
Migration: A Perspective from Pittsburgh,” in The Great Migration in Historical Perspective, ed. Joe William
Trotter Jr. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 68-82; Nicholas Lemann’s The Promised Land: The
Great Black Migration and How It Changed America (New York: Albert A. Knopf, 1991); Hollis Lynch’s The black
urban condition: a documentary history, 1866-1971 (New York:, Crowell,1973.); James Gregory’s The Southern
Diaspora: How the Great Migrations of Black and White Southerners Transformed America (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Isabel Wilkerson’s The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of
America's Great Migration (New York: Random House, 2010). Most of these works are not devoted solely to the
second wave of the Great Migration but include an in depth look at the phenomenon as part of an examination of
the migration as a whole.
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it caused. These works do not describe the basic characteristics of the migrants or precisely track
where these migrants settled.
One work that focuses on the migration of blacks to urban areas in the World War II era
and beyond is Isabel Wilkerson’s The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America's Great
Migration. Wilkerson uses interviews to tell the story of three individuals who left the South and
migrated to urban areas in the north and west. She delves into the stories of these three
individuals who left the south between 1937 and 1953 in order to paint a composite picture of the
personal experiences of those migrating to northern, western, and mid-western cities. Through
the telling of these individual stories, Wilkerson is able to get at the view-point and motivations
of the migrants in a way unlike any other monograph. However her focus on the stories of three
individuals limits the scope of her work. The three stories she tells in detail do not stand in for
nor are they representative of the stories of the millions of African Americans who migrated to
urban areas during the Second Great Migration. Moreover, the structural factors affecting the
choices of these three African-American migrants and thus the larger power-structure within
which they operate are sometimes secondary to the biographic stories in the book.3 This
dissertation aims to tell the larger story of Wilkerson’s migrants in a particular place and time by
exploring the demographic, economic, and social changes resulting from the migration of
southern blacks to New York City during the 1940s.
Many histories of urban areas at mid-century do not explore the demographic changes
involved in the migration, the process of community formation, or its social ramifications in
detail. Nicholas Lemann’s The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It
Changed America is an example. Lemann described the way the urban landscape changed in
3

Isabel Wilkerson, The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America's Great Migration (New York: Random
House, 2010).
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response to mass migration in the post-World War II era. According to the author the migration
was one of the largest and most rapid mass movements of people in history and the result was a
situation in which “urban” became a euphemism for “black” and eventually black urban
communities changed into ghettos. Curiously Lemann does not begin his study with the World
War II migration when the influx of blacks to urban areas began. Examining blacks’ relocation
from rural Mississippi to Chicago in the 1950s and 1960s, Lemann explained the social changes
resulting from the migration such as overcrowded tenements, increased crime rates, and a
general demoralization of character that took place in the ghettos formed after the migration.
Lemann does this in an effort to explain how the sharecropper culture of the southern migrants
precipitated ghetto mentality of those living in the urban cities to which they relocated.4 This
cultural explanation of the problem does not stress the role of racial hostility or the
deindustrialization taking place in urban areas in the 1950s and 1960s. Though he gives some
demographic data in the early chapters of the book, the majority of the remaining chapters are
recollections of migrants used to illustrate the effects of the migration on the migrants and their
experiences in the new and changing urban setting. These recollections were based on several
families, not a large enough basis on which to make the sweeping conclusions he does and
hardly the most objective way of approaching the question.5 Like Wilkerson, Lemann’s focus on

4

Lemann, The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It Changed America. (New York: Albert A.
Knopf , 1991), 6.
5
Lemann’s view that southern migrants bring with them a particular southern culture is a theme in migration
histories. James Grossman’s Land of Hope also posits this idea. Discussing the initial wave of the Great Migration
during World War I and immediately after, Grossman explained that these new migrants experienced a completely
different environment that shocked their southern sensibilities. Grossman highlights the difficulties and adjustments
these migrants had to make in leaving a segregated, rural, agricultural environment, and settling in an integrated,
urban, industrial environment. Placing the migrants at the center of his book, Grossman explained how the ways
migrants learned about the North and then moved and resettled drew upon and strengthened southern black culture,
especially the role of kinship and community. These migrants brought a racially centered world view which also
shaped their response to the new urban environment.
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a few migrants’ stories makes his work narrow in scope as it does not provide a comprehensive
picture of the varied experiences of the migrants.
Those works that explain the changes in community composition, emerging racial
antagonism, and beginning of urban blight that resulted from the World War II migration are not
focused on the North East, but on Mid-West and Western cities. Thomas Sugrue’s study of
urban decline in Detroit, The Origins of the Urban Crisis is a prime example. Sugrue discusses
the formation of centers of black urban life in the post-World War II era. However, the
migration does not figure in his work. In his study of Detroit, Sugrue argued that the origins of
the urban crisis are much earlier than social scientists have recognized, placing them in the 1940s
instead of the 1960s. In this analysis the Second World War plays a much larger role in the
current situation of black urban areas than previously thought. As migration of blacks into
Detroit during the World War II increased, the housing available to them did not, causing severe
housing shortages. Few blacks were able to escape “Paradise Valley”, the black ghetto, and
those who did were faced with many obstacles including fierce white resistance.6 Though
Sugrue pointed to the migration as an important component that created “Paradise Valley,” there
is no discussion of details of the movement in terms of who moved, how many people came, sex
and age characteristics, and employment prospects. Many studies of the World War I migration
made distinctions between black residents and migrants. Sugrue ignores this possible line of
analysis. He does not analyze the role that declining jobs and continued migration had upon
racial discrimination. In the end, Sugrue wants to tell the story of racial discrimination, not the
history of blacks in Detroit.

6

Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996.)
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The clearest example of a study that fully examines the effects of black migration into an
area and its social ramifications is Shirley Ann Moore’s essay “Getting There, Being There” a
study of the black migration into Richmond, California. Moore argued that the increasing
employment opportunities and the passage of Executive Order 8802 banning race discrimination
in defense industries accelerated the movement of black workers into California. Between 1942
and 1945 14,000 blacks moved into Richmond to take advantage of job opportunities, most
importantly in the Kaiser shipyards. The migrants were part of a general process of movement
where black people relocated from the rural south to southern cities, and later on to the cities of
the North and West. According to Moore, blacks were recruited by Kaiser to fill the wartime
labor shortages. These migrants also relied on personal networks such as kinship ties and church
associations, to inform and assist them in their move. Upon arrival, they initially met a cold
reception from the long-time black Richmond residents who felt the newly arriving blacks were
uneducated, abrasive, and unrefined. Though the black old-timers initially feared the migrants
would threaten their tenuous position in Richmond’s economic and social hierarchy, in the face
of increasing racial conflict the two groups joined to overcome prejudice. One of the reasons for
this change may have been that whites did not accept the distinction between long-standing and
recent blacks in the neighborhood, a situation which forced the old residents to embrace the new.
White Richmond residents responded to the influx of black migrants by establishing more
stringent social, political, and economic restrictions on all black residents, newcomers and longtime residents alike. As black migrants entered Richmond, African Americans were isolated and
confined to their North Richmond neighborhoods with little chance of moving from this
burgeoning ghetto. Richmond’s war industries provided enough jobs for African Americans, so
the largest problem was the inadequate housing supply. Furthermore, local newspapers and

6
police departments began to characterize criminal activity in racial terms, giving a distorted
picture of black criminality and stigmatizing the entire community.7
Many of the questions Sugrue asked of Detroit and Moore asked of Richmond can be
asked about New York City. Was New York City like Sugrue’s Detroit with blacks bottled up in
certain areas? At first glance, it appears that New York was different as African American
migrants settled in new areas in Queens, Brooklyn, and the Bronx. But one can still ask the
question, was there white flight or did neighborhoods become integrated? Was this integration
contentious? Did whites organize to prevent blacks from moving into various areas? If the
patterns of black settlement varied in different neighborhoods, why? Were there intraracial
conflicts between long-time black residents and the new blacks moving in? What are the links
between the Second Great Migration and black community formation across the city in the
1940s?
This dissertation attempts to fill a gaping hole in the historiography on African
Americans in New York City during the 1940s. Much of the existing literature on New York
City in the 1940s lacks a study of the demographic significance of the migration. They body of
scholarship on New York in the 1940s has yet to explain where migrants originated, settlement
patterns, and characteristics of these migrants for example their age and gender. The
overwhelming majority of studies that do deal with New York history during the 1940s
document the economic and social trends but fail to mention the role of the migration.
Employment discrimination, black poverty, mortality, and residential segregation in the 1940s
are all subjects covered in works by Cheryl Greenberg, Nat Brandt and Frederick Binder, David

7

Shirley Ann Moore, “Getting There, Being There: African-American Migration to Richmond, California, 9101945,” in The Great Migration in Historical Perspective, ed. Joe William Trotter Jr., (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1991), 106-126.
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Reimers, and Craig Steven Wilder.8 All of these scholars wrote about New York in the 1940s,
and often mentioned the migration as a contributing factor to the social, economic and political
conditions of African Americans in the city; however none specifically deal with the details of
the migration itself, only with the effects.
The availability of better paying jobs in the factories producing goods for the war was the
most important reason blacks moved to New York during World War II. No works currently
explain the process by which blacks were able to find employment in the city’s war industries.

8

Cheryl Lynn Greenberg, “Or Does it Explode?”: Black Harlem in the Great Depression ( New York: Oxford
University Press , 1991), Nat Brandt, Harlem at War: the Black Experience in WWII (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1996), Frederick Binder and David Reimers, All Nations Under Heaven: An Ethnic and Racial
History o f New York City (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), Craig Steven Wilder, A Covenant with
Color: Race and Social Power in Brooklyn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.)
Cheryl Greenberg in her book Or Does It Explode explores the continued problems Harlemites faced after the Great
Depression. While many of Harlem’s residents found employment, and often better employment, and while some
improvements came as a result, black poverty, mortality, and residential segregation continued. The new war
industries discriminated against blacks even after the creation of the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC)
and other wartime measures. Greenberg argues that Harlem moved out of the Depression more slowly than other
areas: for blacks, racism, segregation, and discrimination limited the wartime opportunities others enjoyed. In this
analysis the increase of blacks to the New York area is not even discussed nor considered as a possible reason for
the continuation of African Americans’ denigrated position in the society of New York. Again the migration and its
effects on the social situation are conspicuously missing from analyses of social, political and economic conditions
in Harlem in the book Harlem at War: The Black Experience in World War II. The author Nat Brandt, outlines
various events in Harlem and attitudes of Harlemites, however the World War II migration is reserved for only one
line of the book. Pointing out that the movement of blacks to New York City during the Second World War made
blacks influential voters in elections. Frederick Binder and David Reimers in their book All Nations Under Heaven
discuss the development of ethnic enclaves in New York as well as relations among these groups. Blacks achieved a
widening of employment opportunities, however African Americans experienced economic recovery from the Great
Depression at a slower rate than other ethnic groups throughout the city. Mortality rates, housing discrimination and
shortages, higher rents, and lower paying jobs still plagued black communities. Racial tensions mounted throughout
the war and post-war years and blacks moved out of Harlem and into other racially segregated neighborhoods or in
areas becoming all black because of white flight. The black settlement in Brooklyn’s Bedford Stuyvesant area
expanded rapidly to adjacent Crown Heights and Brownsville, a trend that very well may have been due in part to
skyrocketing black population augmented by black migration from the south, a source the authors ignore. The
economic woes of blacks in Brooklyn and the benefits from the World War II economy are a topic addressed in
depth by Craig Steven Wilder in A Covenant with Color. Wilder argues that though African Americans experienced
a widening of employment opportunities, black men would find it nearly impossible to turn their wartime training
into lasting opportunity. Furthermore federal agencies exaggerated the opportunities that wartime production
brought African Americans – in reality they never received their share of the benefits from the federal funds that
inflated New York City’s defense industries during the war. While providing invaluable information about black
economic life in Brooklyn, the role of increasing black population again is not mentioned in Wilder’s analysis. An
actual study of how many blacks were employed in wartime industries, how they found employment, and their
relations with labor has not yet been done, nor has there been any study of how black migrants fared in the job
markets of World War II New York. Many of these works do not use primary sources in their analysis of the
reasons for these trends in New York, they simply site the conventional wisdom found in other books.

8
Craig Steven Wilder in A Covenant with Color describes discrimination against African
Americans in war industries, but fails to explain where and how blacks were able to find jobs in
war industries. In Brownsville, Brooklyn Wendell Pritchett also argued that African Americans
were denied employment in many occupations, especially in war industries. Nevertheless, he
argued, blacks were able to move into other industrial and white-collar jobs previously closed to
them. Though Pritchett made this distinction, he did not analyze where these barriers were and
what blacks were doing to confront them. He did however explain what jobs were open to
blacks. According to the author, many black women moved out of domestic service and into the
factories (particularly in the garment industry), and they also made inroads in the clerical,
communication, and sales sector. In addition, some black men were hired for skilled positions,
promoted to foremen in some factories, and secured jobs as trolley and train operators.9 This
dissertation begins to systematically analyze black employment in New York during the 1940s in
order to add to our understanding of the causes and effects of the second wave of the migration
to New York.
The role government agencies established to investigate allegations of discriminatory
hiring by war industries played in opening new employment opportunities to blacks in New York
City has not been studied thoroughly enough. Though instances of discrimination continued in
many war industries, by examining the records of local War Manpower Commission and Fair
Employment Practices Committee offices and New York State Committee on Discrimination
records it is clear that in the scientific instruments, electronic instrument, and shipbuilding
sectors investigations by government agencies did indeed expand the number jobs and improve

9

Wendell Pritchett, Brownsville, Brooklyn: Blacks, Jews, and the Changing Face of the Ghetto, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2002.) Much of Pritchett’s analysis of African Americans’ employment limitations
and opportunities were based on secondary sources, therefore it is difficult to verify the sources or evaluate his
arguments.

9
the quality of the positions open to African Americans. Moreover, this dissertation emphasizes
where the most significant shifts were in employment opportunities – the opening of skilled and
semi-skilled industrial jobs to black men in war industries. After the war black women also
moved into clerical occupations and as store clerks after the war. These were white collar
occupations not open to them before World War II.
Several scholars have noted that the Second Great Migration, the widened employment
opportunities blacks enjoyed, the participation of black men as soldiers in World War II, and a
war-time national ethos of democracy and human rights spurred African Americans all over the
country to fight for equal rights.10 Historian Harvard Sitkoff argued that the Second World War
“would challenge the color line on many fronts for most minority groups in the United States.”
In Sitkoff’s estimation
“Jim Crow would be wounded, but not killed, by a series of interrelated
developments, including (1) the hypocrisy of fighting for freedom abroad while
denying it to minorities at home; (2) the equation of racism and Nazism by
prominent American liberals; (3) the nation's need for the loyalty and manpower
of all its citizens; (4) the massive migration of blacks to urban areas and out of the
South; (5) the opening of new opportunities for minorities in industry and the
military; (6) heightened expressions of white support for minority rights; (7) shifts
in federal policies to lessen racial discrimination; (8) pressures arising from
America's new world role; (9) fears that continuing racial violence would hinder
the war effort; and, last but hardly least, (10) the growth and militancy of African
American groups and institutions, who consciously used the war effort to extract
concessions and make gains.11
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African Americans all over the country began to a struggle for greater economic
opportunities and by extension equal rights during the 1940s. Though more historians are
focusing on the early struggles for equal rights in northern cities, few examine the decidedly
economic cast civil rights struggles took during the World War II era and the connection
between labor and civil rights.
The struggle for equal economic opportunity that took place in New York City during the
Second World War is an additional subject of this dissertation. Books like Delores Greenberg’s
Or Does it Explode examine the economic focus of civil rights activism in New York during the
Depression Era however that activism continued in the next decade and has largely remained
undocumented. Like Richard Dalfiume and Nelson Lichtenstein and Robert Korstad, I argue
that the main focus of the movement for equal rights for African Americans during the war years
focused on equal employment opportunity for blacks.12
Korstad and Lichtenstein clearly examine the economic focus of early civil rights efforts
in their article “Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil Rights
Movement.” The authors locate the start of the civil rights movement in the early 1940s as the
nation’s black population migrated to urban centers and became “increasingly urban, proletarian
[in] character.” In their view the key to this early civil rights activism was black membership in
labor unions, particularly those of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Together these
unions and black activists “were in the vanguard of efforts to transform race relations.” The rise
of egalitarian and inclusive industrial unions and the evolution of New Deal labor laws offered
working-class blacks an economic and political standard by which they made demands and
began a popular struggle for civil rights. Korstad and Lichtenstein argue that by the mid-1940s
12
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civil rights issues had reached a level of national political importance that they would not again
have until the 1960s. By the end of the 1940s the moment of opportunity for a lasting laborbased civil rights movement passed because of attacks against organizations and individuals
associated with communism.13
Korstad and Lichtenstein make a very important point about the early movement for
equal rights for blacks – that the goals of civil rights activists in the 1940s were based on the idea
of equality of economic opportunity for all races. Korstad and Lichtenstein’s stress on civil
rights as a struggle for employment is critical and unexamined in the literature on the history of
New York City. Several works have explored black New Yorkers’ very public campaigns for
equal rights in the years before and after World War II but none of those tell the story of the fight
for equal employment opportunities in the war years.14
Martha Biondi is the best known book on the early struggle for black rights in New York.
Her book begins after the war in 1945 and focuses mostly on the activities of Communist
organizations. In To Stand and Fight: The Struggle for Post-War Civil Rights in New York City
Biondi examines grassroots efforts to achieve black rights in New York between 1946 and 1954.
She argues that black leaders had a new urban agenda, pushing issues such as police brutality
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and fair housing to the center of big-city politics. The black struggle for equal rights changed the
landscape of New York and helped to give it a liberal image. After World War II, black New
Yorkers increasingly asserted their right to patronize public accommodations without
discrimination. They challenged exclusionary practices in restaurants, bars, nightclubs, hotels,
swimming pools, and trains. These efforts to desegregate the city’s cultural life, nightlife, and
transportation helped lay the groundwork for the rise of New York as a cosmopolitan global
city.15
Biondi focused her study on leftist and Communist activism, arguing that the Cold War
both advanced and hindered the aims of Civil Rights activists. The Cold War opened up
domestic policies to a global audience critical of American segregation and racial inequality but
also caused the government to crack down on domestic dissent. Biondi described how virtually
every leading activist suffered persecution, investigation, repression, or censorship in the 1950s.
The repression dramatically slowed black mobilization in New York City and undermined the
civil rights-trade union alliance, reduced civil rights leaders’ calls for economic reform, and
muted these leaders’ criticism of American foreign policy. Biondi concluded that the movement
for equal rights in New York City was ultimately derailed by the Cold War because the
movement was so closely allied and associated with the American left.16
Biondi acknowledged that the migration was important to spawning the Civil Rights
movement of the 1950s and 1960s writing, “The massive Black migration of the 1940s
transformed the racial geography of the nation and raised the question of whether segregation
would intensify and spread in the North and West.” She explained how civil rights leaders in
New York City mobilized Black New Yorkers and pushed civil rights onto the city’s political
15
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agenda. Biondi clearly mentions that the early movement for equal rights in 1940s centered
around employment issues.17 However, because Biondi focused on Cold War issues, she did not
examine the migration itself or the employment concerns that were so important in mobilizing
blacks in New York to fight for equal rights.
Unlike Biondi’s work this study includes an examination of the migration and the
employment issues Biondi identified as contributing to the emerging civil rights movement in
New York. It also explores the economic activism of civil rights organizations during the 1940s.
I examine the activities of Communist Front organizations like the National Negro Congress and
the Negro Labor Victory Committee but cast the net more widely to consider the activities of
mainstream civil rights organizations as well. The main goal for New York civil rights
organizations – including the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the
New York and Brooklyn Urban Leagues, the National Negro Congress, and the Negro Labor
Victory Committee – was equality of economic opportunity for New York City’s black residents.
Of these organizations the Brooklyn Urban League was the most successful at opening
employment opportunities for blacks in New York City because of the focus and goals of the
organization as well as its collaborative relationship with state and federal fair employment
agencies.
The Silent Arrival also looks at the effects of black migration and skyrocketing New York
City population on community formation in the city. Other books have examined the effects of
the World War II migration in New York in the context of community studies. Wendell
Pritchett’s Brownsville, Brooklyn, Craig Steven Wilder’s A Covenant with Color, Evelyn
Gonzalez’s The Bronx, and Harold Connolly’s A Ghetto Grows in Brooklyn all mention the
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influx of black residents during the World War II era and explain the effects on the region they
studied.18 This dissertation situates the changing demographic trends in several neighborhoods
in the larger context of the migration’s effects on the city’s population distribution, neighborhood
composition, and race relations.
Wendell Pritchett examined the effects of the World War II migration as part of his study
on the development of the black community of Brownsville, Brooklyn. In his book Brownsville,
Brooklyn Pritchett examined the increasing black settlement in this section of Brooklyn. At the
beginning of the 1940s Brownsville was a working class neighborhood of Jews and African
Americans. These two groups resided in separate communities within Brownsville and generally
avoided conflict. Pritchett argued that this arrangement worked as long as the percentage of
blacks in Brownsville remained small. However as the black population almost doubled because
of the migration, white residents’ concerns about crime and juvenile delinquency in the
neighborhood increased resulting in heightened racial tensions. Discrimination against blacks
rose and blacks claimed increasing incidents of police brutality.19 The 1940s brought on
important shifts in racial composition of Brownsville and profoundly affected race relations in
that area – changes that occurred in other neighborhoods in the city as well. A continuation of
the analysis Pritchett does in his work is necessary to fully understand black community
formation in the city in the 1940s and beyond.
This study seeks to address many of the same topics as Shirley Anne Moore’s work on
Richmond, California as I attempt to explain how black communities in New York City
18

Harold X. Connolly, A Ghetto Grows in Brooklyn (New York: New York University Press, 1977); Craig Steven
Wilder, A Covenant with Color: Race and Social Power in Brooklyn (New York: Columbia University Press,
2000); Wendell Pritchett, Brownsville, Brooklyn: Blacks, Jews, and the Changing Face of the Ghetto (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2002); Evelyn Gonzalez, The Bronx: A History (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2004).
19
Wendell Pritchett, Brownsville, Brooklyn: Blacks, Jews, and the Changing Face of the Ghetto (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2002).

15
developed during the World War II era. Through this dissertation I hope to add complexity to
the story of the effects of the migration in urban areas and reveal how the migration contributed
to the creation of modern cities for the second half of the 20th Century. New York follows and
departs from the general narrative of the effects of the migration on urban areas in this country.
One significant difference is that blacks in New York moved to areas outside of the primary area
of black settlement. New black migrants and Harlemites moved to Bedford-Stuyvesant while
other Harlemites moved north to the Morrisania section of the Bronx. Brownsville as Pritchett
proved also has a significant increase of blacks move to the area. New York’s blacks were not
hemmed into one district as the black residents of Detroit and Richmond were. This dispersion
of the black population affected the character of race relations in the city. Black New Yorkers
did not focus their frustrations and discontent on white residents and civilians during violent
racial conflicts. Instead African Americans in the city focused on the government and law
enforcement to express their discontent in the 1940s.
The dissertation also complicates the narrative of post-war urban decline that we see in
works like Sugrue’s Origins of the Urban Crisis. Though Bedford-Stuyvesant and Morrisania
experienced declining living conditions, increased crime rates, and inadequate social services
and became the picture of urban blight in the 1950s and 1960s; that outcome was not inevitable.
This dissertation elucidates the process by which blacks began to move to these areas and seeks
to present the 1940s as an era of burgeoning opportunity for blacks. In the 1940s New York
African Americans viewed relocation to Morrisania and Bedford-Stuyvesant as a chance to
improve their living standards and quality of life. This dissertation also seeks to compare the
development of black communities in Bedford-Stuyvesant and Morrisania to examine intraracial
class divisions and compare race relations in the two areas. The class composition of the new
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black residents in Morrisania and Bedford-Stuyvesant and the economic means of the white
residents in each area had profound effects on race relations in each of these neighborhoods and
ultimately determined whether they would become integrated communities or whether white
residents would flee.

Chapter 1 explores the demographic changes in the New York City population. It
explains where black migrants came from, where they settled, and the sex and age of the migrant
population. Most of the approximately 200,000 black migrants came from the South Atlantic
states – Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. The largest group of migrants was young
women in their 20s. The two primary areas migrants settled were Harlem, the existing center of
black settlement in the city, and Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn which became a black
neighborhood during the war years. The black population already living in New York City also
moved to new areas. In particular we see black middle class families moving from Harlem to the
Morrisania section of the Bronx creating integrated neighborhoods there.
Many of the black migrants came to find better-paying employment in the city’s war
industries. Chapter 2 of this dissertation examines the changing structure of black employment
in the early years of World War II and explains how war industries in the city came to hire black
workers. It explains which jobs were closed to blacks, the rationale used by employers for
refusing to hire them, and the process that led employers to, for the first time, offer jobs to black
workers.
New York’s industries did not receive many government contracts during the first two
years of the war. The factories, which were mostly light industries, were not given federal
contracts because they could not easily convert to produce the massive quantities of goods
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needed for the war. Therefore the labor market remained tight and jobs hard to find for black
and white workers alike.
Even though there was a tight labor market, African Americans protested for their fair
share of the jobs that were available. Civil Rights organizations like the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League (NUL) used
boycotts, marches, and publicity campaigns to try to pressure the management of these industries
to hire black workers. These measures were largely unsuccessful. Where black activists did find
success however was in pressuring the federal and state governments into passing legislation
barring hiring discrimination by war industries and creating agencies to investigate their hiring
practices. The New York State assembly also established a Committee on Discrimination that
was eventually given the power to enforce state anti-discrimination laws.
New York’s industries began receiving production contracts from the federal government
in 1942 but despite increased production in war industries, African Americans did not
immediately see employment opportunities in those factories.

Black organizations continued to

pressure the management of war industries and state and federal fair employment agencies to
open war industries to African Americans. The activities of the New York State Committee on
Discrimination in conjunction with the local offices of the FEPC to investigate discriminatory
hiring practices made illegal by state legislation and Executive Order 8802 prompted some war
industries in New York City to begin hiring black workers by the end of 1942.
Though war industries began to hire black workers in 1942, these factories were not fully
integrated until 1943. Chapter 3 explains which industrial sectors integrated and what kinds of
jobs blacks held. It also describes the continuing role of civil rights organizations and fair
employment agencies in expanding the occupations open to black workers.
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A labor shortage in 1943, further opened skilled and semi-skilled industrial jobs to
African Americans in the scientific instruments, electronic instrument, and shipbuilding sectors.
Black men left their service jobs to work in skilled and semi skilled jobs at companies that
produced scientific instruments, electronic instruments, and naval vessels during the war. Black
women also benefitted from war-time labor shifts as they found employment other than domestic
work. During the war black women worked in war industries in skilled, semiskilled and clerical
positions.
The NAACP, the Negro Labor Committee (NLC), the Negro Labor Victory Committee
(NLVC) along with its Communist Party affiliated parent organization the National Negro
Congress (NNC), and most importantly the Brooklyn Urban League (BKUL) acted to exert
pressure on the management of war industries and unions that discriminated against black
workers. Through community meetings, press campaigns, cooperation with labor unions, and
anti-discrimination agencies these organizations produced the dramatic employment changes of
the era. The Brooklyn Urban League (BKUL) was the most effective organization in opening
new employment opportunities for blacks in New York City’s war industries. The BKUL
worked with the New York State Committee on Discrimination (COD) to identify war industries
engaging in discriminatory hiring practices. The organization also published reports of this
discrimination to maintain pressure on the COD to continue its investigations. In this way the
Brooklyn Urban League acted with the state to open new areas of employment to African
Americans.
The war caused lasting changes in the employment available to black men and women.
Though many of the city’s African American men were ousted from their skilled and semiskilled jobs when veterans returned from the war, not all black men were forced to return to the
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low paying service jobs they had before the war. In the five years after the war the number of
black men working in service positions had declined and increasing numbers of black men
worked in semi-skilled industrial positions, as skilled craftsmen, and in clerical jobs. Likewise,
most black women were forced from their war-time industrial jobs by the return of soldiers; but
after the war many black women worked in clerical occupations, as phone operators, and as
clerks in department stores. These better-paying positions had been closed to black women
before the war.
The patterns and practices described in Chapters 2 and 3 are examined at the micro-level
in Chapter 4. This chapter presents a case study of how one Brooklyn company that produced
scientific instruments for the Navy began hiring black workers. The Sperry Gyroscope
Corporation employed almost no African Americans before the war. By the end of the war they
employed more than one thousand African Americans and almost 60 percent of those employees
worked in skilled or semi-skilled positions.
Sperry became the focus of black protests for equal employment opportunities because it
held large government contracts to produce scientific instruments for the war but had virtually no
African American workers. The NAACP, the NUL, and the NNC all worked to pressure Sperry
to hire blacks. The initial efforts of these groups prompted Sperry management to hire its first
black workers in 1941, but African American activists continued their protests because the
company had only hired a few blacks. The NAACP, the NUL, and the NNC brought their
allegations of racial discrimination at Sperry to the attention of the local offices of the Fair
Employment Practices Committee prompting an investigation of Sperry’s hiring practices.
It was not until local offices of the FEPC and the state Committee on Discrimination
investigated Sperry’s employment practices in 1942 that the company began to hire larger
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numbers of blacks and more importantly placed them in skilled and semi-skilled positions. A
labor shortage in 1943 then prompted management to make more black hires. Though historians
have argued that the labor shortage was the primary reason for the employment of blacks in war
industries; Sperry’s case undermines this argument. Company management hired comparable
numbers of blacks in the years before and after the labor shortage. This indicates that Sperry
changed their hiring policies before the labor shortage likely in response to the FEPC and COD
investigations.
The chapter also highlights the importance of the United, Electrical, Radio, and Machine
Workers of America (UE) in facilitating black employment at Sperry. The progressive,
Communist-led union which advocated inclusion of black members took over representation of
Sperry workers in 1942 and pressed management to hire black workers as well. At the end of the
war, the UE cooperated with the Negro Labor Victory Committee to prevent lay-offs of black
industrial workers. The activities of the UE underscore the point that labor unions, as well as the
racial organizations, were important in integrating New York’s war industries.
Sperry’s case also illustrates how individuals affected the process by which industries
were integrated. The employment of blacks by Sperry changed the attitude of the company
President Thomas Morgan. He became an advocate of fair employment for blacks in Sperry as
well as in other war industries. Morgan advocated for black employment and education outside
of the company as well, extending his activism to fundraising for the United Negro College
Fund. After the war Morgan’s commitment to employing black workers prompted management
to rehire black workers late 1940s after initial post-war lay-offs.
The employment opportunities offered by companies like Sperry prompted thousands of
African Americans to move to New York during World War II and the migration permanently
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changed the composition of some communities in the city. For migrants housing was a large
concern, only second in importance to finding employment. Moreover, many migrants left the
south to escape Jim Crow and improve their quality of life. Harlem, already overcrowded, could
not hold the thousands of migrants moving to the city. Therefore, many African Americans
chose to move to other areas of the city during the 1940s. Chapter 5 of this dissertation studies
the demographic and social changes, as well as the changes in race relations resulting from the
expansion of black residency to Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn and the Morrisania section of the
Bronx. This final chapter attempts to answer many of the questions Thomas Sugrue asked about
Detroit in the post-war era. It examines the neighborhoods where blacks lived in the 1940s, by
exploring the migration’s effects on the extant center of black residency Harlem and the growing
community of blacks in Bedford-Stuyvesant and Morrisania. As Sugrue did with Detroit,
Chapter 5 studies whether there was white flight or integration in these neighborhoods and
whether whites organized to prevent blacks from moving into the new areas of black settlement.
The chapter also compares the patterns of black settlement in different areas of the city and
explores whether there was conflict between long-time residents and new black residents.
Black migrants were not confined to one area of black settlement in New York as they
were in Detroit and Richmond. Black New Yorkers and migrants alike settled in BedfordStuyvesant creating a second area of black settlement there. Middle class and in the latter half of
the decade working class blacks moved from Harlem to Morrisania as well, integrating that
neighborhood. As in Detroit, the second wave of the Great Migration caused overcrowding, high
rents, crime, and deteriorating social conditions in Harlem. These conditions prompted blacks to
settle in other areas of the city. The ability of blacks in New York to move outside of the central
area of black settlement is very different from the way blacks in “Paradise Valley” and North
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Richmond were bottled up in the black districts of those cities. Finding available housing was
not as acute a problem for blacks in New York as it was in Detroit or Richmond.
Harlemites and migrants alike looked to settle in Bedford-Stuyvesant because of the war
jobs available in close proximity. Moreover, a small black population already lived in the area
which attracted more African Americans. Bedford-Stuyvesant was less crowded than Harlem and
had better housing, two of the primary reasons blacks moved there. Furthermore, the area was
easily accessible from Harlem because of the new train line directly connecting the two
neighborhoods. Thousands of working class and middle class blacks moved to the neighborhood
and by the end of the 1940s Bedford-Stuyvesant was called “Little Harlem” because it was the
second central area of black settlement in the city. The name was even more accurate because
the condition of blacks in the neighborhood increasingly resembled the condition of those living
in Harlem. Landlords began to charge higher rents of new black tenants in Bedford-Stuyvesant,
housing in the area became overcrowded, real estate values plummeted, and crime levels
increased. All of these factors prompted white flight from the neighborhood. But some whites
would not leave without a fight.
As in Detroit during the 1940s, Bedford-Stuyvesant whites organized in opposition to
black settlement. Monsignor John Belford, a priest at the Roman Catholic Church of the
Nativity, led white protests against increased crime in the neighborhood. He embarked on a
public campaign against black residency by publishing articles in his parish newspaper and the
Brooklyn Eagle highlighting the ignorant and destructive character of blacks migrating to the
area. He blamed blacks, and southern migrants in particular, for crime and vice. The Midtown
Civic League, led by Sumner Sirtl, became the primary organization fighting decreasing property
values in Bedford-Stuyvesant. The organization used numerous tactics to try to stop black
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settlement in Bedford-Stuyvesant and in 1943 pressured the King’s County Grand Jury to
investigate the condition of blacks living in Brooklyn, primarily in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area.
The Grand Jury reported a general sense of lawlessness in Bedford-Stuyvesant detailing the
various types of crime plaguing the area. The activities of the Midtown Civic League, Father
Belford, and the Grand Jury investigation drew public attention to the deteriorating conditions in
Bedford-Stuyvesant prompting whites to associate black residency in the area with crime. This
precipitated white flight from the neighborhood.
Despite the racial tension, higher rents, and deteriorating housing in Bedford-Stuyvesant,
blacks still considered the area an attractive place to live in the 1940s. The borough’s more
modern housing and industrial job opportunities continued to attract middle and working class
blacks from Harlem and the south. The continued settlement of blacks in Bedford-Stuyvesant
and the social effects it created precipitated white flight from the area and by the end of the
1940s the formerly white neighborhood was predominately inhabited by African Americans.
Black families from Harlem also moved to the Bronx in the 1940s to escape high rents
and overcrowding. During the war these families settled in present-day Morrisania in the
southwest Bronx. Most of the families who moved were members of the black middle class.
Very often these families had the economic means to move because black men were hired as
postal workers or Pullman porters. Some of the earliest black residents of Morrisania could not
find apartments due to discrimination. Often the families that did move to the area were able to
find apartments because the men of those households worked as superintendents in Morrisania
buildings.
The majority of Harlemites that moved to the Bronx were looking for better living
conditions. Parents moved their families to the area because of the abundance of better housing,
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fresher air, more parks, and better schools. Many blacks believed that settling in Morrisania
would provide a better quality of life for themselves and their children. Morrisania represented a
step up not just in their living conditions but in their social status as well.
In the 1940s some of the white residents of Morrisania had left the area for newer and
more modern housing in the upper Bronx. This left apartments vacant for blacks to occupy.
However many of the white working-class population of the neighborhood did not have the
economic means to move to emerging middle-class neighborhoods in the upper Bronx and had to
stay in Morrisania. African Americans living in the Crotona Park section, as the area was then
known, were quite proud of the fact that they lived in an integrated neighborhood. Integrated
neighborhoods were not common in cities across the country in the 1940s. In fact the growing
black populations in Detroit, Los Angeles, and Chicago found themselves even more hemmed
into distinct black districts as those cities became more rigidly segregated. The residents of
Morrisania, both black and white, worked together to foster a sense of unity resulting in very
little racial conflict in the area. Perhaps the fact that both populations tended to be employed and
the Harlemites resettling in the area were mostly families; fostered good relations between the
different races and ethnicities living there.
As in Bedford-Stuyvesant some negative effects accompanied black settlement in the
area. Higher rents and increasing crime and juvenile delinquency levels accompanied increasing
black residency. Moreover the social and recreational organizations in the area were not
sufficient to deal with the expanding black population. These affects caused the area’s white
residents to look for new places to live. More affluent black residents of Morrisania were also
unhappy with the social effects of increased migration from Harlem, especially towards the latter
half of the 1940s. These black middle class residents complained about higher rents, increased
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crime, and more visible vice in the neighborhood as working class blacks began to move to the
area. Despite these complaints, both middle and working class blacks believed living in
Morrisania was a much better alternative to living in Harlem. Black churches and other
organizations attempted to provide social services that would address the problems emerging as a
result of black settlement in the area.
Through this dissertation I hope to add complexity to the story of the effects of the
migration in urban areas and reveal how the migration contributed to the creation of modern
cities for the second half of the 20th Century. The activism of civil rights organizations in the
city pressured the state and federal government to establish fair employment legislation and
agencies which looked into allegations of discrimination by war industries. Continued civil
rights agitation and the investigations of the FEPC and COD prompted companies with
government contracts to hire black workers providing them with better paying industrial jobs and
expanding the occupations open to African Americans. These advances carried over into the
post-war period as blacks found jobs on white collar, clerical and skilled industrial positions after
the war. The Silent Arrival also presents a revision of the history of New York City as it
considers the creation of black neighborhoods outside of Harlem in the 1940s, a process has yet
to be treated on its own terms in historical works. Moreover, I hope that this examination of
New York in the World War II era will complicate the story of urban decline in cities to show
that the 1940s was not merely a decade creating the conditions for ghettoization of black
neighborhoods in urban areas, but was an era of opportunity for New York’s blacks –
opportunity to improve their jobs prospects, their economic standing, and their living conditions.
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Chapter 1
A Shifting Population:
Black Population Growth and the Creation of Alternative African American Communities

The 1940s was a decade of mobility for African Americans as approximately 1.5 million
blacks moved out of the south to take advantage of better employment opportunities in war
industries in the North and West. Approximately 150,000 blacks moved to Detroit and more
than 200,000 moved to Chicago between 1940 and 1950. There was little provision made for
migrants of any color during the war and the increased population resulted in housing shortages,
racial antagonisms and, after the war, job competition. Nearly 350,000 African Americans chose
to move westward to work in the newly established defense factories on the West Coast. This
new black migration to Los Angeles and the Oakland area created new black communities. As
the population of blacks increased, whites responded by establishing more stringent social,
political, and economic restrictions on all black residents. Most importantly there were housing
shortages in these California cities and African Americans were confined to overcrowded and
declining neighborhoods.20
New York City, was part of these larger migratory trends. Approximately 200,000 blacks
moved from the South to New York during the 1940s. Many of these new migrants initially
settled in Harlem, already by that time the most famous northern center for black settlement.
Like Detroit, Harlem became overcrowded, black residents were charged higher rents, and there
20
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was competition for housing. African Americans in New York, however, were not confined to
Harlem. There was already a black community in Brooklyn and many more migrants joined
them to take advantage of newly available jobs in the city’s war industries, several of which
were in that borough. Two of the city’s largest manufacturing plants, Sperry Gyroscope Inc. and
the New York Navy Yard, were located in Brooklyn and hired blacks. The migrants who moved
to Brooklyn settled in Bedford-Stuyvesant, an area where a small black middle class community
already resided.21 In the 1940s Bedford-Stuyvesant became the second area of black settlement
in the city. Middle and working class blacks also moved northward from Harlem to the Bronx,
integrating neighborhoods in present-day Morrisania. These new black residents of Morrisania
were not new migrants, but had been living in Harlem. Many long-time Harlem residents moved
to Morrisania in search of better living conditions. At the beginning of the decade the Bronx was
overwhelmingly white with very few African Americans living in the borough. As the decade
progressed Morrisania became an integrated multi-ethnic, multi-racial neighborhood. There,
blacks were able to escape the overcrowding of Harlem in larger apartments with more room,
and more fresh air.
Histories of New York City have mentioned the fact that thousands of southern African
Americans migrated to the city during the Second World War. However, the historical work
lacks analysis of the social characteristics of this group, and the neighborhoods and districts in
which they settled.

Black mobility throughout the Nation
The flow of African American migrants entering New York City during the 1940s was
part of a larger movement of peoples throughout the country. Overall the United States
21
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population was moving from rural areas to urban industrialized ones during the war years to take
advantage of employment opportunities in factories in need of personnel to accommodate the
increased production demands of the war. According to historian Richard Polenberg people
were generally moving “from the country to city, from south to north, and from east to west.” 22
The Southern agricultural economy had changed dramatically since the 1930s as a result of New
Deal legislation. Crop reduction during the depression, as well as mechanization of farming
through the adoption of tractors, harvesters and sprayers reduced the need for black rural
workers. The lack of work in the south and the new availability of industrial jobs prompted
blacks living in the rural south to migrate. Furthermore, the Jim Crow system and potential
violence at the hands of whites contributed to the factors pushing African Americans to leave the
south.
From 1938 through 1950 the federal government promoted economic growth in the south
through federal legislation. In the latter stages of the New Deal program, President Franklin
Roosevelt focused his attention on industrializing the Southern economy which he saw as the
most “backward” and “underdeveloped” in the nation. According to historian Bruce Schulman,
the Roosevelt administration “decrying the South’s economic backwardness and political
conservatism,…launched a series of aggressive programs to reorder the southern economy.”23 In
1937 the South’s per capita income was half of the standard of the rest of the nation. The South
registered the nation’s lowest industrial wages, farm income, and tangible assets. Sickness,
misery and unnecessary death were a direct effect of low farm and industrial wages in the region.
Southern farms and businesses lacked mechanization, employed labor intensive modes of
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production, and lacked access to capital. The federal government saw industrialization as a way
to end southern poverty.
Tenants and sharecroppers, many of whom were black, suffered the most from the
failures of southern agriculture. They confronted deep and desperate poverty and suffered the
machinations of powerful landlords. One of the methods tenants and sharecroppers used to
escape this situation was migration. During the Depression the economic situation became much
more grave. Bruce Schulmann wrote, “The initial blows of the Depression hit hardest in the
South, collapsing the already fragile foundation of many southerners’ subsistence.” The region
for decades had resisted federal intervention in favor of states’ rights, even at the expense of
economic development. However the Depression injured the economy so badly, southern people
and their leaders who had rejected government assistance looked to the federal government for
relief. 24
Government efforts to rehabilitate the southern economy had ambiguous effects on
blacks’ situation in the South. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) transformed
southern agriculture at the expense of tenant farmers and farm laborers. The legislation reduced
the amount of acreage in production, replaced southern tenants with wage laborers, and
mechanized farm work. The implementation of these measures reduced the number of blacks
farmers needed in southern agriculture and black sharecroppers and tenant farmers were
displaced.25
The displacement of black farm and industrial workers, Jim Crow laws, and threats of
violence motivated African Americans to migrate to other areas in the country. These dynamics
stimulated black movement out of the south as many looked to improve their lives. This

24
25

Ibid, 14.
Ibid., 21-30.

30
movement did not occur in the 1930s because there were few jobs available in the north for
blacks then. World War II provided industrial opportunities for southern blacks looking to leave
a stagnant economy that had less and less of a place for them. These better paying jobs attracted
them to Northern and Western areas. Even in the years after the war, when job growth in the
North ebbed, the flow of blacks out of the south continued as mechanization on southern farms
caused further displacement of black agricultural labor and shrinking economic opportunities of
southern African Americans.
Millions of Americans in northern cities, both black and white, had migrated at some
point from the south. Approximately five million people born in the south, or ten percent of the
population, were in 1950 living in northern cities. One million people born in southern areas
migrated north between 1940 and 1950.26 The migration of both black and white southerners to
northern and western communities during the World War II era was part of a long continual
process of relocation that had been taking place since the First World War. Both New York
State and New York City were recipients of migrants from southern areas.
During the 1940s New York City’s general population increased but the African
American population increased at a higher rate than the white population. The black population
rose from 458,444 people to 749,080, an increase of 63.4 percent while in general the city
population increased 5.8 percent and the white population increased by 1.90 percent.27 By 1950
African Americans comprised 9.49 percent of the city population in comparison to 6.14 percent
in 1940. The black population in the entire New York metropolitan area (including portions of
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New Jersey) increased by 56.6 percent between 1940 and 1950.28 State statistics were similar to
the city. Between 1940 and 1950 New York State’s population decreased overall, the net loss
amounting to 34,000 people; however the non-white population29 increased by 477,685
residents.30 During the 1940s the numbers of African Americans in the city increased, but more
importantly the proportion of the population that was black increased at a rate much faster than
the white population of the city, evidence that this increase was due to in-migration.

Table 1: Population of Whites and Blacks in New York City 1940-1950
White
White
White
Black
Black
population population Change population population
1940
1950
1940
1950
New York
749,080
7,110,275
6,977,501
+1.90% 458,444
City
% of total
93.6%
city
population

90.2%

- 3.4%

6.1%

9.5%

Black
Change

+63.4%
+ 3.4%

The largest number of migrants of all races into New York State came from the south.
Most of the New York state population, 10,389,085, were native to the Middle Atlantic area
(New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania).31 By 1950 the largest number of residents born out
of state came from the south Atlantic - Virginia, Maryland, South Carolina, North Carolina,
Georgia, and Florida. Over a half million people (531,465) had migrated from these states. The
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largest number of migrants came from South Carolina (124,460), followed by North Carolina
(104,895), Virginia (103,560), Georgia (77,955), Florida (44,005) and Maryland (35,725).32
Very similarly to the case of the general population, in New York State most out-of-state
born African American residents came from the south Atlantic region. The state’s total nonwhite
male population equaled 403,175 of which 49.34 percent was from the south, 42.29 percent from
the north east, 1.87 percent originally hailed from north central states, and .63 percent from
western states. Of the southern states contributing nonwhite male migrants over the years South
Carolina added the most people to the state population (48,225), followed by North Carolina
(38,010) and Virginia (31,835).33 As for nonwhite females, of a total 477,205 54.53 percent
were from the south, 38.31 percent were born in the north east, 1.65 percent hailed from the
north central, and .37 percent migrated from the west. Most non-white women originally born in
other states came from South Carolina (66,900), followed by North Carolina (50,505), and
Virginia (47,685). These figures illustrate that the largest proportion of nonwhite men and
women in New York State migrated north from southern areas. Most of these migrants came
from South Carolina, North Carolina and Virginia.34 Since 85 percent the African American
population of New York State (749,080 of 880,380 people) lived in New York City at the time of
the 1950 census, it is logical that the above proportions are similar for New York City’s Negro
population as well.
The census for 1950 does not provide direct information on the nativity of African
Americans living in New York City; however the 1940 census does provide this information for
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the years 1935 to 1940. In that study it shows that most African American men and women who
migrated from other areas to New York City between 1935 and 1940 were from southern states,
most coming from South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia in descending order.35 These
migratory trends most probably carried over into the next decade especially as the flow of black
migrants to the city increased after the start of World War II.
The largest increase of the population of African Americans was among people ages 2529 throughout New York City, as well as in Manhattan, Brooklyn and Bronx boroughs,
indicating that most migrants were in this age range. In New York City the number of African
Americans between the ages of 25 and 29 increased by 33,812 persons. In Manhattan the
increase was 12,112 people, in Brooklyn 13,371, and in the Bronx 8,480. This was true for both
men and women in those same boroughs, as well as New York City overall.36 The higher
proportion of single blacks to black families living in Manhattan suggests that many of these
migrants were single.37
Through further inspection of the statistics it is possible to ascertain the sex of many of
the migrants. African American females seemed to be moving to the city in greater numbers
than black males. This discrepancy was perhaps due, in part, to black males being overseas for
military duty during World War II and later the Korean War. Perhaps the available jobs in the
city’s women’s industries in New York also attracted more women to migrate. The Negro
female population in New York City as a whole consistently increased more than the male
population in each age group. In 1950 there were 159,503 more females in the city than in 1940.
In comparison there were 131,133 more males in New York in 1950 than there were in 1940.
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Therefore though the population of both males and females increased, there was an addition of
28,400 more women than men.38 Though there was a general increase in the population of
blacks citywide and in the boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn and Manhattan, it is clear that the
population of black women increased more quickly than that of men. Perhaps New York
attracted more females than other industrial cities with heavy industry which generally employed
males.
Other demographic factors must be considered. Because the white population of New
York was much larger than that of the black population, small percentage increases in the white
population represented a much larger number of people than percentage increases in the black
population. Furthermore, there was much white migration out of the city. Still, the large
discrepancy in the rate of growth between these two groups indicates an influx in the Negro
population from outside areas. It is not probable that natural increase could produce such a
marked increase in the number of African Americans in New York, particularly in Manhattan,
Brooklyn, and the Bronx, over a ten year period.
The statistics prove that the sharp increase in black population in New York indicated
migration. These migrants came from the South Atlantic states of Virginia, North Carolina, and
South Carolina. Most were young people in their 20s no doubt looking for opportunities to
improve their working and living conditions.

Harlem: New York’s Continuing Black Mecca
In Manhattan, where the largest population of African Americans in New York resided,
there was a marked increase in the number of Negroes between 1940 and 1950. The black
population increased by 35.24 percent from 298,365 to 403,502. This increase was much higher
38
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than that of the general or white populations in the borough. The general population increased
from 1,888,942 to 1,960,101 or by 3.77 percent and the white population actually decreased from
1,577,625 to 1,556,599 a loss of 1.33 percent. By 1950 African Americans were 20.58 percent
of Manhattan’s population in comparison to 15.79 percent a decade earlier. The proportion of
whites in Manhattan’s population fell from 83.5 percent to 79.4 percent.39 The gains in black
population were due to migration.

Table 2: Population of Whites and Blacks in Manhattan 1940-1950
Black
Black
White
White
White
population population Change population population
1950
1940
1950
1940
403,502
1,556,599
Manhattan 1,577,625
-1.33% 298,365
% of total
borough
population

83.5%

79.4%

- 4.1

15.8%

20.6%

Black
Change
+35.24%
+ 4.8

Negro population of central Harlem was very transient during the War years. African
Americans who lived in Harlem moved to other boroughs during the war. Therefore the actual
migration into the area, taking into account those who were also leaving, was much larger than
statistics showed.40
Most of Harlem’s new black residents came from southern states. A survey of out-ofstate students in two school districts of central Harlem and white Washington Heights make this
point clear. In comparing the composition of the student population in each district from July to
October 1945, the Urban League found that migration in the black districts was four times that of
the upper Washington Heights section. Furthermore it was found that the majority of pupils
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moving into the central Harlem districts were from South Carolina and North Carolina, with
Florida, Georgia, Virginia and New Jersey also contributing many. 41 These findings
complement the information provided by the census as to the origin of increase of African
American interstate migrants to New York.
The increasing African American population in Manhattan remained concentrated in
overwhelmingly black neighborhoods, like Harlem. In the areas of Manhattan where blacks
resided there were very few whites. These areas, each of which was in or directly adjacent to
central Harlem, retained these population characteristics during the 1940s. In all but three of the
tracts where African Americans were the majority, the number of black residents increased from
1940 to 1950.42 Very few areas with a majority of white residents experienced a dramatic
increase of black residents during the 1940s. There were six in total, three of which were in
central Harlem and the other three in northern sections of Harlem from 146th Street to 153rd
Street along the Hudson River.43 Though more and more blacks moved into Manhattan, the
areas blacks could live in did not. Black residents in the borough remained confined to central
Harlem and its adjacent areas although in a few adjacent white areas, the number of blacks
increased. The growing black population would strain the already overcrowded and dilapidated
housing in the area.
Like the city in general, the largest number of migrants moving to the area were between
the ages of 25 and 29. The second largest groups of migrants however differed from the city
population in general. In Manhattan the age group with the second largest population increase
was 20 to 24 year olds.44 Unlike other areas in the city, in Manhattan a relatively equal number
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of men and women entered the city. Statistically, the increase in the number of men
outnumbered that of women by only a small margin, 799 persons.45 The relatively young age of
African Americans moving into Manhattan suggest those migrating were young adults in their
20s.
The black population was confined to Central Harlem because of white resistance.
Whites living in Washington Heights (168th northward to 181st Streets) and upper Harlem fought
black settlement in their neighborhoods. Property damage, vandalism, and racial slurs were
some of the tactics disgruntled whites used to discourage black families from moving into their
communities in Washington Heights.46 The resistance was successful as black population in
Manhattan remained primarily confined in Central Harlem.
As a consequence of the southern migration, Harlem’s population continued to rise
ultimately straining the housing and community facilities in the area. If blacks were blocked
from moving north, they did move to black enclaves in other boroughs. Most black migrants
initially settled in Harlem, the first area of settlement for the majority of migrants.47 Because
Harlem could not accommodate all the migrants entering Manhattan, many African Americans
moved to other boroughs like Brooklyn and the Bronx. Bedford- Stuyvesant quickly became the
second principal area populated by African Americans in New York in the 1940s.
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Bedford Stuyvesant: The second area of black settlement
The most striking increase of African Americans took place in Brooklyn. That borough’s
black population almost doubled, rising to 213,057 in 1950 from a population of 107,253 in
1940. This is in comparison to a general population that increased from 2,698,285 to 2,738,175,
a difference of only 1.48 percent and a white population that decreased from 2,587,951 to
2,525,118, a loss of 2.43 percent. Brooklyn’s Negro population in 1950 comprised 7.78 percent
of the county population in comparison to 3.97 percent in 1940. 48 As in Manhattan, the increase
in blacks in Brooklyn’s population far outpaced white growth in the borough.

Table 3: Population of Whites and Blacks in Brooklyn 1940-1950
White
White
White
Black
Black
population population Change population population
1940
1950
1940
1950
2,587,951
2,525,118
213,057
Brooklyn
- 2.43% 107,253
% of total
95.9%
borough
population

92.2%

- 3.7

4%

7.8%

Black
Change
+98.65%
+ 3.8

As in Manhattan, most African American migrants to Brooklyn were between the ages of
25 and 29. However there were some subtle differences. In Brooklyn the 30 to 34 year olds
experienced the second largest population increase and 20 to 24 year olds had the third largest
amount of increase in Brooklyn and the Bronx. 49 Moreover the gender composition of the new
black population in Brooklyn differed from that in Manhattan. The black female population
increased by approximately 5,400 more than the increase of the population of black males.50
This was a statistically marginal difference with regard to the 100,000 person increase in the
black population of Brooklyn; but it is notable that the gender distribution was more skewed than
48
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that of Manhattan. The increase in the population of both sexes was significant. The number of
black men and women residing in the borough almost doubled and many of those new residents
were young men and women many of whom would find increasing employment opportunities in
Brooklyn’s war production factories.
There were expanding job prospects for black men and women in the most important war
industries in the city. Some of the largest war production plants, including the Brooklyn Navy
Yard and Sperry Corporation, accepted African Americans in various positions. Though some of
these positions were often the lowest paying in the factory, black men and women would receive
higher pay than they could doing janitorial, domestic, or farm work in the South. In addition to
job openings in war industries, black women were also able to find better paying clerical and
retail positions as white women vacated them for well-paid skilled and semi-skilled employment
in war industries.51 The availability of higher-paying jobs in war industries as well as clerical
and retail positions for black women served as a compelling pull factor attracting southern
African American migrants to New York.
The fact that the largest increases in the black population in Brooklyn during the 1940s
were people between the ages of 20 and 29 does not seem to be coincidence. Harlem during this
era was very overcrowded and had been since the first wave of black migration during World
War I. Furthermore, the majority of New York City’s war industries were in the outer boroughs
(Brooklyn and Queens) and Long Island. The Navy Yard and the Sperry Gyroscope Company,
both located in Brooklyn, were major war-time employers in the city which would attract black
workers.
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The Bronx: Moving Away from the Hustle and Bustle
Though the increase of African Americans in Brooklyn skyrocketed, there was evidence
that blacks were moving into the other boroughs of New York. The Bronx, previously an
overwhelmingly white county, experienced an influx of black residents. The population of
African Americans in that borough more than tripled in the 1940s, increasing from 23,529 in
1940 to 99,615 by 1950, an increase of 323.37 percent. Like Manhattan and Brooklyn, the
increase of black residents in the Bronx far outpaced the increase of white residents in that area.
Between 1940 and 1950 the white population of the Bronx increased by only 1.56 percent, from
1,370,319 people to a population of 1,391,662.52 Though the increase in the number of blacks
moving into the Bronx was significant, the main areas of black settlement were Manhattan and
Brooklyn during the 1940s. Most of the early black residents that settled in the Bronx were
middle class blacks relocating from Harlem for more space and quieter streets, not migrants from
the south.53

Table 4: Population of Whites and Blacks in the Bronx 1940-1950
White
White
White
Black
Black
population population Change population population
1940
1950
1940
1950
1,370,319
1,391,662
99,615
Bronx
+1.56% 23,529
% of total
98.3%
90.3%
1.7%
6.5%
borough
-8
population
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Black
Change
+323.37%
+4.8
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The characteristics of blacks moving to the Bronx were more like those of blacks settling
in Brooklyn. As in Manhattan and Brooklyn, the largest number of blacks moving to the Bronx
were 25 to 29 years of age. As in Brooklyn the 30 to 34 year olds experienced the second largest
population increase and 20 to 24 year olds had the third largest amount of increase in the
Bronx.54 As in Brooklyn, more black women than men moved to the Bronx. Of the 76,086 more
blacks living in the Bronx by 1950 the population of African American women in the borough
increased by 6,250 more than the population of men.55 These numbers show that during the
1940s the largest group of people to move to the Bronx was young women.
Many African Americans moving into the Bronx during the war years did so to escape
the high rents in Harlem. The area of the Bronx with the largest population of African
Americans, 161st Street to 169th Street and from Franklin to Prospect Avenues, experienced an
increase in population from 3,000 in 1939 to a projected 30,000 by 1942. At the time, it was
estimated that 200 families moved to this area each month from Harlem, therefore the migration
of blacks was secondary migration within the city not direct migration from southern states.56
The west Bronx from Crotona Park south to 161st Street between Webster and Prospect
Avenues in the present-day Morrisania section housed the majority of the new black Bronxites.57
As the black population increased the white population did not significantly decrease, creating
integrated neighborhoods. This was unusual for demographic trends of the day. Most urban
areas in other cities that experienced black settlement also experienced white flight as an almost
immediate response creating segregated black neighborhoods. This was not the case in
Morrisania in the 1940s. Perhaps this was due to the middle class stature of the blacks moving
54
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into the neighborhood but it was more likely due to the limits of whites’ finances to move to the
new middle class developments being built in the upper Bronx. It should be noted that some
whites left the area as neighborhoods that were previously all white became predominately
African American but it is not clear from the statistics alone whether the whites left the area
before or after blacks began to move in.58 Maybe the fact that, in comparison to Brooklyn,
relatively few blacks moved into the Bronx kept whites from fleeing Morrisania.
There seemed to be relatively little racial tension as blacks moved into Morrisania. A
reporter for the Amsterdam News described Morrisania as being a veritable melting pot, with
Italians, Jews, Germans, Poles, Irish, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans living all together with blacks,
all getting along “remarkably well.”59 The lack of racial conflict was likely due to the marked
efforts by middle-class blacks already living in the Bronx to prevent many of the social problems
such as juvenile delinquency and crime present in Harlem.60 In any event, the effects of the
movement of blacks into the Bronx played out quite differently from what happened in
Manhattan and Brooklyn, and in many other cities across the country. Integrated neighborhoods
and relative racial harmony were not typical outcomes of the demographic changes of the 1940s.

Conclusion
Through examination of the census it is clear that African Americans were migrating into
New York City. The Negro population measured as the percentage of the total population in the
city increased much faster than the white population during the 1940s.

The large difference in

the rate of increase most likely is due to emigration from outside areas into the city. The
probable age and sex of the migrants can also be ascertained from census data. The largest group
58

See Table 1.15 in the Appendix.
“Inside Story on How Bronx Rivals Harlem,” Amsterdam News, July 3, 1943, 3.
60
Ibid, 19.
59

43
of blacks migrating to New York in the 1940s was between the ages of 20 and 34; and most were
women. These women found job opportunities in the city’s many war industries during the war.
Most of these migrants came from states in the South Atlantic region just as they had during the
first wave of the Great Migration. Most of the migrants moved from South Carolina, North
Carolina, and Virginia to New York City.
During the 1940s the distribution of blacks in the city changed. Due to the migration and
resulting increase in the city’s black population, new areas of black settlement emerged. Harlem
continued to be the largest and most famous black neighborhood, but due to overcrowding in
Harlem Bedford-Stuyvesant became the second major area of African American settlement in the
city. The majority of the African Americans who moved to Brooklyn during the 1940s settled in
the Bedford- Stuyvesant neighborhood. The migration transformed that section of Brooklyn
from a predominately white community to an African American community.61 By 1945 central
Brooklyn had become “the primary locale of nonwhite residency in the borough” and the place
where most of those who were entering the borough settled down. 62 So many blacks moved into
Bedford Stuyvesant that newspapers began to refer to Bedford- Stuyvesant as “Little Harlem.”
In addition to these central areas of black settlement, blacks moved into new areas like
the South Central Bronx. Harlemites began moving to the ethnically mixed neighborhood in
present-day Morrisania where a small number of middle class blacks resided. Some whites
abandoned the area both before and after the black migration but for the most part the
neighborhood remained integrated. Though the number of blacks in total in the Bronx remained
low, black settlement in this area significantly changed the complexion of the neighborhood.

61

See Table 1.11 and Figures 1.2 and 1.3 in Appendix.
Craig Steven Wilder, A Covenant with Color: Race and Social Power in Brooklyn (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2000), 177.

62

44
The creation of multiple areas of black settlement in the boroughs of New York made the
racial spatial arrangement this city very different than in others. As blacks migrated into Detroit,
Chicago, and Los Angeles, new residents were forced to live in one black community.
Overcrowding, declining living conditions, and increased crime resulted from the migration.
This arguably caused more intense competition over space and access to community resources.
Perhaps the creation of a black neighborhood outside of Harlem and the dispersal of New York’s
increasing black population into other boroughs prevented widespread racial violence from
breaking out in New York during the war.
The expansion of employment opportunities for blacks in New York during the war was
most probably a motivation for blacks to migrate and settle in New York City. It is no surprise
that many of those migrating to the city settled in Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant. Harlem had
served as the center of black residence in the city since the 1910s and black migrants continued
to settle there. Brooklyn was the site of many of the employment opportunities newly opened to
black New Yorkers. Many of the major war employers had plants in Brooklyn and there
growing numbers of jobs became available to blacks. The expanding job opportunities available
in the Manhattan and Brooklyn attracted migrants and changed the employment landscape and
financial opportunities not only for black newcomers from the south, but for all blacks New
Yorkers.
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Chapter 2
Opening Opportunities:
Collaboration between Black Organizations and Fair Employment Agencies

World War II ushered in important changes in the type of jobs open to African
Americans. Before the war most African Americans in urban areas held low-paying service jobs
or worked as farmers in the south. At the start of World War II in the cities of the Midwest and
West, notably Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Oakland, the jobs in most factories were
closed to blacks. This changed after President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 in 1941
prohibiting discriminatory hiring practices by defense industries. Some industries which had
excluded blacks, like the aircraft and shipbuilding industries, hired black workers only after the
Fair Employment Practices Committee was established. A labor shortage in 1943 also caused
employers to begin to relax the bars to hiring and unions found it more difficult to maintain
restrictive policies.63 Many of the war-time employment trends in New York fit that trajectory.
During the early years of the war New York did not have large war production plants that
could easily convert for the production of war goods. Therefore the city’s industries received
few contracts in the first two years of the war. There were few job openings in most war
industries and a labor surplus in the city. By and large black New Yorkers did not find industrial
employment in the first two years of the conflict. Unlike other cities where factories were
immediately converted or built for war production, it was not just discrimination that prevented
blacks from getting jobs.
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Despite the tight labor market African American civil rights activists protested for
industrial jobs for blacks at the onset of war. They wanted what they viewed was a fair share of
the few jobs that were available in war industries for black workers. Advocating for fair
employment became the focus of several civil rights organizations including the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Urban League. These organizations
led protests to the headquarters of some of the city’s largest war-time employers, but these early
initiatives were ineffective.
Given the limited success of black activists’ efforts to pressure companies to hire African
Americans, black organizations began to focus their agitation on the government. The March on
Washington Movement was one of the principle organizations to undertake this type of activity
and successfully pressured President Roosevelt to establish the Fair Employment Practices
Committee to investigate companies accused of discrimination. Local offices of the NAACP and
Urban League pressured the New York State government to pass legislation prohibiting
discriminatory hiring practices by companies with government contracts.
In 1941 the New York State Assembly prohibited discrimination against black workers in
war industries and created a Committee on Discrimination in Employment in the New York State
War Council. During the war the Committee on Discrimination (COD) investigated hiring and
employment practices in war industries, and worked with the regional offices of the United
States Employment Service (USES), the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), and the
War Manpower Commission (WMC) to see that war industries adhered to anti-discrimination
legislation. The COD also worked in conjunction with organizations focused on improving
black employment, most importantly the Brooklyn Urban League, to expand the number and
type of jobs open to black New Yorkers.
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The passage of federal and state legislation outlawing discrimination in war industries in
1941 and the enforcement of this legislation by state agencies also prompted some war industries
to stop discriminatory hiring practices. During the early war years, African Americans were
able to find employment in skilled and semi-skilled industrial positions never before open to
black workers. The new jobs blacks found in war industries represented a definite and
significant change which continued and increased after a labor shortage in 1943.

No Conversion, No Jobs, No Place for Negroes: New York City War Production 1941-42
Whether blacks obtained new jobs was initially a function of New York’s labor market,
which was not too friendly in the early years of the war. As the nation’s economy geared up for
war and President Roosevelt moved the country towards supporting the Allies through the Lend
Lease program in March, 1941, the seemingly far away conflict impacted the American
economy. New York’s industries were difficult to convert to war time production and the city
received few production contracts from the government. Most of the factories in New York were
small scale factories that could not be converted into the large-scale factories needed to produce
war goods. To organize the growing economy and to ensure that it produced the goods needed
for war, the federal government created mobilization agencies which purchased or arranged for
the military to purchase goods, closely directed those goods' manufacture, and heavily influenced
the operation of private companies and whole industries. The government also curtailed
production destined for civilians. Moreover these agencies rationed steel, aluminum, copper, and
cotton which were needed to produce military goods to ensure their availability for war
industries.
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The New York area was primarily a producer of nondurable consumer goods with more
than a third of factories and industrial workers producing apparel.64 Moreover the majority of
New York’s factories had to decrease production because of a shortage of materials which were
increasingly being consumed by war production. This resulted in a decrease in the number of
manufacturing jobs in the metropolitan area. The factories that did convert to war production did
not use the same workers it previously employed because they did not have the technical skills
required.
Higher employment rates in New York City during 1941 were an effect of recovery from
the Depression, not increased war production. The 65 percent increase in job placement by the
New York State Employment Service (NYSES), the state government’s apparatus for helping the
unemployed find positions in state sponsored or supported firms and offices, seemed to indicate
an improved economy in 1941. Those placements, however, were in mostly non-manufacturing
positions.65 Moreover, unemployment rates increased as well. Layoffs due to conversion of
civilian plants to wartime production, for which some workers were not qualified, was part of the
reason for the increasing number of unemployed New Yorkers. An unexpected drop in
consumer buying caused plants that produced consumer goods to lay off workers as well.
Government restrictions on the use of building materials also caused unemployment among
construction workers. More than 50,000 workers in the building and construction sectors were
unemployed at the end of 1941 with little prospect of work unless they could be absorbed by
other industries or find jobs outside of the city. A government proposed cut back on use of
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cotton textiles due to the redirection of cotton to war production prompted fears of more layoffs
and dislocations in the apparel industry.66
The shortage of manufacturing jobs continued through the first half of 1942. In the midst
of the wartime employment boom and the mounting demand for manpower state-wide, New
York City was considered a “black spot” where thousands of skilled and unskilled workers were
unemployed. The city’s factory, construction, trade, and service workers continued to
experience dislocation and unemployment as a result of materials shortages due to rationing,
military priorities, and curtailment orders. Of the 3.5 million employed New Yorkers, only
300,000 were engaged directly in war production while another 300,000 were unemployed.
Among the city’s factories, the apparel trades constituted a third of the establishments and
workers. Materials shortages and uncertainty of factory owners on government controls caused
owners to fire some workers.67 Moreover, credit curtailment, higher taxes, and purchasing of
war bonds caused the purchasing power of New Yorkers, and thus retail sales, to decrease.68 The
demand for labor in the city’s construction sector in 1942 was still far below normal, but
employment for skilled construction workers improved slightly. The supply of skilled
construction workers declined as workers migrated to other areas where work was readily
available, reducing the labor surplus in that sector. Moreover some construction workers
converted their knowledge and training to industrial skills which further reduced the surplus.
Unemployment was much higher for unskilled construction workers.69
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One reason New York City experienced difficulties converting to war production was the
nature of city factories. Establishments were small in size, employing on average only nineteen
workers. Typically war production required large-scale operations and highly specialized and
integrated management.70 Thus, New York City could not be like Detroit, which had large auto
factories which could be converted. Considering the state of the labor market in New York City
and the general unavailability of jobs, it is little surprise that African Americans were not
considered for the few war jobs available in 1941 and 1942.

Finding a “Place for Negroes”: Pressure for Fair Employment Legislation
In spite of the general lack of war contracts and jobs in New York, the city’s blacks
mobilized to protest for equal employment opportunity. Some organizations and black leaders
used the press to voice their opinions and gather support. Others took to the streets with protests,
mass meetings, and rallies. Before the Great Depression, organizations like the Urban League
tried to convince employers to hire blacks. But now these requests were powered by mass
protests and legislation. Targets widened too. Initially the targets were managers of war
industries, but black protest expanded to state and federal government. Black activists in New
York pushed the state and federal government to create and enforce legislation outlawing
discriminatory hiring practices by industries with war contracts.
Economic activism was an outgrowth of protests in New York City during the
Depression. Black New Yorkers felt the Depression most sharply as unemployment rates for
African Americans were double that of whites in the city. The problems blacks faced in the
1920s had not been jobs, but the Great Depression changed all of that. As unemployment levels
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rose, the political activity of individuals, churches, philanthropic and social uplift organizations
came together around the issue of employment. Whether the organizations worked together, or
at cross-purposes, these Harlem groups tried to improve economic opportunities for the city’s
African Americans. In the absence of laws prohibiting discriminatory hiring in industry, black
political action was the critical force in gaining skilled and white-collar positions during the
Depression. Numerous Harlem organizations turned their energy toward this struggle, relying on
activism from the Harlem community. The campaign participants used mass protests, strikes,
and boycotts as its most important weapons.71 No longer did blacks meekly petition employers.
Blacks now demanded their rights. Mark Naison argued that it was the Communist Party that
pioneered this kind of action in Harlem.72 And as Harvard Sitkoff has argued, this militancy
continued in the 1940s.73 As the nation, state, and city recovered from the depression, black
New Yorkers used similar tactics to sustain the fight for economic rights and set their sights on
equal employment opportunities in the city’s war industries.
Again, unlike the 1920s, blacks had allies. Historian Richard Chamberlain and others
showed that, labor organizations were especially important to African Americans’ fighting for
war jobs. In the north and south black activists in trade unions and civic organizations, National
Urban League (NUL) affiliates, and National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) chapters worked together and separately to advance black employment, the
number one civil rights goal. These activists advocated laws and demanded enforcement of laws
to obtain jobs for black workers.74
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Black protest began shortly after the outbreak of war in Europe. Though statistics showed
there was little wartime conversion and few jobs in New York’s war industries, the city’s blacks
felt that they were not getting their fair share of the war work that was available. Week after
week in 1940 and 1941 articles appeared in the Amsterdam News lamenting the lack of job
opportunities for blacks in defense industries nation-wide.75 One editorial criticized defense
industries for ignoring members of the National Technical Association, an organization of skilled
black workers, and engineering graduates from Hampton and Tuskegee universities. The author
argued that labor shortages in the defense industries would be abated if employers would
consider hiring black workers.76 It was not simply the morality of the issue. Defense industries,
they said, could not efficiently produce goods because of their refusal to hire black skilled
workers.77 The discrimination against black workers was particularly prevalent in the aircraft
and shipbuilding sectors. Aircraft companies notoriously refused to hire blacks to work on
production lines, offering them only janitorial positions. The following cartoon appeared in the
Amsterdam News depicting an African American mechanic applying for employment at a
company that made Triplane aircrafts. In the cartoon the manager of the company told the
applicant that though there is a need for manpower in the airplane industry, they refuse to hire
Negroes.78
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Figure 1: “It Just Doesn’t Make Sense”
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In the early 1940s the NAACP’s primary concern was equal employment opportunities in
war industries. The NAACP began a national letter writing campaign to President Roosevelt,
Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, and members of Congress
protesting discrimination in defense industries. The NAACP tried to enlist the government,
advocating a Congressional investigation into the status and treatment of black workers in the
defense program.80 Walter White, the executive secretary of the organization, held a community
meeting in Brooklyn to discuss the place of blacks in the nation’s defense industries and suggest
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ways to fight for black employment in that borough.81 The New York branch of the NAACP
declared January 26, 1941 National Defense Day, using radio, public forums, and meetings
throughout the city to highlight the discrimination blacks faced. On that day ministers, civic
leaders, and prominent black New Yorkers described the patriotism of the race in defending
democracy and the failure of the National Defense program to include blacks in military service
or in war jobs.82
Brooklyn proved to be one of the central areas for protest as many of the war industries
were located there. The National Negro Congress, NAACP, and other grassroots organizations
focused their activities against discrimination in that borough. Robert Washburn, the Executive
Secretary of the State War Council’s Committee on Discrimination considered Brooklyn the
“capital of discrimination.” In a speech to the Brooklyn Bureau of Charities on March 12, 1942
Washburn said that the entire borough had failed to stop or slow down job discrimination against
blacks, Jews, and Italians. In his view less progress had been made in Brooklyn than in any
other defense industry center in New York State.83 Despite the tight labor market in New York,
Washburn blamed discrimination by plant owners for low employment levels of African
Americans in war industries. He believed that the problem of discrimination could “not be
solved by legislation, but by public opinion operating on employers and labor alike.”84 Black
organizations did just that by publicizing discrimination in Brooklyn’s war industries and trying
to turn public opinion against companies with discriminatory hiring practices.
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In January, 1941 the Brooklyn branch of the NAACP called a mass meeting at which
questions pertaining to blacks’ place in the national defense program were addressed.85
Approximately 900 Brooklynites heard Walter White, the National Secretary of the NAACP,
speak. White urged blacks to unite to combat racial discrimination in the Army, Navy, and Air
Corps. He also agreed to lead a delegation to the Brooklyn offices of the Sperry Gyroscope
Corporation, one of the largest wartime employers in New York, in an effort to secure jobs for
African Americans.86 Though the initial meeting was not successful, black organizations
continued to target Sperry and the company hired its first black workers later that year.87
Following White’s failed trip to Sperry, E. Frederic Morrow, the Branch Coordinator of
the NAACP asked Fred Turner, the President of the Brooklyn Branch for his help in a campaign
against discriminatory hiring practices in war industries. The national organization was looking
to compile information on hiring practices of war industries to make recommendations to
Congress for more stringent rules against hiring discrimination based on race. The NAACP
focused on Brooklyn for the campaign because there were many large plants in the area with
millions of dollars worth of war contracts. Sperry Gyroscope, Worth Engineering Corporation,
Atlantic Basin Ironworks, the Brooklyn Navy Yard, Arma Corporation, and Brewster Aircraft
were just a few of the many war production plants located in Brooklyn. Morrow asked Turner to
personally investigate whether African Americans were being employed and generally what the
policies of these plants were in this regard.88 It is not completely clear what became of this
NAACP campaign. However it is clear that the organization targeted Brooklyn companies for
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legal action against discrimination because of the overt racism of companies’ hiring policies and
the concentration of federally funded war industries in that borough.
The NAACP’s activism in Brooklyn was indicative of the organization’s new focus on
expanding employment opportunities for African Americans. From its inception the NAACP
was an interracial organization, with a middle class membership, that concentrated their
strategies for expanding black rights on legal campaigns. According to historian Beth Tomkins
Bates the NAACP was influenced to begin focusing on African Americans’ economic problems
during the late 1930s due to challenges from outside and within. New activists like A Philip
Randolph and organizations like the National Negro Congress, along with pressure from several
local branch offices pushed the NAACP to endorse collective action and mass unionization.89
Just as civil rights organizations and black newspapers urged defense industries to hire
black workers, they urged blacks to learn trades to increase the supply of skilled blacks. One
writer to the Amsterdam News urged African Americans to acquire the technical skills war time
employers were looking for. The author also recommended that New York’s skilled black
workers assert themselves in the job market.90 Special courses in skilled trades were offered to
blacks in Harlem through a variety of programs such as the New York Urban League’s job
training courses for black workers at Columbia University.91 When war industries opened their
doors to black employees, African Americans would be trained and ready to take those jobs.
Refusal to hire black workers in skilled positions was not unique to employers in war
industries; it was a problem that plagued many skilled crafts as well. Though blacks were urged
to get training in trades, they found that training did not always convert into jobs. In fact Alice
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Citron, a delegate of the Teacher’s Union in New York, reported her experience with the
Vocational Guidance Council for Students. She said that Negro graduates, although they left
school with extensive training and were qualified in various trades – plumbing, mechanics,
electrical work, sheet metal work – could not find positions upon graduation. She alleged that
this was due to the fact that unions controlling these trades refused to accept black graduates.92
The exclusion of African Americans in some labor unions was a problem blacks would have to
overcome to attain more profitable employment.
Consequently in addition to addressing the problem of discrimination in defense
industries, New York’s African Americans fought discrimination in labor unions, especially the
craft unions which had some control over training and hiring. At the 1940 annual convention for
the American Federation of Labor, A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping
Car Porters, asked the union federation to officially end discrimination against black workers in
all if its locals. Randolph’s demand was met with apathy and disinterest. In fact the federation
reneged on its promise to integrate blacks into the administrative organizations of its national
body and claiming local autonomy, the AFL refused to terminate lily white crafts which
prohibited black membership.93
The Negro Labor Committee (NLC) and the Negro Labor Victory Committee (NLVC)
also attempted to integrate war industries through labor unions. Due to the strong belief in the
rights of workers and the unity of the working classes regardless of race they were prompted to
try and work for black rights through the labor movement. These leftist organizations worked
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under the assumption that if craft unions would accept black members then black workers
through the unions could obtain training for skilled industrial jobs.
The Negro Labor Committee was founded in 1935 by Frank Crosswaith to organize and
guide black workers in trade unions and to establish solidarity between black and white
workers.94 The organization was active in seeking better wages, working conditions, and
improved benefits for all workers. The Committee attempted to organize black workers and to
lend its support to unions interested in organizing blacks.95 Many of the labor unions affiliated
with the NLC were locals of garment industrial unions.
The International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU), an affiliate of the
American Federation of Labor, was known for its socialist leaders, inclusive ethos, and
progressive stance with regard to race. Therefore the union was open to black workers and
advocated for black employment in garment firms in the city. In fact the “ladies’ garment
workers union became one of the most militant promoters of civil rights for blacks.” The
ILGWU had a particularly strong relationship with the Negro Labor Committee and Frank
Crosswaith who also worked as a general organizer for the union.96 The activities of the NLC
therefore focused mostly on expanding job opportunities for blacks in the needle trades through
black membership in the ILGWU.
The Negro Labor Victory Committee, founded on June 27, 1942, was a subsidiary of the
National Negro Congress. The purpose of the organization was to open the doors of industry to
all Americans regardless of race and to encourage black workers to join trade unions. Leaders of
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the organization were all Communist trade unionists including Ferdinand Smith, Secretary of the
Maritime Union; Dorothy Funn a member of the Teachers Union; and the most active member
Charles Collins, Executive Secretary of the Hotel and Club Employees Union. The
organization’s leaders sought to make the fight for equality for blacks and other minorities an
integral part of the program of the organized labor movement. By the 1940s, the National Negro
Congress was mainly Popular Front organization that was labor oriented, but also supported
freedom for the Scottsboro Boys, anti-poll tax legislation, and freedom for colonial peoples of
Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean; goals that evidenced its connection to the
Communist Party.97
Most of the Committee’s efforts focused on forcing union locals to alter their practices
and influencing national unions to enforce their non-discrimination policies. The NLVC did this
through anti-discrimination committees it set up in union locals affiliated with the AFL and CIO
such as the Fur Dress and Dyers Union and the National Maritime Union. The organization
functioned mostly in unions affiliated with the Communist Party. While the NLVC failed to
reach a majority of unions, the organization pushed labor unions to open its doors to black
workers, thus negating industries’ claims that union discrimination prevented them from hiring
African Americans, and expanding the industries in which black workers could find jobs.98
Though the Negro Labor Committee and the Negro Labor Victory Committee had the
same goal and attempted to reach it through the same mechanisms, the relationship between the
organizations was contentions. These two groups represented the division between Socialists
and Communists on the left. Frank Crosswaith and the leadership of the NLC viewed the NLVC
as a rival group which tried to replace the NLC as the premier organization representing black
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labor. Crosswaith seemed to be trying to protect his turf as the younger NLVC began looking for
labor affiliates and tapping potential donors for financial support. Moreover Crosswaith’s ire
towards the Communist NLVC was linked to the decades long political rivalry between the
Socialist Party and the Communist Party.99
The National Negro Congress, the NLVC’s parent organization, was founded in 1936 as
a coalition of activists with diverse view-points fighting for improvement of African American
rights. The organization was not affiliated with any political position or party. Black trade
unionists, community activists, women’s clubs, Communists, and disgruntled NAACP members
advocating a greater focus on labor issues supported the NNC. The NNC focused its efforts on
the immediate concerns of African Americans – including the repeal of the poll tax, passage of a
federal anti-lynching law, abolition of discrimination in public services, and enactment of a
comprehensive civil rights program.100
By 1940 the NNC had lost much of its ideological diversity. The majority of the NNC’s
members were American Communist Party members or supporters and CP ideology and the
Popular Front’s agenda began to dominate the position and activities of the NNC. After Soviet
leader Stalin surprisingly signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler in 1939, NNC leadership also
went along with the CP party line criticizing Roosevelt’s retreat from New Deal programs as the
country pumped more money into production for war goods. The changing position of the NNC
prompted A Philip Randolph, the NNC’s president, to refuse to stand for re-election paving the
way for Max Yergan, a former YMCA official and NNC vice-president firmly in the CP camp,
to be elected president. Many of the NNC members opposed to the pro-CP position the
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organization had taken also left. Ralphe Bunche and the Urban League’s Lester Granger
publicly criticized the new ideology of the NNC. 101
After Germany invaded Russia violating their non-aggression pact in 1941, the
Communist party changed their position and supported the war. Communist affiliated civil
rights organizations like the NLVC became less isolated.102 Many Communists, therefore, were
involved in initiatives to better job opportunities for blacks in New York during the war. Harlem
leaders such as Ben Davis affiliated with Communist influenced organizations like the National
Negro Congress and the Negro Labor Victory Committee and advocated for fair employment for
black workers.103 For the remainder of the war Communists in New York forged collaborative
relationships with liberal interracial organizations like the NAACP and Urban League.
Some of the early campaigns to end discriminatory hiring practices by war industries
found success. In August of 1941 the NAACP set its sights on the seemingly impenetrable
airplane industry, using the press to pressure Brewster Airplane Company in Long Island City,
Queens into hiring black workers. Criticism from representatives of local NAACP branches and
other New York City groups, combined with accusations of discrimination and bad publicity,
caused the company’s management to hire their first ever black worker in August of 1941. The
NAACP’s criticism of Brewster revolved around the case of Edmond Van Osten. Van Osten
was a black tinsmith with nine years of experience whom Brewster management had deemed
under-qualified for a position. Though he was not hired, the company readily employed
numerous white candidates with only two years experience in the same position refused Van
Osten. The NAACP brought Van Osten’s case to the attention of the New York Employment
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Service, where an agency official confirmed Van Osten’s qualifications. After the NAACP’s
criticisms were published Brewster hired four other black workers.104 These hires, though small
in number, were large in significance as the aeronautic industry was one of the toughest for
blacks to penetrate. Bad publicity highlighting discriminatory hiring practices pressured some
companies to hire black workers in an era in which discrimination was increasingly looked down
upon and viewed as un-American, especially in the face of Nazi fascism and xenophobia.
Even more dramatic was the People’s Court of Inquiry’s town meeting to address many
of the problems facing Harlem’s blacks including discrimination in the job market. New York
City government officials were invited to attend the meeting and respond to the complaints and
opinions of the Harlem community. Designed to resemble a mock trial, the People’s Committee
planned to present witnesses who would testify to their deplorable living conditions and lack of
employment opportunities.105 The People’s Committee was created out of the Greater New York
Coordinating Committee for Employment by Adam Clayton Powell Jr. to support his bid for
City Councilman in 1941.106 Powell publicly announced that the People’s Committee would
attempt to bring together African Americans and Puerto Ricans to use their organized strength to
obtain employment.107 Interestingly one of those scheduled to be interviewed at the Court of
Inquiry meeting was a migrant single mother who left the South and brought her children to New
York in “pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness for herself and her children.” The mother was
disappointed when instead she found “unemployment, poverty, and public officials who had
consistently attempted to deprive her of a miserly relief.”108 Meeting organizers invited city
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officials to the inquiry and urged them to directly respond to the problems blacks faced. The
inquiry was an attempt on the part of the People’s Committee to bring the problems of black
New Yorkers to the direct attention of city leaders.
Blacks widened their efforts to open employment in defense industries to black workers,
pressuring not only the companies themselves but the state and federal government as well.
Blacks believed that the state employment service did not refer blacks to jobs. So, in January of
1941 the New York Urban League pressured the State Employment Service to assign black
interviewers to all of its New York City offices so that black applicants would be better served.
This was done in order to avoid the tendency for white interviewers to refer only white
applicants to jobs.109
Black politicians looked to find legislative solutions to the problem of employment
discrimination. In March of 1941 three Harlem assemblymen William Andrews, Daniel
Burrows, and Hulen Jack introduced bills aimed at destroying all forms of job discrimination.
These proposed laws would make discrimination in companies with government contracts
illegal, increase punishments for those who violated these laws, and amend state laws to include
racist hiring practices as transgressions of the civil rights of state residents.110 In the spring of
that year Governor Herbert Lehman established the New York State War Council Committee on
Discrimination in Employment (COD) and the state assembly passed legislation outlawing
discrimination in war industries. State Senators Walter Mahoney, Charles Perry, and Phelps
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Phelps introduced three supporting measures to the State Senate. 111 This was a critical first step
in state prohibition of employment discrimination.
Though these bills were not passed by the assembly, Governor Herbert Lehman
established the New York State War Council Committee on Discrimination in Employment
(COD) to deal with complaints of hiring bias.112 Lehman, a long time supporter of progressive
legislation for equal opportunity, appointed the members of the COD in March of 1941, and
chose Frieda S. Miller, the Industrial Commissioner of New York, as its chairman. The COD
operated under the State War Council, which oversaw the mobilization of all state resources for
the war effort, and its initial purpose was to fight bias against blacks and Jews who had suffered
discrimination for decades, as well as Italians and Germans who were discriminated against
because of their perceived association with the Axis powers in Europe.113 To ensure efficient
production Lehman impelled the committee to make war industries utilize all individuals without
consideration of race, color, creed, or national origin. The committee consisted of twenty-seven
members appointed by the governor representing industrial, labor, civic, and racial
organizations.114
The committee’s first task was to mold public opinion against discrimination in
employment so their first action was a publicity campaign. The COD staff sent ten thousand
letters to leaders in the state asking them to endorse full employment for minority groups. When
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a large number responded, they were sent to local newspapers to drum up more support for the
committee’s activities.115
The COD itself had little power to concretely end discriminatory employment practices.
Its members and chairman conferred with war contractors throughout the state in an attempt to
expand job opportunities for minorities through moral suasion and education. Complaints were
investigated by voluntary organizations because the COD lacked field staff and the committee
could do little in the face of delay, obstruction, or noncompliance by companies. Though it is
not clear from the COD documents what they considered voluntary organizations, the
organization actively cooperated with black organizations such as the National Urban League.
There were few concrete advances made by the COD during its first year of existence.116
It was not until the fall of 1941 that legislation went into effect giving the COD legal
grounding for its activities. In April of that year, Governor Lehman signed the Mahoney bill
which barred discrimination in government funded or supported industries. The bill, which was
sponsored by the Congress of Industrial Organizations and strongly backed by Lehman, read
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation engaged to any extent
whatsoever in the production, manufacture or distribution of military or naval
material, equipment or supplies for the State of New York or for the Federal
Government to refuse to employ any person in any capacity on account of the
race, creed or color of such person.117

115

History of the Committee on Discrimination in Employment, State War Council Committee on Discrimination,
8/14/1942, Papers of the New York State War Council’s COD, Reel 14, Box 6, Folder 265 – Committee Reports
March-December, 1942.
116
History of the Committee on Discrimination in Employment, State War Council Committee on Discrimination,
August, 14, 1942, Papers of the New York State War Council’s COD, Reel 14, Box 6, Folder 265 – Committee
Reports March-December, 1942; Anthony S. Chen, ““The Hitlerian Rule of Quotas”: Racial Conservativism and the
Politics of Fair Employment Legislation in New York State, 1941-1945,” Journal of American History, (March
2006): 1238-1264.
117
“100 Bills Adopted in Rush at Albany,” NYT, March 26, 1941, 40; “Lehman Signs Bill Barring Race Bias,” NYT,
April, 19, 1941, 9.

66
In September 1941 the Mahoney Act went into effect.118
New York’s black activists pressured for similar anti-discrimination legislation at the
federal level. Leaders of national civil rights organizations headquartered in New York led the
charge to pressure the federal government to eliminate discriminatory hiring practices in defense
industries. Lester Granger, in charge of industrial relations for the National Urban League,
blamed the National Defense Advisory Commission for the virtual exclusion of black skilled
workers from defense projects.119 Granger believed the Commission could secure compliance
with its non-discrimination order through the Office of Production Management (OPM).120 The
OPM, which had representation in the Advisory Commission, exercised general direction over
federal war procurement and production programs.121 Granger urged OPM Associate Director
Sidney Hillman to withhold special tax privileges from defense industries if they discriminated
against black workers. Granger argued that the government could rightfully penalize these
companies because by not employing black workers, they were compromising war-time
production and thus the national interests.122 In the spring and summer of 1941 black leaders
went further and aimed to take their protests directly to the president.
In April,1941 A. Philip Randolph, leader of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters,
announced plans for an “all-out march” to Washington, D. C. to demand an executive order to
end racial discrimination in defense industries. It was his hope that 10,000 blacks would
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participate in this March on Washington.123 On April 1, 1941 Lester Granger, Walter White,
Channing Tobias of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), Mary McLeod Bethune of
the National Youth Administration (NYA), and Randolph asked President Roosevelt to forbid
discrimination in the armed forces and defense industries. When Secretary of War Stimson and
Secretary of the Navy Knox refused to desegregate the armed forces, Roosevelt, afraid of
angering employers and Southern Democrats, did not insist. Instead he weakly issued a
statement condemning discrimination. African American leaders were incensed. The black
delegation felt that this was not enough and proposed a March on Washington at a meeting in
Chicago. Randolph agreed to lead the March on Washington Movement (MOWM) and issued a
formal call for support.124
Responding to Randolph’s call, local blacks formed a greater New York Committee to
aid in mobilizing thousands for the proposed March on Washington which was scheduled for
July 1941. The New York Committee planned a mass demonstration on City Hall to urge Mayor
Fiorello LaGuardia and the City Council to assist in the efforts to ban discrimination in national
defense industries. A large committee of black women supported the March on Washington
Movement as well. These women began a March on Washington button campaign throughout
the Greater New York area.125
In June Randolph spoke to more than 500 Brooklyn residents at a mass meeting at the
Alexander Hamilton High School. Randolph told the crowd the story of a black New York
University of Technical Engineering student who applied to twelve companies for employment.
The student received replies from six telling him no employment vacancies were available, and
did not hear from the other six companies at all. Randolph used this episode to illustrate the
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need for the federal government to step in to end unfair employment practices, and gain popular
support for the Movement.126
The March on Washington did not come to be. On June 25, 1941, the pressure from
blacks and the March on Washington Movement pushed President Roosevelt to issue an
executive order banning discriminatory hiring practices in industries with government war
contracts. Threatened by the embarrassment of having a mass protest in the U.S. capital
highlighting government injustice; the President issued Executive Order 8802. Not only did
Executive Order 8802 prohibit hiring discrimination, but it also prohibited government training
programs from discriminating against black workers. Finally the executive order established the
Committee on Fair Employment Practices (FEPC) in the Office of Production Management.127
The committee was to receive and investigate complaints of discrimination in violation of the
executive order, and take appropriate steps to redress grievances which it found to be valid. The
MOWM was successful in exerting enough pressure on the president to force him to outlaw
discrimination in war industries and create a federal institution devoted to identifying and
investigating discriminatory hiring practices.
Buoyed by the passage of the executive order, black New Yorkers were euphoric and
optimistic about their place in the workforce. Roosevelt’s executive order received front page
coverage in the Amsterdam News, and was the subject of many editorials in the following weeks.
The newspaper published a political cartoon entitled “It Means What it Says!” In the cartoon the
large hand of the federal government delivers the executive order prohibiting discrimination in
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the national defense program to “Prejudiced Employers”128 By the summer of 1941 black protest
had pressured the state and national government to take first steps towards outlawing
discrimination in employment.
After the passage of New York State and federal anti-discrimination legislation, there
were some immediate gains. Brewster Aeronautical Corporation in Long Island City hired a
crew of black sheet metal workers, but it was clear that Executive Order 8802 and the FEPC
were not immediate and complete solutions to the problem of job discrimination.129 In order to
get those sheet metal workers employed at Brewster Aeronautical, heavy pressure from the
NAACP and other black organizations in New York was needed. Despite the executive order
passed only two months before, it took public press campaigns about the discriminatory hiring
practices of Brewster Aeronautical to force the corporation to begin to employ blacks. The
NAACP concluded that, “the Brewster Company furnishes an example of the necessity of
constant vigilance by organizations outside of OPM [Office of Production Management] and the
need for close examination of all the ‘smooth excuses’ of companies seeking to dodge the
employment of Negroes by one pretense or another.”130 Black protests brought attention to
discriminatory hiring practices in war industries under the purview of Executive Order 8802 in
an effort to influence the companies to employ African Americans.
The passage of the Executive Order 8802 and the Mahoney Act in and of itself was not
enough to convince employers to hire black workers. The situation at Brewster was not
uncommon. Employers continued to refuse to hire black workers. Companies often blamed
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white workers, claiming they refused to work with blacks. Furthermore some unions refused to
accept black workers.131 It was clear that the vigilance of black organizations would be needed
to address these problems in order for the executive order and Mahoney Act to be effective.
The Brooklyn Coordinating Committee on Defense Employment for Negroes found some
success in placing black workers after the establishment of the Committee on Discrimination and
the FEPC. From April to October of 1941 more than 600 African Americans received help from
the Committee, 199 being directly referred to jobs and 122 of them being placed. Defense
training was obtained for 183 African Americans through the NYA and Board of Education. The
NYA worked alongside the New York City Board of Education to offer training opportunities for
black men in a variety of occupations. The Board of Education accepted African Americans in
all categories of training, but trained black women only for jobs in the garment trades (one of the
few industrial areas open to black women during the early years of the war). The National Youth
Administration however provided training for black women in the radio trades as well.132
Industrial training for African Americans was very important in the fight for black employment.
Training would create a group of skilled blacks ready to enter jobs in war industries, effectively
eliminating managers’ claims that they could not hire black workers because they were not
trained in the needed skills to work in the factories.
During the New Deal, the National Youth Administration had operated youth training
programs and continued to do so during the war. The NYA, when it was conceived, aimed to
combine economic relief with on-the-job training in federally funded work projects designed to
provide youth with marketable skills for the future. The organization, which was directly
controlled by the federal government, attempted to encourage training and full employment for
131

Franklin O. Nichols, “Summary of the Proceedings of the Eastern Regional Conference of the Urban League
Industrial Secretaries,” February1942, Edward Shakespeare Lewis Papers, Box 2, Folder 1.
132
“Negroes Here Get Defense Training,” NYT, November 9, 1941, 35.

71
African Americans as well. In 1937 it launched a program specifically targeted for African
American youths headed by Mary McCleod Bethune.133 In January of 1941 the NYA launched
a drive to place Negro machinists and placed every black applicant in a position.134
The NYA also collaborated with the BCCDE’s parent organization the Brooklyn Urban
League to achieve greater black employment in defense industries. The NYA aided the
Brooklyn Borough Urban League’s (BKUL) defense employment drive which it launched in
April 1941.135 The National Urban League had close ties with the NYA as Lester Granter, the
Urban League’s assistant Executive Secretary in charge of industrial relations, served on the
Advisory Committee on Employment problems of Negro Youth for the NYA.136 In May 1941,
twelve National Youth Administration workers assisted the Brooklyn Urban League’s drive to
get technically skilled blacks hired by industries with government contracts. These NYA
workers compiled lists of recent black technical school graduates and submitted them to the
league. BKUL Industrial Secretary Charles Berkley then approached employers with the names.
The NYA workers also went to unions to query about their policy for admitting qualified black
workers. Trained black workers were then encouraged to apply for industrial positions and
union membership.137 The BKUL collaborated with government offices with which it had
personnel ties to train and place black workers in war industries a tactic that it would continue
throughout the war years.
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After the passage of Executive Order 8802, the NLVC also looked to use the federal
government to open up jobs in war industries to African Americans. They called on the War
Production Board to immediately place trained black workers in jobs in war industries, asked for
additional war contracts for New York City, and urged that blacks be appointed to policy-making
boards and commissions.138
The creation of the COD and the FEPC and the passage of the Mahoney Act were very
significant in that the federal and state governments took measures to protect minorities from
hiring discrimination. Each however had its limitations. Though black organizations
increasingly looked to use government agencies to open up jobs in factories with government
contracts to African American workers, the COD lacked the staff to investigate companies and
enforce its legislation and the FEPC did not have mechanisms to force companies to comply with
its findings and suggestions. Therefore the agencies were not very effective in opening jobs to
blacks in war industries. This would change in 1942 as increased war time production created
more available jobs, the government strengthened the powers of the COD and FEPC, and civil
rights organizations stepped up pressure on these government agencies and employers alike for
more jobs in war industries.

America at War: More Contracts, More Job Opportunities in New York City
After the United States officially entered the war on December 8, 1941, the United States
government looked to gain a firmer grasp on the economy. As in previous American wars
money and resources were of the utmost concern to the federal government. Consequently, the
government expanded its power to oversee production of war materials and food as well as the
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manpower supply for factories within the states, especially in centers of production. The War
Manpower Commission (WMC) was created in April, 1942 under the chairmanship of the
Federal Security Administrator Paul V. McNutt. The WMC consisted of representatives from
the War Department; the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, and the Navy; the Federal Security
Agency; the War Production Board; the Selective Service System; and the Civil Service
Commission. The WMC recruited labor for war and essential civilian industries, trained labor for
jobs essential to the war effort, analyzed manpower utilization practices to increase labor
efficiency, and accumulated national labor market information.139
Many other government offices were incorporated into and operated under the umbrella
of the War Manpower Commission during the war in order to centralize oversight of the nation’s
wartime economy. The FEPC was part of the WMC from 1942 until its reorganization by
Executive Order in 1943. In May, 1943 the President issued an executive order that moved the
FEPC under the president’s jurisdiction and required all government contracts to have a nondiscrimination clause. Though it was no longer under the jurisdiction of the WMC, the FEPC
retained close ties with the organization.140 The cooperation of these two organizations would
help ensure that racial discrimination did not interfere with war production.141
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The United States Employment Service (USES) also operated as part of the WMC during
war years (1942-1945).142 Local USES offices were responsible for taking action against
companies who discriminated and USES officials were responsible for persuading employers or
anyone acting on their behalf to eliminate restrictive hiring or training practices.143 These
activities during the war years were overseen by the WMC.
Not only did the federal government integrate national offices, it also began to
incorporate and cooperate closely with offices of the state government. On January 1, 1942 all
staff and facilities of the New York State Employment Service were transferred to federal
jurisdiction at the request of President Roosevelt.144 The USES and the State War Council’s
Committee on Discrimination in Employment cooperated closely. As the COD investigated the
hiring policies of corporations, it asked USES and other interested social, religious, and racial
organizations to refer black applicants to companies lacking colored workers.145 Tightening of
federal control over offices of state government provided a unity of purpose, at least in New
York.
The COD looked for new tactics to increase its effectiveness. Early in February of 1942
it intensified its attacks on discriminatory hiring practices using a two-pronged strategy. It tried
to end the evasion of existing laws with a bill to prevent employment agencies, utility
companies, and not just the defense industries, from discriminating against minority job
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applicants. Second the committee hired more field staff to increase the pressure of persuasion on
employers with discriminatory practices.146
Just as the COD was becoming more active, the city’s economic conditions improved. At
mid-year state and city authorities secured additional war work for New York City. Until this
point, the city had received less than four percent of the total volume of war orders when it did
nearly 8 percent of the nation’s peace-time manufacturing. As a result, USES encouraged New
York City’s unemployed workers to find jobs in the more active markets in adjacent counties in
Long Island, New Jersey and Connecticut.147
As more jobs became available, state and local government organizations more actively
tried to obtain jobs for New York’s blacks, but war industries continued to discriminate against
black workers. Several members of the Committee on Discrimination expressed frustration with
the organization’s inability to make employers comply with their findings and asked Governor
Lehman to strengthen the powers of their committee.148 New legislation was passed to allow
Lehman to do just that by establishing more severe consequences for those who evaded the law
and giving state officials the ability to enforce anti-discrimination legislation.
In the spring of 1942 two amendments to the Mahoney Law, the Schwartzwald and
Washburn Acts, were passed by the state legislature giving the Committee more power. The
Washburn Act made it a misdemeanor to exclude a citizen of the state by reason of national
origin, race, color or creed from employment in war industries or enjoyment of privileges
furnished by innkeepers, common carriers or employment agencies. The second law, the
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Schwartzwald Act gave the State Industrial Commissioner administrative powers in relation to
discrimination in war industries. This meant that the Commissioner could enforce the laws
against discrimination. The Commissioner could also require submission of information, records
and reports pertinent to an investigation of discriminatory hiring practices.149 Consequently the
COD began a campaign to eliminate all questions regarding race, religion, color, or national
origin from employment applications for war contractors.150
The amendments to the Mahoney Act also authorized the Industrial Commissioner to use
the “powers of administration, investigation, inquiry, subpoena and hearing vested in him to
enforce of anti-discrimination laws in war industries.” The commissioner could require
submission at regular intervals of information, records and reports pertinent to discriminatory
practices in industries. Frieda Miller, the state Industrial Commissioner, promised to use the law
to issue orders to defense contractors prohibiting discriminatory hiring practices and to request
affirmative action to correct past discrimination.151 Miller’s tough position and threat to use
administrative orders that demanded action was an outgrowth of her past work in the labor
movement. As a longtime labor official, she “reached for the regulatory tools most familiar to
her.” Administrative orders like those she promised to issue were commonplace in labor
relations since the Wagner Act, which conferred cease-and-desist authority to the National Labor
Relations Board as well as the power to order offending companies to take affirmative action to
compensate people who had been victimized. Many state labor boards, including New York’s,
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enjoyed such powers. Therefore when Miller began to invoke similar powers she was just
extending a regulatory model prevalent in industrial relations.152
The passage of the Mahoney Act and the Schwartzwald and Washburn Acts gave the
COD the power to actually achieve its goals. In March, 1942, a field staff was organized to
investigate specific complaints and to undertake investigations on the Committee’s own
initiative.
The state legislation was reinforced by new legislation from the city. A New York City
law aimed at employment agencies was added to the arsenal in the legal war against racial and
religious discrimination. The Hart Bill, signed into law by Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, outlawed
employment agency ads which specified race, creed, or color limitations. If an advertising
agency ran such an ad at the request of a factory or company, the agency would be held liable for
violating the law unless it could prove it had written instructions from the employer to do so. In
addition when an employer ordered an agency to place limitations in the ad, the employer’s name
had to be given in the advertisement. Therefore if there were discriminatory ads being placed by
employers, state officials could identify them easily. Violation of the law was a misdemeanor
and could result in the offending agency losing its license to operate.153
Other state offices attempted to adhere to the mandate from federal and state
governments to end discrimination in war industries and government offices. Anna Rosenberg,
regional director of the Social Security Board, cracked down on discriminatory practices in the
United States Employment Service in the New York area. In July of 1942 she warned USES
staff that there could be no misunderstanding of her 1941 ban on bias against minority groups,
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which she issued when she took over direction of the office. She also declared that any future
violation would be interpreted as willful. Rosenberg’s new order also clearly defined
discrimination by USES and other employers as a “failure to refer occupationally qualified
applicants” to jobs because of their race, color, creed, national origin, or citizenship. Under these
new orders it was discriminatory for an employer to pay one group higher wages than equally
qualified members of other groups. It was also considered discriminatory to refuse to hire an
applicant on the grounds that he or she will be excluded from a union because of race. Confining
any group to a specific occupation under the guise of maintaining a balanced staff was also
considered discrimination. Rosenberg stated that it was also discrimination when a union, acting
as an agent for an employer, excluded any person from membership because of any of the above
reasons. Rosenberg asked the COD to advise USES when factories were utilizing discriminatory
hiring practices.154
The COD strengthened its efforts to end discrimination after passage of the Schwartzwald
amendment to the Mahoney Law. Industrial Commissioner Frieda Miller, Chairman of the
COD, announced the beginning of a new phase in the committee’s fight against discrimination.
The State Labor Department implemented machinery to prosecute war industry employers who
discriminated. All employers holding war production contracts who continued to use
discriminatory hiring practices could be served a formal order by the state Department of Labor.
Unless the employer complied with the order within ten days of its receipt, he was subject to
criminal prosecution for a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of no less than fifty dollars and no
more than five hundred. In fact the State War Council, of which the COD was a part, began
carrying out provisions of the New York State Penal Law effective September 1, 1942
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prohibiting private employment agencies from accepting job orders from war industries which
contained discriminatory specifications referencing race, color, creed, or national origin.155
The employment situation slowly began to improve for blacks in the summer of 1942.
Placements of skilled and semi-skilled blacks had increased in New York and New England. At
the same time enrollment of blacks in war training classes in the metropolitan area and New
York City also increased from 4 percent to 10 percent of total trainees. The WMC attributed this
increase to the coordinated efforts of the regional offices of the WMC, FEPC, COD, and the
cooperation of trade unions in the area. One indicator that the employment situation was
improving was the willingness, albeit reluctantly, of firms to train black women for skilled
positions in industrial sectors that were very hard for blacks to obtain. Black women were being
trained in aircraft classes, after the Eastern Aircraft plant of General Motors in the New York
City suburb of Tarrytown accepted black women trainees. Moreover the United Electrical,
Radio, and Machine Workers of America (UE), a progressive Communist led union, continued to
campaign for the placement of Negro workers in the New York area, with locals 1225 and 1227
placing more than fifty colored workers in shops.156
As more jobs became available African Americans stepped up their efforts to pressure the
government to end hiring discrimination. The city’s blacks used regional offices of the FEPC
and COD to secure employment for skilled black workers. These agencies provided African
Americans with a venue through which they could improve the job opportunities available to
them and consequently their economic standing. Black organizations brought instances of
violations of state and federal anti-discrimination legislation to the attention of these agencies
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which then conducted investigations of the accused companies, oversaw their hiring practices,
and forced them to comply with the state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination.
The Brooklyn Urban League was one of the main organizations that brought
discrimination cases to the offices of the COD and FEPC. African American job applicants who
had been discriminated against reported the bias to the League’s Industrial Department. The
BKUL would often publicize these instances of discrimination. In a public statement in 1942 the
New York and Brooklyn branches of the Urban League charged several industrial companies
with war contracts of having discriminatory hiring practices and obeying “the letter but not the
spirit” of the executive order, by hiring a few black workers for unskilled jobs making them
token black workers in plants with hundreds of men. Furthermore they alleged that war
industries often had higher qualifications for Negro applicants and frequently never reviewed the
accepted employment applications from black job seekers.157 The League brought these cases to
the attention of the COD for the dual purposes of bringing public attention to the discriminatory
practices of the companies and to make the government anti-discrimination agencies aware of
them as well. In most instances the BKUL conducted investigations into the hiring practices of
the accused companies and upon finding evidence of discrimination would forward complaints to
the appropriate offices of the COD and FEPC for investigation and, hopefully, corrective action.
The goals and activities of the Urban League made it a perfect working partner for fair
employment agencies. From its inception the NUL had been concerned with the problems faced
by blacks living in cities. Throughout the organization’s history, a major goal had been to
broaden economic opportunities and break barriers to black employment.158 The Urban League
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focused its efforts on meeting the needs of the nations’ urban black communities and in New
York and other large cities dealt with massive migrant populations, discriminatory housing and
labor markets, and radical political movements. According to historian Toure Reed from the
League’s birth thorough World War II the organization used two major strategies to achieve its
goals. The first was that it attempted to prepare blacks for life in the industrial city by offering
moral and vocational training and assisting migrants and longtime residents in locating housing,
employment and city services. Secondly the Urban League encouraged employers, unions, and
landlords to open jobs and housing to blacks.159 This second goal was the focus of New York
City’s Urban League branches.
After the strengthening of the COD’s power to enforce anti-discriminatory legislation, the
Urban League increasingly looked to use government agencies to aid its efforts at opening up
new posts and new occupations to blacks New Yorkers. According to the state Committee on
Discrimination, the League served as the most important employment agency for blacks in
Manhattan and Brooklyn because of its highly developed placement service.160 Therefore when
the COD wanted to steer black workers towards jobs in industries it deemed had discriminatory
hiring practices, the agency often looked to the Urban League placement service to provide
qualified applicants. Strengthening this collaborative relationship was the fact that Charles
Berkley, appointed to the COD in July of 1942, was the former Industrial Secretary of the
BKUL.161 As a result the Urban League, the Brooklyn branch in particular, also became the
primary conduit of skilled black laborers that the COD sent to integrate companies with
discriminatory employment practices.
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During late November and early December of 1942 the city economy continued to
improve. Employment increased in the skilled trades, in the longshore sector, in delivery
services, hotels, and other service industries, and in war plants. Employment in the six leading
war industry groups – shipyards, ordinance, aircraft, electrical and non-electrical machinery,
professional and scientific instruments – increased 8 percent between September and November.
The Navy Yard, where employment was expected to increase, contributed largely to these gains.
The employment of women and African Americans during the same period showed large gains –
25 percent and 21 percent respectively. There were labor shortages in a few trades. Acetylene
welder trainees (male and female), arc sender trainees (male), skilled molders, wood and metal
patternmakers (mechanics and trainees), typewriter, office machine and refrigerator repairmen,
and highly skilled airplane sheet metal mechanics were needed. Reports from both building and
repair shipyards in November disclosed a gain of 12 percent over employment in September. In
many of the shipyard trades (shipfitters, boilermakers, machinists, welders, and caulkers) the
supply of all classes of workers was exhausted.162 As employment prospects improved in the
city, more jobs in war industries became available to black workers.
By the end of 1942 leading war plants in New York City hired many more blacks. From
September to November the number of blacks more than doubled.163
Table 5: Negro Employees in War Production firms, 1942
Number of
Total
Black workers
firms
employment
July 1942
289
264,469
4,933
September
302
252,102
4,705
1942
November 1942 309
263,155
11,463
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Several historians have argued that a labor shortage in 1943 was the most important reason for
this increase in black employment.164 But this increase in the number of blacks employed in war
industries took place before the labor shortage began. Therefore it could not have been just a
labor shortage that prompted the city’s war industries to begin hiring black workers. The
expansion of posts and occupations available in war industries in the first two years of the war
was more likely due to a combination of factors.
Agitation from local chapters of the NAACP and National Urban League pressured the
New York State government to pass legislation baring hiring discrimination in war industries and
to establish the Committee on Discrimination. Black activists also lobbied the federal
government for similar measures which resulted in President Roosevelt’s establishment of the
FEPC. As a result, a few war industries hired black workers in skilled and semi-skilled positions
for the first time. The NYA also trained black workers in skilled trades to make them qualified
for jobs in war industries. Many companies continued to discriminate against African Americans
however and due to weaknesses in the FEPC and COD these government agencies could not
force them to comply with state and federal laws outlawing discriminatory hiring practices.
Black organizations therefore continued to pressure government agencies to end discrimination
in war industries. In 1942 the state government responded by strengthening the COD by passing
measures that allowed the organization to enforce the state anti-discrimination laws.
In 1942 the labor market also improved as city manufacturers received more production
contracts from the government. Civil rights organizations like the Brooklyn Urban League
cooperated with government agencies to place black workers in newly available positions in war
164

Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company,
1972); John Blum, V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II (San Diego: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1976); Shirley Ann Moore, “Getting There, Being There” The Great Migration in Historical
Perspective (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1991), 106-126.; Robert Weaver, Negro Labor: A
National Problem (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946.)

84
industries. The Urban League forwarded trained black workers to companies with government
contracts that were hiring. Despite some scholars’ depictions of the Urban League as a
conservative black organization with regard to civil rights activism, in this period and in this
borough, the Brooklyn Urban League was an active agent of change.165 The focus of black
organizations on working towards economic opportunity gave the movement for equal rights a
decidedly economic cast in the 1930s and 1940s. The activities of the NAACP and the Urban
League in the early 1940s illustrate that equal employment opportunity for African Americans
was the civil rights issue of the war years.
The improved labor market, civil rights activism, and the enforcement of laws barring
discriminatory hiring practices by war industries caused companies to hire black workers.
Consequently the number of blacks working in war production plants increased in 1942. The
expansion of employment opportunities for blacks in war industries continued after 1943 as
increased production and a labor shortage prompted war industries to hire even more black
workers.
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Chapter 3
The Road to Full Integration:
The 1943 Labor Shortage, Government Agencies, and Civil Rights Activism

Across the nation a 1943 labor shortage caused employers to begin to relax the bars to
hiring and unions found it more difficult to maintain restrictive policies.166 1943 proved to be a
watershed moment in New York City’s war industries as well. In that year New York firms
began receiving more defense work prompting factories to hire large numbers of blacks. Though
the labor shortage was the most important reason New York industries employed black workers,
a combination of circumstances seemed to have contributed to the hiring of black workers for
skilled and semi-skilled jobs in New York’s war industries.
Though not all companies had exactly the same reasons for hiring black workers, many
employed them because in the face of a severe labor shortage, black labor was the most readily
available pool. Other companies were forced to hire black workers because they were targets of
protests from civil rights organizations and investigations by the Committee on Discrimination or
local offices of the War Manpower Commission. Some of these companies’ workers were
represented by integrated unions. Many of the companies hiring black workers had a
combination or all three of those situations.
Though war industries in the city began hiring black workers discrimination persisted and
black activism was still needed to ensure fair hiring and fair treatment of the blacks employed in
war industries. Civil rights organizations like the Brooklyn Urban League and National Negro
Congress continued to cooperate with the COD and local offices of the FEPC to investigate

166

Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company,
1972); John Blum, V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II (San Diego: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1976); Shirley Ann Moore, “Getting There, Being There” The Great Migration in Historical
Perspective, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1991), 106-126.; Robert Weaver, Negro Labor: A
National Problem (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946).

86
discrimination against workers employed in war industries. Other organizations like the Negro
Labor Committee and the Negro Labor Victory Committee cooperated with progressive labor
unions to ensure black membership and training which would open more industrial jobs to
African Americans.
Some of New York’s African Americans took to the streets to protest continued hiring
discrimination. The Harlem Riot in August of 1943 drew attention to the inequality of job
opportunities for blacks in war industries and prompted Mayor La Guardia to organize a
committee to investigate race relations in the city. Moreover, the riot prompted the state
government to pass fair employment legislation pertaining to all employers in the state.
The convergence of these factors pushed industrial producers in the shipbuilding,
scientific and electric instrument sectors to hire black workers in skilled and semi-skilled
positions. This was a dramatic shift. Blacks who could only formerly find employment as
janitors, casual laborers, and domestic servants during the war years, found higher paying,
unionized jobs never before open to them.
Across the nation at the war’s end as soldiers returned to reclaim their jobs, demand for
production decreased, and factories formerly producing war goods reconverted to consumer
production, many blacks in these cities were ousted from the jobs they held during the war.
Black women workers here hired in newly available service positions as secretaries, store clerks,
and phone operators. As veterans returned to jobs in factories many black men were fired and
returned to the low-paying service positions they held before the war.167

167

Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company,
1972); John Blum, V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II (San Diego: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1976); Shirley Ann Moore, “Getting There, Being There,” The Great Migration in Historical
Perspective, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1991), 106-126.; Robert Weaver, Negro Labor: A
National Problem (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946).

87
Similarly as New York’s factories decreased their production capacity and soldiers
returned from combat, many black men were ousted from their jobs in war industries. Many
other black men however were able to use the skills they acquired working in war industries to
find skilled and semi-skilled industrial work by the end of the decade. By 1950 the percentage of
black men working in unskilled service positions had decreased. Black women also found
employment in new sectors of the city’s economy after the war. As in other cities as soldiers
returned from the war, black women were laid off from their jobs in factories. Though they
could no longer find industrial jobs, black women worked in clerical and retail positions - jobs
which were closed to them before the war. These jobs were better paying than the domestic
positions black women had before the war. The types of jobs blacks could find expanded during
the 1940s, providing black workers with more options for gainful employment moving forward.
World War II thus served as a watershed of employment opportunities for New York’s African
Americans.168

1943: A Turning Point
Until late 1942, factories across the nation could fill their labor needs with workers from
the large reservoir of Depression era unemployed. From that time forward there was a shortage
of labor which became progressively more severe as production needs grew.169 In New York
City this was also the case. New York’s war industries received more war contracts in 1943.
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Industries therefore increased production which meant more jobs for New Yorkers. As the labor
market in the city improved blacks and women saw increased and expanded job opportunities in
some of the leading war production factories.
The increase in black workers in New York’s war industries was, in large part, caused by
increased production. Between 1942 and April of 1943 the dollar value of New York City’s war
contracts increased from approximately 140 million to 980 million dollars.170 The conversion
process in New York had differed greatly from other industrial centers throughout the state.
Steel plants and heavy industry in the Buffalo area had been readily converted to defense
production. Existing aircraft industries and shipbuilding plants upstate needed only to expand
and the electrical, chemical and precision machinery plants there had been ready for warproduction. As we have seen, New York City was a different story. The thousands of small
plants producing consumer goods, most of which were concentrated in the city, did not readily
convert. Moreover in the metropolitan area, labor costs had been too high to compete
successfully with other areas for war contracts. Among the 35,000 manufacturing plants in New
York few were large factories employing thousands of workers. Most of these plants were
packed into lofts and old industrial buildings. Only 2 percent of New York City’s work force
was employed in plants of more than a thousand employees.171
Some of the most important sectors of the New York economy finally began to convert to
war production in 1943. One of those areas was the garment sector. The apparel industry was
one of the largest industrial employers in the city before the war; however few contracts were
given these small shops during the early war years. Those shops for the most part did lighter
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sewing and did not have the heavy, multiple stitch sewing machines required for defense
production. In addition the garment trade in the early days of the war was handicapped by high
labor costs. The government began to offer New York’s garment factories more contracts in
1943. The city’s 3,700 metal-working shops were also fairly successful in converting to war
work, subcontracting with plane, ship and ordnance plants elsewhere in the region.172 In 1941
and 1942 the government did not give woodworking plants war contracts, but in the early months
of 1943 that changed as well.173
The result was that industrial employers in the city hired more black workers. The
number of black workers in war industries increased rapidly at the end of 1942 growing by 12.5
percent between November 1942 and January 1943. By February of 1943 close to 4 percent
(13,000) of the approximately 350,000 workers at 281 major metropolitan war plants were
black.174 By April of 1943 the city’s unemployed were being rapidly absorbed by plants that
converted to war production.175 By July of that year the city had become the second largest
holder of war contracts in the country and as a result both essential and non-essential industries
hired more African Americans.176
Not only did the number of African Americans employed by war industries increase, but
the proportion of workers who were black did as well. The proportion of African Americans to
all employees in war industries rose from 1.5 percent in May 1942 to 6 percent in May 1943.
Moreover, by May approximately 4 percent more black workers were employed than in March in
172
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354 selected war factories in the city. By mid-1943 nearly 20,000 non-whites worked in New
York City war production plants, a threefold increase from May 1942.177 By January, 1944 the
workforce in New York almost doubled from the summer of 1942, while the number of black
employees quadrupled.178
The largest increases in black employment occurred in the electrical machinery and
chemical industries. Employment of non-whites in all private shipbuilding yards increased 3.7
percent between March and May of 1943. Nonferrous metals, chemicals, electrical machinery,
iron and steel industries as well as the shipyards employed an average or above average
proportion of black workers by mid-1943. The non-electrical machinery and aircraft industries
had the lowest proportion of non-white employees. Of the war production plants shipyards
employed the largest number of African Americans (7,000), followed by professional and
scientific instrument factories (2,200), and electrical machinery firms (1,850). The non-electrical
machinery and aircraft industry, notorious in the past for discrimination against African
Americans, had the lowest proportion of non-white employees.179
In many cases it was the labor shortage that prompted war industries to hire large
numbers of African Americans. This is evident in the hiring practices of Titeflex Metal Hose
Company, Fairchild Aviation, and Curtis Wright. These companies hired more black workers
during 1943 than they had the previous year. Fairchild Aviation had hired only six black
workers from February to December of 1942. By January of 1944 they hired 96 more totaling
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102 black workers. Titeflex hired 110 black workers between February and December of 1942.
Over the course of 1943 the company hired 625 more blacks to make it 800 black workers.
Wright Aeronautical hired 672 during 1942, but hired more than 3,000 black workers the
following year. These numbers indicate that the labor shortage created by increasing contracts
caused this large increase in the hiring of African Americans.180
The labor shortage in 1943 was felt in New York’s very lucrative shipbuilding industry
causing shipyards to hire large numbers of black workers.181 In June of 1943 the labor shortages
at the Brooklyn Navy Yard became so acute that it began to appeal directly to blacks to fill jobs.
Lieutenant Commander N. D. Hubbell released a statement to the Amsterdam News alerting
black workers to skilled and unskilled job opportunities at the Brooklyn Yard. Openings
included mechanic learners (open to female applicants), 1st, 2nd, and 3rd class skilled laborers,
helper-trainees, and apprentices.182
The labor shortage in the shipbuilding industry continued into the late summer and fall.
In fact by August there was a manpower shortage in specific occupations in the shipbuilding
industries.183 And in September the shortage became so acute that the War Manpower
Commission (WMC) ran stories in Harlem newspapers on cooperation between the agency and
the Harlem Branch of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) to recruit ship yard
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workers.184 The press release announced a job drive to recruit shipyard helpers and laborers for
thousands of openings in shipyards in and around the Port of New York. Benjamin Barnette,
Employment Secretary of the Harlem YMCA, explained that applicants for these jobs needed no
previous experience, and that chances for advancement were good. Those hired as helpers would
be used to assist journeymen electricians, outside machinists, welders, and pipefitters and would
be upgraded to journeymen on the basis of their ability not seniority.185 Skilled and semi-skilled
positions had opened to black workers in one of the largest shipbuilding yards in the Greater
New York area.
The labor shortage had similar effects on the hiring practices of other major war factories.
By the end of 1943 the Calco Chemical Division of the American Cyanamid Company, the Arma
Corporation, and the Sperry Corporation specifically set out to hire black employees. These
companies promised black workers everything under the sun – good wages, good working
conditions, and even union membership – to attract them to their companies.186
Though the labor shortage seemed to be the most compelling reason for war industries to
hire black workers, state and federal government organizations also played an important role in
changing hiring practices. One important achievement was that in companies that had never
hired black workers state and federal anti-discrimination agencies influenced management to
integrate their workforce. Several war industries investigated by the FEPC for employing very
few blacks, began hiring African American workers in the wake of their FEPC hearings. One
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such firm was Babcock and Wilcox.187 The company, which had no black employees before
1943, hired thirty-one African Americans by January, 1944. The change in Titeflex Metal Hose
Company’s hiring practices was most impressive as the company hired 746 black workers
between the summer of 1942 and early 1944, increasing their hires by almost 1400 percent.
More importantly in January of 1944 these black workers represented 20 percent of the
company’s workforce after previously having comprised a mere 3.2 percent. Curtis Wright, the
largest employer of African Americans in this group of companies appearing before the FEPC,
increased their black workforce more than fivefold from 2,995 to 16,155. In total these six firms
provided 15,461 black New Yorkers with jobs between the summer of 1942 and January of
1944.188 Though the percentage of black employees working at firms appearing before New
York City FEPC hearings seemed small, the increase in employment levels was impressive as
the resistance to hiring blacks had been unusually strong in these industries.
The more significant change in employment trends was that employers hired larger
numbers of African Americans for skilled and semi-skilled positions. Government agencies
aided in making this happen as well. This is particularly true of factories investigated and then
monitored by the New York FEPC. In May of 1942 100 percent of Ford Instrument’s black
workers were unskilled workers (110 of 110) and represented 1.83 percent of the company
workforce. One year later in May of 1943 30 percent of the company’s 343 black workers were
in skilled and semi-skilled positions. Wright Aeronautical, in 1942, had 31 skilled and semiskilled black workers with 241 African Americans in unskilled positions. The next year the
company had 1,703 African American workers, of which almost half (891) were skilled or semi187
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skilled workers. The general statistics for companies who came before the FEPC for hearings
show that there was a significant increase in black skilled and semi-skilled workers. In the six
companies with hearings before the FEPC the changes in employment trends are apparent. In
these industries where there were 1,035 total black workers in 1942, one year later these same
companies employed 1,308 black skilled and semi-skilled black workers alone with another
2,294 African Americans in unskilled positions.189
Though many historians of World War II assert that the FEPC failed to make war
industries hire black workers en mass and fully end discriminatory hiring practices they fail to
highlight the positive achievements of the organization, especially those FEPC offices that were
successful at the local level.190 Though, by the end of the war, many of the companies
investigated by the FEPC and found to have discriminatory hiring practices achieved black
employment levels lower than the national average of blacks in the American population, the
change was significant. These companies employed very few blacks before the war; therefore
the increase in the number of black workers was gradual causing black workers to comprise a
smaller percent of the companies’ workforce. This was the case both nationally and in New
York.191 Moreover, FEPC- investigated firms in Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, and
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Birmingham, showed larger proportional gains in black employment than other companies.192
Therefore the seemingly small gains represented large achievements for FEPC investigated
companies. Perhaps the most important effect of FEPC investigations on companies’
employment policies is the noticeable increase in the number of blacks employed in skilled and
semi-skilled positions in FEPC monitored war industries.193 In New York the FEPC’s
importance goes beyond being a symbol of the United States government’s first foray into
protecting the civil rights of its black citizens. The organization helped foster material advances
for black workers in the war years.
Black women in particular benefitted from expanded job opportunities in 1943, leaving
positions as domestics and laundresses to find jobs in factories. According to the Brooklyn
Urban League, black women, many of whom were “recent migrants from the South”, found
employment in industries producing consumer goods and those engaged in war production.
Black women sought inspection and blueprint reading, bench assembly, machine shop, radio
assembly, aircraft mechanics, and riveting jobs. Many females between the ages of sixteen and
twenty-five who applied to the Brooklyn Urban League’s placement services took advantage of
the National Youth Administration’s (NYA) training program. The industrial and clerical
training of the NYA allowed the Industrial Department of the Brooklyn Urban League to place
many women in industrial positions. In the first half of 1943 alone 455 of 1,061 of the Brooklyn
Urban League’s placements of women were in skilled or semi-skilled positions.194 The
dissolution of the NYA in July of 1943 was a great disappointment to the members of the Urban
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League’s Industrial Department. Black women referred by the Industrial Department had been
placed in a variety of occupations including precision instrument workers, turret and engine lathe
operators, milling machine operators, inspectors, and drill press operators among other
occupations.195
Beginning in 1943, as black women found employment in many major war production
plants including the Brooklyn Navy Yard, the Intertype Corporation, the Arma Corporation, and
garment firms, the Negro Labor Committee became active in organizing black women. 196 The
NLC established a women’s division of the organization in 1944 to deal with the large increase
in women workers in the city and a club room was set up for women workers in the Harlem
Labor Center, a meeting place run by the Negro Labor Committee that served as headquarters for
trade unions in Harlem.197 In the face of increasing racial hostilities and the foreseeable
problems for black labor during reconversion, the Negro Labor Committee looked as early as
1944 to take steps to provide black workers, especially women, with a stable place in unions and
industrial positions.198
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Table 6: Brooklyn Urban League Placements in the first half of 1943199

Female

Male

General Factory
Packers & Wrappers
P(ower) .M(achine)
.O(perator).
Clerical
Dial Painters
Stock Clerks
Inspection
Assembly
Welding
Drill Press
Unclassified (Civil Service,
USES, menial)
Training (with & without pay)

223
75
72

Laborers
Porters
Machine Shop

102
72
22

25
21
20
16
16
9
3
272

General Factory
Welding
Auto Machines
Machinist
Aircraft & Riveting
Shipfitters
Drill Press
Training (with & without pay)

44
7
10
2
2
3
1
61

309

23

Total
Total Unskilled

1061
606
(57%)
455
(43%)

Unclassified (Civil Service,
USES, Menial)
Total
Total Unskilled

Total Skilled / Semi-skilled

Total Skilled / Semi-skilled

349
241
(69%)
108
(31%)

Green – Unskilled Positions
Blue – Skilled / Semi-skilled

Work in war industries was not available to all black women however. The great
majority of the 2,546 female applicants desiring war employment were between thirty and forty
years of age. The Urban League’s Industrial Department found it hard to place these applicants
in positions in war industries because of age requirements set by the factories. Many factories
set an age limit for women hired for work, and many African American women applying for jobs
were older. Moreover, most black women had limited factory experience and needed training.
Though white women did not have experience or training for factory work either, management
more readily accepted them into training programs, evidence of management’s preference for
white workers. Training with pay jobs were the most coveted positions by black women, but
199
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high education, physical, and “type” requirements (requirements that did not explicitly have to
do with race but would exclude most black applicants) demanded by the major war industries in
the city automatically disqualified most Negro women from these training positions. Although
outright racial discrimination by war industries was illegal, factory employers used non- racial
criteria to continue to exclude black women from skilled positions. They did however place
black women in unskilled positions in factories.200
Despite these remaining bars to the employment of black women in war industries other
areas of employment opened. Because whites were vacating positions in department stores
(termed at the time retail selling) and restaurants for war or better paying industrial jobs, Negro
women were being hired in large numbers for the first time.201 Generally service occupations in
non-essential industries were less desirable than jobs in war industry. Because of lower pay
there was heavy labor turnover in the service positions. The complete shut-down of some
luncheonettes, cutbacks on days of operation in restaurants, and the deterioration of services
reflect the difficulties restaurants faced due to labor shortages. As restaurant workers left their
jobs to fight in the war or for better paying jobs in war industries and elsewhere, restaurant
owners took the USES’ advice and began hiring women, older workers and blacks to fill vacant
positions. Placements of black workers increased considerably during the first five months of
the year. African Americans comprised 35 percent of the total restaurant placements as
compared to 12 percent for the same period a year earlier. Black membership in Local 6 of the
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Hotel and Club Employees’ union increased as well, rising from 5 percent of the locals’ 16,000
members to 20 percent.202
Many black women also found employment in the needle trades as the Brooklyn Urban
League placed its third largest group of applicants in positions in that sector. Many black
women who had worked in garment factories before the war had industrial experience.203 The
International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), a major labor organizer for the apparel
industry, had readily accepted black members since the 1930s.204 Black women however were
reluctant to take these positions during the war because the pay in war industries was
substantially better; but they were forced to by the lack of other job opportunities.205
As more and more women used the Brooklyn Urban League’s placement service to find
employment, the number of men using the organization to obtain jobs decreased. In the first half
of 1943 of a total 3,447 applicants to the League’s Industrial Department only 901 were males.
Men made up 27 percent of all applicants interviewed by the organization, however a large
percentage of those interviews were conducted in the first few months of 1943. In fact the
number of male applicants decreased so much that even with the increase in its service to women
the Brooklyn Urban League’s total number of persons served in 1943 was lower than the similar
period of the previous year. Moreover the number of men placed in skilled and semi-skilled
positions by the League was much lower than that of women applicants. Aircraft industries
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remained largely closed to both black men and women.206 There is no concrete information as to
why this was the case. Perhaps fewer men used the job placement service because the labor
shortage had forced industries to lower their barriers against black employment.
Despite the opening of new occupations to blacks in war industries, many companies
continued to hire blacks for unskilled, low skilled and menial positions.207 Moreover,
discrimination continued in various forms including refusal to hire African Americans and hiring
of blacks for only maintenance and porter positions. Some war industries also employed blacks
as token workers, hiring just enough to avoid investigation by government agencies. In addition
some war plants would hire minorities sent by USES for jobs and then quickly fire them.208
The U.S. Employment Service, a federal organization that was supposed to enforce laws
barring discriminatory hiring practices, itself practiced racial discrimination. In August of 1943
the State, County and Municipal Workers of America (SCMWA), a CIO union, charged that the
New York State USES was not following its own antidiscrimination policy. James King, the
New York district president of the SCMWA, criticized USES for allowing employers who had
been refused service at a local office for discriminatory hiring policies to use the service at
another location. Moreover King charged that USES did not adequately and fairly train
applicants because its employees did not want to work with blacks, Jews or Catholics.209 This
was not surprising as USES was more closely oriented toward employers and concerned with
continuous, efficient production. No matter the reason, the continued discrimination against
206

“Negro Worker Asset or Liability? America Must Decide,” Semi-Annual Report of the Brooklyn Urban League
Industrial Department, August 1943, New York State War Council COD, Box 7, Folder 340.
See Table 6.
207
“Negro Worker Asset or Liability? America Must Decide,” Semi-Annual Report of the Brooklyn Urban League
Industrial Department, August 1943. New York State War Council COD, Box 7, Folder 340.
208
New York State Office of War Information Report, released May 9, 1943, New York State War Council COD,
Box 6, Folder 265.
209
“USES Drafts New Plan to Fight Discrimination,” New York P. M., August 29, 1943, New York State War
Council COD, Box 5, Folder 217 - Organizations Other Than NYSCOD.

101
African American workers, even by government offices that were supposed to uphold nondiscrimination policies was a source of disappointment for many African Americans.
Despite continued challenges integrating war industries, 1943 proved to be a pivotal year
for the employment of black workers. As the government gave factories in the city more
production contracts, they in turn hired African Americans. Electrical machinery and chemical
industries, shipyards, and scientific instrument factories hired black workers. More and more
African Americans found higher-paying skilled and semi-skilled positions, particularly in the
case of companies investigated by the FEPC. Employment opportunities were especially
important for black women as many found jobs outside of domestic service positions. Some
found jobs in war industries as the Urban League placed 43 percent of women in skilled and
semi-skilled positions as opposed to 31 percent of black men.210 Others found employment in
restaurants and department stores.

Continued Activism for Equal Employment Opportunities
The success of efforts by the FEPC and COD in opening jobs in war industries to blacks
could not have been achieved without the continued cooperation of black organizations. The
Brooklyn Urban League led in these efforts. The organization continued to pressure both
employers and government agencies for equal employment opportunity as New York City’s
labor market improved in 1943.
The Brooklyn Urban League (BKUL) continued its close collaboration with the COD.
The cooperation of BKUL and the New York State Committee on Discrimination was facilitated
by close communication between officers in the two organizations. The BKUL kept in close
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contact with the COD in order to make the government agency aware of any activities
concerning black employment and discrimination against blacks in companies that produced war
goods. The BKUL Industrial Secretary Lorenzo Davis sent letters to COD Executive Director
Charles Berkley detailing the BKUL’s negotiations for black employment with companies with
war contracts.211 In instances where Davis felt the Urban League’s activities were not enough to
effect change, he referred the organization’s information on specific cases to the COD and asked
for assistance in placing black workers.
The BKUL also shared information its workers gathered on companies the COD was
investigating. In July of 1943 Davis sent Berkley reports on three companies the COD was
currently investigating – Arma Engineering Corporation, Sperry Gyroscope Corporation, and the
Bulova Watch Corporation.212 The BKUL claimed that Bulova, which had been paying for daily
newspaper and radio advertisements for more than a week in a desperate effort to get women
workers, told all qualified black women referred by the BKUL that there were no job openings.
The BKUL charged that though there were supposedly no openings at Bulova, white women
were being hastily hired. The report alleged the Arma Corporation, which manufactured
scientific instruments - specifically analog computers - during the war, practiced a different
method of discrimination equally effective. The corporation set extra high qualifications for
black female applicants that the BKUL sent for jobs. At the time the report was published, only
six of seventy black applicants sent to Arma had been hired. The report also provided details on
the use of higher employment standards and rigid testing standards to eliminate black workers at
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the Sperry Corporation. The BKUL claimed that Sperry, which had earlier in the year opened an
employment office in Harlem in response to prolonged agitation for black employment, had
announced that it would hire 500 black workers. The Harlem office was almost entirely staffed
by blacks and received a majority of black applicants for trainee and skilled positions. The
Harlem office rejected 93 of every 100 applicants through testing or while training. Many black
job applicants to Sperry made complaints to the BKUL citing difficult testing and arbitrary
rejections by the company’s Harlem office. 213 From the evidence it is unclear whether the
Urban League’s charges were true or how much direct effect this particular episode had on the
companies’ employment policies. It is significant however that after COD initiated
investigations into the hiring practices of these companies, both Arma and Sperry hired black
workers in positions not open to them previously and Sperry continued to do so after the war.
The Brooklyn Urban League played an important role in relaying information about the hiring
practices of companies suspected of discrimination. With an established record for job
placements perhaps the COD believed the Urban League was the most reliable source of
information on black employment. The BKUL kept the COD’s attention on the continued bias
of firms that it was investigating; pushing the agency to continually confront the companies to
make them end discriminatory practices.
Not only did the Brooklyn Urban League transmit information to the COD, but it
received information as well. The COD provided the Brooklyn Urban League with information
the COD had gathered during its investigations including statistics and official statements of
companies’ policies. After Bulova Watch Company rejected six of seven black female
applicants for an advertised position in the company the BKUL looked to the COD for
213
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assistance. To help its efforts to get black women hired at Bulova, Davis asked the COD to get
information on how many black women were employed by the firm in comparison to whites.214
The Brooklyn Urban League incorporated these numbers in their reports and public statements.
In 1943 the BKUL also began to cooperate with federal offices. The League became the
official cooperating placement agency of the United States Employment Service.215 Officers in
the League also cooperated with the FEPC to investigate one of the largest employers in the
state, the Brooklyn Navy Yard. Davis, Industrial Secretary of the Brooklyn Urban League and
Chairman of the Citizens’ Anti-Discrimination Committee (CADC) on the Brooklyn Navy Yard,
took steps to file a brief with the FEPC alleging discrimination by the Navy. Having received
numerous complaints alleging discrimination, intimidation, and unsatisfactory treatment from
superiors, Davis asked members of the CADC to approve an official complaint about the Navy
Yard’s discrimination requesting immediate FEPC intervention.216 These reports of
discrimination against the Navy Yard, along with agitation from the National Negro Congress,
led the FEPC to conduct intensive investigations of the employment practices of the Brooklyn
Navy Yard in 1944 and 1945.217
The collaborative relationships between the Brooklyn Urban League and the FEPC and
COD accounted for the organization’s success in placing black workers in industrial positions.
The Brooklyn Urban League’s employment service placed 1,410 African Americans in jobs
during the first half of 1943 alone. Though the majority (60 percent) of black workers placed by
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the employment service were placed in unskilled positions; the large minority (40 percent) of job
applicants it placed in higher-paying skilled and semi-skilled positions was very significant.218
These applicants held jobs that were closed to African Americans before the labor shortage in
1943.219 The Brooklyn Urban League considered the State Committee on Discrimination one of
its major supporters whose cooperation, along with the help of the FEPC, allowed the League to
successfully facilitate the hiring of black women in civilian and defense industries. In its 1943
semi-annual report the BKUL Industrial Department paid tribute to the COD and the Fair
Employment Practices Committee for aiding in its drive to secure equal economic opportunity
for black workers in New York City.220 The BKUL’s placement of blacks in these positions
constituted a definite and significant change in employment trends for the rest of the war.
The influence of black activism in opening employment opportunities for black workers
is clear. The Sperry and Arma Corporations, which previously did not employ African
Americans, hired black workers and in 1944 were among the first companies to hire African
Americans for office positions. Though the labor shortage accounted for some of the appreciable
gains for black laborers in 1943, Arma and Sperry had been the focus of very public protests
from the NAACP and the Brooklyn Urban League. Public protests, published reports of
discrimination, and referral of complaints of discrimination also led to FEPC and COD
investigations of the two companies. It was through a combination of these causes; a labor
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shortage, black organizational activity, and investigations by the FEPC and State War Council’s
Committee on Discrimination; that many blacks were able to find industrial positions. The
cooperation between social organizations like the Urban League and government agencies which
enforced progressive state legislation barring discriminatory hiring practices led to increases in
the number of blacks working in war production plants. In this way the Brooklyn Urban League
became part of the enforcement infrastructure for fair employment agencies. Despite some
scholars’ depictions of the Urban League as a conservative black organization with regard to
civil rights activism, in this period and in this borough, the Brooklyn Urban League was an
active agent of change.221

Unrest for Opportunity: The Harlem Riot of 1943
In July of 1943 the Brooklyn Urban League issued a report stating that more job
applications were coming in per day to war industries in New York than at any other time in
history, but pondered why companies still complained of a labor shortage. In their estimation the
manpower deficiency in the Brooklyn / New York area was artificial, created by the
unwillingness of these industries to hire black workers.222 As the report highlights, after the
labor shortage the opening of industrial job opportunities to black workers did not come
wholesale. Not all war industries integrated, nor did every factory in integrated industries hire
black workers. The process was slow and incomplete.
The frustrations blacks felt at employers’ continued refusals to employ them in higher
paying war industries contributed to the Harlem Riot. On the night of August 2nd a riot began in
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response to a white police officer shooting an off-duty Negro soldier whom he charged with
interfering in the arrest of a black woman in the lobby of a hotel on 126th Street. False rumors
circulated accusing the officer of having killed the soldier while trying to defend his mother. In
response to the rumors black rioters broke store windows, looted, damaged property, and
attacked policemen. By the morning of August 3rd 6 people had been killed, 189 injured, 606
arrested, and hundreds of stores looted. Property damage was estimated at two million dollars.223
Though the catalyst for violence were the rumors of police brutality, many black New
Yorkers and some African American leaders believed this burst of violent action was an
outgrowth of unequal economic opportunities for New York’s Negroes. In an editorial in the
Amsterdam News one writer explained that equal treatment of blacks, including equal job
opportunities, could have prevented the riot. He wrote:
While we are aware that absolute democracy cannot be attained for all of the
people of this country in a short period of time, we believe that America will not
be embarrassed before the world by other race riots if the Negro Americans are
granted their just deserts [sic] of:
1) Equal job opportunity.
2) Equal treatment in the armed forces.
3) Equal protection of their legal and civil rights.
If these elementary rights of citizenship are not granted to Negroes now, other
similar disturbances should cause no surprise.224
In this instance it is clear that the lack of equal employment opportunity was thought by
some to be a major precipitating factor for the unrest in Harlem. From his placement of job
discrimination at the top of the list of what blacks deserved, this writer believed that the lack of
equal job opportunities perhaps was the most important factor in the riot. Many black leaders
believed the frustration blacks felt over job discrimination had contributed to the Harlem Riot.
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Whether they were right or wrong, black leaders in New York used the new attention to advance
their ideas for racial uplift.
BKUL Industrial Secretary Lorenzo Davis similarly linked the discrimination against
blacks in the war industries and the riots that swept the country in the summer of 1943.225 In the
1943 semi-annual report of the Brooklyn Urban League Davis expressed his belief that the
disturbance in Harlem was in part caused by the failure to integrate black workers into America’s
war-time economy. He emphasized the role of the Negro worker because all the major
disturbances took place in centers of concentrated war activity where the status of black workers
had been a controversial issue – Mobile, Alabama; Detroit, Michigan; Beaumont, Texas;
Chester, Pennsylvania; Baltimore, Maryland; and Brooklyn and Harlem, New York. In all of
those instances injustices to black workers contributed to the conditions which made these
violent outbreaks possible. The denial of employment opportunity, discrimination in the work
place, segregation of blacks after employment, wage differentials favoring white workers, and
the denial of promotion of black workers consistent with their skills were routine practices for
war industries. Davis believed that the government’s solutions had not been adequate and
challenged it to treat these companies with a democratic firmness ensuring an end to
discrimination.226
Like Davis other black leaders urged the city, state, and federal governments to find
solutions to the conditions that caused the Harlem Riot. A. Philip Randolph called on Mayor La
Guardia to create a Commission on Race to study the reasons for the riot. Randolph himself was
convinced that the inequality of opportunity for black economic advancement had contributed to
the riot. Though Randolph did not condone the actions of those who perpetrated the property
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damage, he did urge blacks to “stand up and fight for their constitutional and economic rights
with the ballot, constructive agitation, education through moral, religious and labor
organizations, and all means lawful and orderly, of social protest.”227 In response to the unrest,
and at the prompting of black leaders and the New York City Council, Mayor La Guardia created
a commission dedicated to the study of race relations in the city called the Mayor’s Committee
on Unity. This new committee was significant as it was the first of its type and because it was
made into a permanent institution.228
In the wake of the riot, labor activist Frank Crosswaith called a meeting of the members
of the Negro Labor Committee to consider the need for a worker education program to combat
racism within unions. Crosswaith believed educating workers about black contributions to
American life was one way to foster better relations between workers of all races and ethnicities.
Elmer Carter, a NLC representative from the COD, felt that unions themselves should improve
conditions between black and white workers. In his opinion, members of unions affiliated with
the CIO needed to be acquainted with what their union constitutions stood for – the inclusion of
workers of all races and the solidarity of all workers regardless of race. Crosswaith suggested
using Education Committees in unions affiliated with the AFL and CIO to educate their white
members. The committee resolved to focus on using the existing union machinery to make
workers recognize that blacks were human beings and should be treated as such. Their hope was
that this education would allow white union member to accept black workers. In the NLC’s
estimation this was the only way to avoid continued racial upheaval and bloodshed.229
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The NLC created a Committee on Race Relations in October of 1943 to survey union
practices and identify unions that discriminated against black members. They would then
campaign for an end to these racist practices. The committee was also focused on teaching
workers about the problems black workers faced. The Committee looked to achieve this through
collaboration with the FEPC, the COD, the National Urban League, the Young Men’s Christian
Association., the Young Women’s Christian Association, and the Labor Committee of the
NAACP.230 Racial tolerance among workers became the primary focus of the NLC after the
Harlem Riot.
The riot also prompted black organizations to increase the pressure on federal offices to
investigate discrimination by major war industries in the area. The National Negro Congress and
Brooklyn Urban League continued their efforts to end racial bias in New York’s war industries
focusing in particular on the Brooklyn Navy Yard, one of the largest employers in the city. By
1943 the Navy Yard, which experienced an acute labor shortage, had begun hiring black
workers, so many of these cases were not about discriminatory hiring practices but alleged
inequitable treatment of black workers. Many black women working in the yard filed
discrimination complaints with the NNC alleging that black workers were forced to labor under
conditions detrimental to their health and assigned menial work that was beneath their job
classifications and abilities. Moreover, these women reported that when workers complained
about the practices to managers, they were given low efficiency ratings and assigned to
undesirable jobs. Rear Admiral Kelly, the Commandant of the Brooklyn Navy Yard,
categorically denied the existence of any racial discrimination toward black workers. The
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National Negro Congress, with the cooperation of the Brooklyn Urban League, began a drive to
get the complaints of black workers in the Navy Yard registered with the FEPC.231
Blacks’ discontent with unequal employment opportunities led leaders of government fair
employment agencies to renew their efforts to end racial prejudice in war industries. Joseph
O’Connor, WMC Deputy Regional Director, promised a clear cut procedure to put teeth into the
anti-discrimination policy of the USES in New York. He did however defend the activities of
the USES using its record and cooperative relationship with the State Committee on
Discrimination as evidence of its commitment to ending discriminatory hiring practices.232
The new state governor Thomas Dewey, in an effort to win public, support took on the
issue of discrimination in employment but did not use the COD as his main instrument to do so.
In May, 1943 Dewey publicly expressed his deep dissatisfaction with the committee and he
slashed233 the COD’s budget by 25 percent in June, a move that New York’s black activists
feared would cripple the agency.234 As the allies’ victory in Europe became more probable,
perhaps the agency seemed less necessary. After all the mandate of the COD would vanish with
the end of the war as would the war contracts over which it had jurisdiction, and even if the
agency survived it had no independent authority to enforce the law. Fearing that the COD would
end, Alvin Johnson, the new president of the Committee worked with committee members to
draft a legislative proposal creating a permanent, independent commission with centralized
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jurisdiction over public and private employment. 235 The COD also used public reaction over the
Harlem Riot and revulsion against Anti-Semitism and the lobbying activities of the American
Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith to argue for the creation of a
permanent Committee. In response Dewey appointed an ad hoc commission against
discrimination.236
By the end of 1943 the activities of the Committee on Discrimination and other fair
employment agencies would be even more important. The scope of the activities of the COD
and FEPC expanded after 1943. Not only did the organization try to integrate war industries, but
it also began to eradicate unfair and discriminatory treatment of blacks hired by war industries.
Moreover, as the end of the war loomed so did the prospect of reconversion. The competition
over jobs would increase as soldiers returned from the war and war industries reconverted to
consumer production, losing lucrative government contracts and perhaps cutting jobs. This
caused the COD to undertake efforts to prevent of a return to lily-white industrial factories. The
violent outburst in Harlem the previous August increased fears that reconversion and the loss of
jobs for blacks would result in another burst of violence as it had after World War I.

Anxiety and Action: Government Agencies’ Increased Efforts for Black Employment
In 1944 the Committee on Discrimination, renamed the New York State Committee
Against Discrimination (CAD), stated that racial and religious tensions in the state had reached
serious proportions. The critical need for increased war production coupled with the necessity to
fully utilize manpower resources gave the committee a sense of urgency which was reflected in
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the increased number of investigations it conducted in 1944. Various factors contributed to the
increase in racial antagonisms in the city. Prospects for an early peace brought with it cutbacks
in production, talk of reconversion, and mass layoffs. Perhaps most importantly there was fear
of post-war unemployment, which much like the unemployment in the wake of World War I,
would more adversely affect African Americans and women as they were the first ousted from
jobs in war industries. All of these factors played a part in creating a climate of fear, which the
CAD considered conducive to the growth of racial and religious tensions. For these reasons, the
work of the Committee increased considerably in volume.237
The field representatives of the committee conducted more investigations during 1944
than in either of the two previous years. The CAD investigated war plants, employment
agencies, labor unions, defense training schools, and some public utilities. Field representatives
followed the Committee’s established practice of persuasion and conciliation with companies
with discriminatory practices rather than compulsion to comply with the law.238 Fifty percent of
the 505 companies investigated by the CAD in 1944 involved war plants, employment agencies,
labor unions and miscellaneous organizations in the New York City metropolitan area. Because
this area was the country’s largest industrial center and the center of the state’s black population,
most of the Committee’s efforts were concentrated there.239
The CAD found that though more blacks were being hired by war production plants, in
1944 African Americans were still underrepresented in war industries throughout the state.
Blacks constituted less than 2 percent of the New York State work force in war plants but made
up 4 percent of the state’s population. Furthermore, the CAD found that blacks had not been
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upgraded to the highest positions for which many were qualified, a situation that the committee
considered important to understanding why there were critical shortages of skilled labor in many
occupation categories.240
Continued discrimination caused the disparity in employment levels. Employers blamed
their white workers for low levels of black employment claiming that they could not hire African
Americans because white employees refused to work with them. In addition companies used the
“failure to apply” excuse for not hiring black workers. They argued that there was a “total
absence of Negroes” from the employment rolls because no African Americans applied for jobs.
CAD field representatives however found evidence to the contrary. African Americans
frequently did not seek employment in positions where blacks were not typically hired. CAD
therefore pointed out to employers that a negative policy of waiting for blacks to apply for jobs
would not bring positive results. To overcome blacks’ belief that they would not be hired, the
committee suggested that the companies send letters to organizations responsible for placing
black workers in positions – like the USES and the Urban League – explaining that they would
hire blacks. These companies were required to send copies of such letters to the CAD. The
refusal of an employer to take such action was considered evidence of discrimination and would
subject the company to other compliance measures.241
Obtaining employment was not the only challenge black workers faced. Members of the
CAD field staff also found that some war industries refused to integrate minority groups after
hiring. The discrimination against employed African Americans included failure to pay equal
wages for equal work, failure to upgrade, segregation, isolation, and use of separate dressing
rooms, sanitary and toilet facilities. Some employers discriminated by assigning black workers
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to menial, janitorial, or other low-paying laboring jobs. According to the CAD, segregation of
black workers created in the collective minds of the white workers “attitudes of racial
exclusiveness and fosters a myth of race superiority.”242 These attitudes, therefore contributed to
employers’ excuses that they did not hire black workers because white workers refused to work
with them. CAD itself was pessimistic about the gains blacks had made, cautioning against
conflating employers’ increased willingness to employ blacks with an end to racism. In fact the
organization claimed the relaxation of discriminatory practices may have been an effect of the
increased need for labor.243
Despite the Committee’s pessimism, CAD statistics showed that the news was not
completely bleak for blacks looking for war-time employment. Towards the end of 1944 24,900
blacks were employed in 270 leading New York City war plants constituting 8.4 percent of the
total staff.244 This was due, in part, to continued improvements in the labor market of the war
industries. In the first quarter of 1944 it was not difficult for either a white or black worker to
secure a job. It was easier however for a white worker to secure certain types of work, namely
skilled positions. Despite this difference, it was less difficult for African Americans to secure
more desirable, higher paying kinds of jobs than in the previous three years.245 Statistics
demonstrated these trends. The ratio of all black workers to total personnel in these same 270
war firms a year earlier in November of 1943 had been only 6 percent. Moreover despite an
overall decrease of 6,400 workers in the plants between September and November, nearly 1,300
blacks were hired during the same period. In addition, there were above average percentages of
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black employment reported in plants producing steel products (16.3 percent), electrical
machinery (11.4 percent), and nonferrous metals (11.1 percent). In terms of absolute numbers,
the shipbuilding industry remained the largest employer of blacks (8,969), followed by electrical
machinery (5,696), ordnance plants (2,230), and factories making scientific instruments
(2,028).246
Other encouraging black employment trends were recorded by the United States
Employment Service. There were fewer reports of discriminatory hiring practices filed against
firms serviced by USES and local offices reported that employers seemed to be more receptive to
relaxing their job specifications once they were investigated. Placements of blacks in
manufacturing firms increased during 1944. In February of 1945 blacks constituted 30 percent
of USES placement activity in manufacturing plants as opposed to 23 percent one year prior.
Outside of household placements USES placed black workers in apparel, shipbuilding, and
electrical machinery plants, all manufacturing industries which employed above-average
proportions of black workers.247

The Next Step: The Question of Upgrading in 1944
Like the CAD, the regional office of the FEPC continued its activities to alleviate
discrimination. And like the CAD the FEPC began to investigate discrimination against blacks
employed in war industries. One of the industries under FEPC scrutiny in 1944 was the
Brooklyn Navy Yard. In 1944 and 1945, pressured by the complaints of black workers and the
National Negro Congress, the New York office of the FEPC investigated and helped arbitrate
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fifty-one cases charging discrimination against African American workers at the Navy Yard.
Many of these cases were brought to the Navy Yard with the help of the Brooklyn Urban
League.248
By that time the Brooklyn Navy Yard had become the largest employer of African
Americans in New York City, employing 6,250 black workers.249 Therefore, most of the
complainants were skilled or semi-skilled workers who claimed they were denied requests for
upgrades and promotions because of racial discrimination (22 cases). The second largest amount
of cases brought to the FEPC involved accusations that the Navy Yard dismissed or suspended
them unfairly due to race (11 cases). Discriminatory hiring was the third most common
complaint brought to the FEPC about the Navy Yard (5 cases). There were various other
complaints filed with the FEPC including denials of transfers and unjust efficiency ratings due to
racism, refusals to train Negro workers, and several instances of mistreatment because of race.250
Of the twenty-two cases brought before the FEPC claiming denials of promotions and
upgrades, half of those (11) were “satisfactorily adjusted.” That is, in half of the cases the
plaintiffs were awarded promotions after FEPC investigations. The FEPC dismissed all of the
complaints on unfair dismissals and suspensions and all but one of the complaints of
discriminatory hiring practices.251 The FEPC had its most important and effective role in helping
Negro workers already hired by the Brooklyn Navy Yard achieve higher status and pay in the
company. The campaign of the NNC and BKUL had a large part in facilitating the adjustment
and eradication of discriminatory employment practices.
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Even in cases where the FEPC did not officially record a satisfactory adjustment, it is
clear its investigations still had positive effects. George DeYounge, a recent migrant, had
worked as a mechanical and architectural draftsman and filed a complaint with the FEPC on
February 1, 1945 alleging that he was denied a transfer to a position for which he was better
qualified. He also wanted to contest the efficiency rating he was given, as it was the reason the
Navy Yard denied his request for a transfer.252 DeYounge had originally been assigned work as
a Junior Engineering Draftsman with a SP-3 rating in April of 1942 after being transferred from
Washington, D. C. to the New York Navy Yard in Brooklyn. In October of that year he was
promoted to Assistant Engineering Draftsman with an SP-4 rating and in December he was made
an Engineering Draftsman with a SP-5 rating. DeYounge requested a transfer from the General
Arrangements Section in November of 1944 to the Diesel Section.253
DeYounge’s application for a transfer was denied because of a severe shortage of
personnel in the section in which he was already working. Furthermore, DeYounge had been
given an efficiency rating of “Fair” which did not warrant his transfer to a more skilled position.
DeYounge appealed his efficiency rating. Because of his persistent appeals, the Diesel Section
granted DeYounge’s request for an interview and though he had no previous experience was
given a job in that area. DeYounge however declined and chose to remain in the General
Arrangements department.254
Part of the reason DeYounge declined the position in the Diesel Department may have
been that the General Assignments department began giving him tasks that better utilized his
skills. Between January 30 (two days before his complaint was officially filed with the FEPC)
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and July, 1945, DeYounge had been assigned work involving docking plans and data required
for the dry docking of ships, such as checking and designating on drawings the appropriate
locations for openings below the water line on ships which were placed in drydock. It was
estimated that these duties constituted about 25 percent of his assigned responsibilities.
DeYounge, as of July of 1945, was interested and satisfied with his new duties and on July 2,
1945 received an unofficial rating of good.255 Though the Navy Yard did not officially record a
satisfactory adjustment for this case because Mr. DeYounge was never transferred to the Diesel
Department, the fact that the FEPC investigated and workers had a place to voice their
complaints affected the working conditions and tasks black employees were given.

From the Factory to the Office: Black Employment in White Collar Positions
While African Americans were increasingly being employed in New York war plants, no
corresponding progress was noted with respect to employment of blacks in positions connected
with the administration of business, such as office or white collar workers. Resistance to
employment of blacks as stenographers, typists, or filing clerks was greater than in factory work.
Some progress was noted though. The Sperry and Arma Corporations were included in a list of
establishments using black workers in office positions, not surprising since they had been
investigated by the FEPC and WMC. Of the twenty-nine companies listed as using blacks as
office workers, twenty-eight were in New York City.256
Though many white collar office jobs were not open to black workers, employment
advances were made for black workers in telephone companies. After complaints of
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discrimination were filed against Bell Telephone Laboratories by well-qualified black women in
October 1943, the USES suspended service to the firm while it investigated its hiring practices.
Upon completion of the probe USES revealed that the charges of discrimination were justified.
In a conference at the FEPC’s New York office, company officials stated that supervisors in
local USES offices had not been complying with the company’s anti-discrimination measures
which had been put into place in conformity with Executive Order 9346 which eliminated
discrimination in regard to hire, tenure, terms or conditions of employment, or union membership in war industries. The FEPC sent instructions to remedy the situation. At the time Bell
Telephone Laboratories employed only sixty-seven black workers. By August 1944 the number
had risen to 186, and many of these workers held professional and clerical jobs, as well as skilled
positions in shop and maintenance departments.257
In December, a new occupation opened for black women at the New York Telephone
Company. Management hired twenty-six women as its first black operators. Though the
company had a stated policy of non-discrimination, black women who were denied jobs proved
that statement untrue. A young black woman filed a complaint with the regional FEPC the
previous summer alleging that New York Telephone had refused her employment as a
switchboard operator because of her race. Although her specific complaint was dismissed, the
FECP investigated the general complaint that blacks had not been hired for such jobs. The
company was ordered to advise the Committee of any progress it made in hiring minorities.
Thirty days after the conference New York Telephone announced that it had found and accepted
twenty-six African American women for training and employment as operators, four of whom
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went to work the following Monday.258 Though the company claimed that the “employment of
Negro girls … was in line with company policy” it is clear that the FEPC investigation was the
stimulus for the company’s action since it hired them soon after FEPC proceedings.259
Though there was slow and incomplete success in integrating companies, there were
tangible achievements through legislation and the courts. The New York State Court of Appeals
in July1944, for the first time brought unions within the purview of the antidiscrimination law.
In an effort to comply with Section 43 of the state Civil Rights Law which prohibited labor
organizations “from denying membership to persons by reason of race, color, creed or national
origin”, the New York locals of the Railway Mail Association admitted seven black members.
When the national union ordered the New York local to oust them, the New York locals referred
the issue to the Committee Against Discrimination, which referred the case to the Industrial
Commissioner for a hearing. The New York Supreme Court found in favor of the national union
which argued that the Railway Mail Association was a fraternal, beneficiary association and not
a labor organization and therefore not subject to the state’s anti-discrimination law. When the
local appealed the decision to the state Court of Appeals, the ruling was overturned in a
unanimous opinion therefore upholding the anti-discrimination law preventing labor unions from
denying membership to minority groups.260

Ives-Quinn Law: Anti-Discrimination after the War
Another major victory in the fight against discrimination in employment came in 1945.
The New York State assembly, for the first time anywhere in the country, created a permanent
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fair employment practice commission. In June of 1944 Governor Dewey created a committee to
study discrimination in the state. Irving Ives, a Republican assemblyman from central New York
chaired the committee. Ives was known for his consistent liberalism on civil rights and became
the central legislative figure supporting the Ives-Quinn bill which would outlaw discrimination in
employment on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin.261
Governor Dewey’s study group advised the state government to create of a permanent
State Committee Against Discrimination (SCAD) in the Executive Office of the State. The
SCAD would consist of five members, with the power to formulate policies; adopt rules and
regulations; and receive, investigate and pass on complaints alleging discrimination in
employment. It could also hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and compel the production of
records. This new committee would also be able to create agencies and councils necessary to
uphold the laws. One significant feature of the proposed law was that it declared the opportunity
to obtain employment without discrimination a civil right.262
As expected organized labor (particularly the CIO-affiliated unions), the NAACP, NUL,
and American Jewish Congress all rallied behind the bill. Black leaders, organizations, and press
in New York publicly rallied whole heartedly in support of the law which categorically barred
employment discrimination based on race, creed, religion, or ethnicity in all industries. Frank
Crosswaith of the Negro Labor Committee sent telegrams to Governor Dewey, Senator Quinn,
and Assemblyman Ives urging the necessity of the bill’s passage.263 African American leaders,
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organizations and press publicly advocated the passage of this anti-discrimination law as a way
to finally end racial bias and the treatment of black New Yorkers as second-class citizens.
Ives promoted the law by explaining that discrimination was a threat to American
democracy just as fascism was overseas.264 Republican Party leaders who held or aspired to state
offices such as Dewey and Ives took a liberal stance on fair employment, supporting the bill
because they needed to compete for minority votes in statewide elections. However most rank
and file Republican representatives from upstate, rural areas, where few racial and religious
minorities resided strongly opposed the bill. Their stance largely reflected that of their
constituents. There was also opposition from some residents of New York City’s suburbs –
Westchester, parts of Queens, and Long Island – who disagreed with what they believed would
be preferential treatment to black citizens.265
Though many politicians opposed the law, most would not openly criticize its aims
especially as intellectuals, liberal politicians, and minorities increasingly equated the war as a
fight against the Nazis and racism. Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma, one of the most
influential writings on race relations of the time, argued that the oppressive treatment of blacks in
this country undermined the American creed which emphasizes liberty, equality, justice, and fair
treatment of all people. White racism, and not any biological, innate inferiority, had produced
African American inequality. Myrdal argued that discrimination forced blacks into lowly social
positions, which in turn confirmed beliefs of African American inferiority.266 In this changing
intellectual climate there was an increasing sentiment that discrimination was no longer
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acceptable. Therefore diverse segments of the business community – manufacturers, merchants,
and the corporate bar – joined to praise the intent of the bill, but warned that if it was passed jobs
would flee the state, discrimination would intensify, and disgruntled employees would unfairly
threaten their employers with work stoppages. Those opposing the bill also claimed the law
would cause resentment that could spark race riots. Conservatives compared Ives-Quinn with
the Wagner Act which they claimed prevented employers from firing incompetent and
insubordinate workers.267
In February, 1945 Republicans, in an attempt to garner support opposing the legislation,
called for a hearing on the bill in the Assembly. Robert Moses inflamed matters by claiming that
the proposed Ives-Quinn would force companies to use hiring quotas and would therefore
prevent them from hiring workers based on merit. Mayor La Guardia did not testify but sent a
statement of support for the legislation, challenging Moses’ criticism. At the hearings,
supporters for the law outnumbered opponents by an eight to one margin, and the proceedings
backfired against the racially conservative Republicans who had called for it. Within weeks the
Assembly and the Senate passed the bill. The Ives-Quinn Act mandated equal treatment in public
and private employment and allowed the newly reformed State Commission Against
Discrimination (SCAD) to enforce the law. If the committee determined that discrimination had
occurred, it could direct the company to stop such action and take affirmative action measures
such as hiring, reinstatement, or upgrading employees. The orders handed down by the
commission would be subject to judicial review.268
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As Robert Weaver, former head of the Negro Manpower Service of the War Manpower
Commission, explained, at the end of the war in 1945 there was no adequate national legislative
program for reconversion.269 Therefore there was no legal way for the national government to
protect the employment gains blacks achieved during the war. The FEPC remained a temporary
agency and was deprived of federal funds. New York was one of only three states in the nation
to pass fair employment legislation.270 This was an important development to not only protect
African Americans but to also prevent the racial problems that emerged in the wake of World
War I.
There were many advances in black employment during 1944 and 1945. First, major war
industries employed more black workers. This was due to continued labor shortages as well as
the activities of government agencies especially since the state was equipped with new weapons
to fight employment discrimination. The State Committee Against Discrimination was able to
use new laws barring discriminatory hiring practices in war industries to continue to investigate
and prosecute companies discriminating against black employees. Their actions were aided by
the activities of the regional FEPC who cooperated closely with SCAD and the local offices of
the United States Employment Service.
New York’s black civil rights activists scored a major victory in the fight for equal
employment with the passage of the Ives-Quinn Law. The law was the result of mobilizations by
community organizations. The violence of August 1943 was in the forefront of the minds of
numerous black leaders as many worried about how African Americans would fare as the
nation’s economy reconverted after the war. Many feared that if African Americans were ousted

269

Robert Weaver, Negro Labor: A National Problem. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co. 1946), xi.
Anthony Chen, “The Hitlerian Rule of Quotas”: Racial Conservativism and the Politics of Fair Employment
Legislation in New York State, 1941-1945.”
270

126
from industrial positions as they were after World War I violence would again erupt, an
especially troubling prospect in the wake of the Harlem Riot.
New York was the first state to pass a fair employment practices law. This law set the
precedent for other states to follow suit. The passage of the Ives-Quinn Act and the activities it
allowed the FEPC and SCAD to undertake made the situation in New York unique in the
national story of black employment during the Second World War.

Inclusive Representation: Unionizing Black Workers
As the war was coming to a close, black leaders and organizations also focused their
efforts on increasing black union membership in an effort to secure black employment during
reconversion. In Detroit, where reconversion and subsequent cutbacks began earlier than in New
York, those fired were almost exclusively black men and black and white women. Because
many industrial plants did not hire black workers until the war began, according to seniority rules
cutbacks and layoffs disproportionately affected black workers. A 50 percent cutback would
mean a 60 to 100 percent loss of black workers.271 Black leaders feared this would be the case
for black workers in New York as well. Black organizations focused on integrating labor unions
as a way to open training programs, and thus industrial jobs, to black workers; and as
reconversion loomed hoped these unions would protect the progress they made during the war.
The Negro Labor Committee and the NNC’s Negro Labor Victory Committee were the principle
organizations to focus their activities on cooperating with unions during the war years.
The Negro Labor Committee found measured success mostly in the unions of textile,
clothing and shoe making industries. The garment, textile and shoemaking industries supported
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the Negro Labor Committee from its earliest days. The New York Joint Board of Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America, the Textile Workers of America, and more than twenty locals of
the International Ladies Garment Workers Union gave financial donations to the NLC.272 In
1946 David Dubinsky, president of the ILGWU lauded the organization’s support of trade
unionism and it’s fostering of solidarity among black and white workers. According to
Dubinsky the union and its affiliates in the Greater New York area recognized the equality of
black workers and applied the principle of the equality of workers in its organization and
factories. In 1945 Dubinsky celebrated the progress the garment industry had made in the last
decade as black workers entered shops, made better wages and attained a higher standard of
living. This, in his estimation, was accomplished through the union’s work with the NLC. The
progress blacks made in the garment industry went beyond union membership; black workers sat
on the ILGWU executive board, belonged to shop committees, and represented their locals at
union conventions.273
The NLC made great strides in collaborating with unions in the garment trades to secure
jobs for African Americans. However as the war prompted more conversion and industrial
positions became available black workers looked to get jobs in other industries with better
paying positions. This was particularly true for black women. Though the garment industry was
one of the only industrial sectors open to black employment before the war, black women
preferred other industries during the war because they paid more than the needle trades by 1943
when the labor shortage began. Perhaps this was why the NLC was not as successful in placing
blacks in new industries. Their major collaborators were with unions representing the garment
trades which were not where the majority of workers looking for war employment sought jobs.
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The NLC’s rival, the Negro Labor Victory Committee, was more successful at reaching out to
unions to place African Americans in jobs not previously open to them and eradicating
discrimination against blacks employed in war industries.
The NLVC was successful in attracting unions to support their efforts. In 1943 fiftyseven unions in Greater New York with a combined membership of over 200,000 were affiliated
with the NLVC.274 By 1944 the number of unions affiliated with the NLVC increased to 107
with a membership exceeding 300,000. The organization later established branches in Newark,
Buffalo, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Washington DC, and St. Louis.275
The NLVC cooperated with affiliated unions to defend and advocate for black workers
who had been hired by war industries. In April of 1943 Sarah Williams, a messenger for the
Brooklyn Navy Yard and member of the Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and
Technicians (a Navy Yard Civil Service association and CIO union), alleged that she was
unfairly dismissed the previous month. The Commander in charge of the Supply Department for
which she was a messenger complained that Williams walked too slowly on errands and was
dismissed for that reason a week after she was hired. The Federation of Architects, Engineers,
Chemists and Technicians (FAECT) notified the National Negro Congress of the accusation and
asked for a member of the NLVC to sit in on the conference between the union and the Navy
Yard. The hope was that the NLVC would be an additional advocate for Williams at this
meeting. Though P.T. Roberts, Commander of the United States Navy found the dismissal to be
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fair, this case illustrates the way in which member unions and the NLVC cooperated to try to end
bias against black workers in industries making war goods.276
One year later the NLVC again collaborated with the Federation of Architects, Engineers,
Chemists, and Technicians (FAECT) to try and redress black workers’ claims of discrimination.
In April 1944 Local 137 of the United Federal Workers of America, the local representing Navy
Yard workers, embarked on a letter writing campaign and asked the NLVC to join them in
pressuring the government to make the Brooklyn Navy Yard, a government agency, cease
discrimination.277 It seems that the NLVC was good at protesting discriminatory hiring, but
those protests by and large did not open job opportunities in war industries for blacks.
The NLVC was more effective in fighting hiring discrimination when it functioned as an
employment placement service. Known for its activism on behalf of black workers and its good
relationship with various unions, the New York State Committee on Discrimination asked the
NLVC to refer qualified workers for jobs in war industries. Often the NLVC sent workers from
unions affiliated with the NLVC.278 In one such situation Charles Berkley, the director of the
COD, asked the committee to refer five qualified black applicants to Acme Backing Corporation
in Brooklyn which manufactured rubberized fabric. Acme had placed ads in newspapers
announcing available jobs for males and the COD asked the NLVC to send black males to apply
for the jobs. The NLVC would then make a report of Acme’s treatment of the men when they
applied for the position in order to ascertain whether or not they were victims of
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discrimination.279 In these instances the NLVC worked to refer qualified applicants for jobs in
an effort to identify companies who discriminated against black workers. In this instance, when
the NLVC worked alongside the COD, their efforts at expanding employment opportunities for
blacks in New York were most successful.
As the war ended, the Negro Labor Victory Committee and its parent organization the
National Negro Congress worked to minimize the loss of black industrial positions. The NLVC
continued to expand its education programs to foster racial tolerance and acceptance. Both
organizations called for unions to adjust their seniority policies to avoid the complete lay-off of
newly hired black workers and a return to the exclusionary pre-war labor practices.
One of the main purposes of the NLVC was to establish anti-discrimination committees
in many of the unions affiliated with the organization. In the fall of 1944 M. Moran Weston,
Field Secretary for the NLVC, reported that both the CIO and AFL had broadly accepted the
Committee’s aims to protect the gains of black workers and had undertaken this task through
national, regional, and local conferences on post-war problems all over the United States.280 In
addition to this national education program, Weston believed that unions had the responsibility to
organize workers effectively for political action and to see that the program was adopted and
supported by industry. He urged industry and government to maintain war-time levels of
production and provisions for the maximum employment of all workers.281
Thomas Richardson, Executive Vice-President of the United Federal Workers of America
(CIO) and member of the NLVC, urged organized labor and progressive industrialists to support
a proportional lay-off plan as a solution to impending black unemployment after the war. The
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program would not eliminate wide-spread lay-offs of black or white workers, but would protect
the rights of blacks to hold certain jobs in certain industries which had opened to black workers
during the war.282 The NLVC argued that seniority rules protecting arbitrary termination and the
drive to protect the new employment status of black workers came from the same goal – the
protection of workers. The organization thus urged unions to reconcile those two aims. At a
March 1945 conference attended by 300 representatives of CIO, AFL, and Independent unions
Thomas Richardson proposed a proportional layoff plan which would “protect the rights of
Negroes to hold certain jobs in certain industries which they have been able to win since the
beginning of the war.”283
Later that year the Executive Board of the NLVC designed a seven point program to
protect the jobs of black workers during reconversion. The plan urged unions to ensure
maximum employment for all workers and maximum employment of blacks during large-scale
layoffs. The NLVC plan accepted seniority rules, but implemented special formulae and
procedures to avoid the firing of recently hired black workers. The Committee wanted full
participation of blacks in all programs for re-employment, training, re-training, relocation, resettlement, and compensation. In essence the measures would prevent blacks from being
relegated to service and unskilled employment which would have effectively rolled back the
advances black laborers had made during the war.284
The modification of seniority rules was a very complex proposition for unions that did
not discriminate on racial or any other terms. Many union officers believed it would be an unfair
privilege to black workers and a slight to long-time union members. Moreover there was fear
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among union members that any change in the system of seniority would undermine the union’s
role as a safeguard to the rights of workers. The NNC countered that because blacks were so
unjustly treated in the past, special measures had to be taken to ensure equal treatment in the
future. The organization warned that if new measures were not adopted, blacks would disappear
from industrial positions returning to the same situation before World War II. The NNC said
that the special provisions the CIO made for war veterans is an example of what could be done to
ensure continued employment of blacks.285
Under the rules of many CIO unions time away from the job was not counted towards
seniority. Strict application of this rule to veterans amounted to an unfair punishment for those
who had served our nation. Therefore the CIO made an agreement with the Veterans of Foreign
Wars under which returning veterans are granted “accrued seniority” in which time spent in the
service counts as time spent on the job. At its national convention the CIO recommended to its
affiliated unions that in the case of veterans in a given plant or industry, the same rule apply. In
this way a special provision was made to protect the jobs of war veterans. The NNC argued that
similar provisions to protect African American workers could be adopted as well.286
Pressured by the NNC and NLVC the CIO made a statement reaffirming the
organization’s anti-discrimination stance. Organization leaders believed the advances made by
African Americans through the FEPC and the enlistment of thousands of minorities in war
production, were basically due to the anti-discrimination policy of the CIO which had brought
those questions to the fore. The CIO wanted to protect the gains black workers made during the
war and urged affiliated unions to prohibit all forms of racial discrimination. To those ends, the
CIO also recommended the government make the FEPC a permanent institution and abolish Jim
285
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Crow laws and poll-taxes.287 This position withstanding for the vast majority of unions in the
CIO the prospect of changing seniority rules in unions was quite intimidating for union leaders
and management alike. There was very little support amongst rank and file workers for changes
is seniority laws, even if failure to do so would end black employment and integrated factories.
Even progressive unions like the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America,
which had accepted black members and worked to integrate companies where it represented
workers, did not amend its seniority laws.288
Black workers found expanded employment opportunities in war industries with the help
of some labor unions. African Americans were accepted into labor unions, most readily into
locals affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations; and those labor unions therefore
pushed for black workers to be employed in industries in which they represented workers. They
also used educational programs to teach white workers about working with African Americans,
thus dealing with the major problem employers cited for not using black workers. However, the
advances black workers made through unions were constrained in the post-war era. Veterans
returning for the war came home looking to reclaim the factory jobs they left. Unions, which
had always been champions of equal and fair treatment of members, could not easily adjust
seniority rules in a way to protect black workers while maintaining seniority privileges of
veterans. To favor African American workers over returning veterans was an untenable solution.
Therefore immediately after the war many black workers were laid-off from the manufacturing
positions they procured during the war. The loss of black jobs in the industrial sector was
African Americans’ and Civil Rights organizations’ main concern for the rest of the decade.
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The Fight to Hold On: The Process of Reconversion
The prospect of reconversion unsettled African Americans. By March of 1945 there were
a total of 21,200 blacks working in the city’s war industries.289 Many worried that the gains
blacks made in employment during the war would be lost and unemployment levels would rise
as soldiers returned to reclaim their jobs. The prospect of another round of violence like that
which occurred in Chicago, Washington, and numerous other cities after World War I was
worrisome to black leaders, government offices, and organizations looking for equality of
employment opportunities for the city’s blacks. But there was no major outbreak of violence or
unrest in the period after World War II even though black employment levels in the city’s
industries generally took a setback.
Faced with declining prospects in skilled and semi-skilled positions, the New York
Urban League attempted to do what it could to stem the loss of black jobs in 1944. The
Industrial Department of the Urban League of Greater New York had an employment service
with branches in Brooklyn and Manhattan.290 They also launched a Vocational Opportunity
Campaign to encourage youths to plan and train for trades. 291 Despite these measures, the New
York Urban League’s job placement rate dropped; only 25 percent of applicants were placed in
jobs by the Service Operation.292
The Brooklyn Urban League’s Acting Industrial Secretary Theresa Parker thus warned
blacks against seeking war-jobs in 1944 and encouraged them to take lower paying jobs “with a
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post war future” outside of the war industries. Parker argued that there were plenty of war jobs
for blacks but very few high salaried skilled positions. She encouraged black Brooklynites to
take lower paying jobs outside of war industries that would not be affected by the return of the
troops and reconversion.293
Her fears of black displacement from war industries were well founded. In the year after
the war ended some of the advances black workers made during the conflict were eroded. In
June, 1945 the labor market in New York City was tight. Lay-offs from war firms in the area
increased during the summer of 1945 due to contract cutbacks and curtailments. Government
cuts in the wire, fragmentation bomb, and aircraft programs resulted in layoffs in firms
producing parts for these industrial sectors. Termination and rescheduling of contracts by the
army’s Signal Corps and Ordnance branches accounted for the majority of the dismissals.294
Blacks would have been among the first fired from these firms since they had been among the
most recent hires.
By 1947 the affects of the return of thousands of soldiers from World War II was
apparent as many black workers were ousted from skilled and semi-skilled industrial positions.
According to the Urban League of Greater New York the problem was no longer whether blacks
could get jobs, but rather if they could get jobs using the skills they acquired during the war. In
1947 NYUL officials wondered “How can the gains that have been made in skilled and
professional employment during the war be consolidated?”295 Most of the applicants to the
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organization’s job placement program were from Manhattan and Brooklyn (94 percent) where
the majority of the city’s blacks lived.296
Despite cuts in these areas the city’s shipyards continued to experience a labor shortage.
The number of vessels in the port being constructed or repaired was larger than at any other
previous time.297 The recruitment program for Navy Yard workers continued. The Brooklyn
Navy Yard had become the largest industrial employers of blacks in the city. Continued
productivity in the shipyards proved to serve as a safeguard for black jobs in that sector.
The Urban League of Greater New York tried to find solutions for the hiring problems
blacks faced in the post-war years by providing preparatory classes for the civil service exams
for social investigators in the Department of Welfare. These courses were taught by instructors
from other social agencies, government offices, and the United Public Workers of America, an
organization affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Civil service employment
became another option for black job seekers.298

Table 7: NYUL Employment placement statistics, 1947.
Total

Manhattan

Brooklyn

Queens

Applicants

7240

5236

1603

401

Placements

1782

1198

516

68
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Due to the changing labor market after reconversion the New York Urban League’s
placement rate was low in 1947. Only a quarter of applicants were placed in jobs by the Service
Operation. A third of those placed in jobs by the Urban League’s Employment Service worked
in the clerical and sales areas and 10 percent were in professional, managerial and skilled
positions.299 These placements constitute a significant shift in the types of jobs available to
blacks after the war.
The Industrial Relations Department of the NYUL focused on steering blacks into
clerical and sales positions because the training required was relatively little in comparison to
skilled industrial positions. They also believed that blacks would be employed in greater
numbers in firms that were sensitive to public opinion and patronage – for example retail stores.
Furthermore the League said that most of these retail and clerical positions were characterized by
high turnover rates, which made integration easier since there was less sustained resistance from
white employees.300
Retail, an expanding area of employment, seemed to provide the primary job
opportunities available for black New Yorkers seeking jobs in the post-war era. The report
revealed that in Manhattan and Brooklyn the most important placement contacts were Gimbel
Brothers and Franklin Simon which were both department stores. Several placements in
Brooklyn were in Brooklyn Safeway stores. Therefore the League held meetings for black
women interested in department store employment. With the help of certain department stores in
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Brooklyn, and the unions of the retail trade, job opportunities and requirements were
discussed.301
Black women were also increasingly finding employment in white-collar office jobs and
in clerical positions. The New York Telephone Company had hired five hundred additional
black operators in all borough offices. Black secretaries and stenographers, both female
occupations, were introduced in many businesses and professional offices. Many of these
placements were significant because they were firsts. Successful placement of black women in
white collar jobs was significant because of the general tightening of hiring specifications and
increased competition for jobs after the war.302 These continued, though small, advances in
clerical and sales occupations was due in part to general relaxation of personnel practices and the
activities of the State Commission Against Discrimination.
Because of the collaborative relationship the Urban League and SCAD had fostered and
the positive results achieved Olivia Frost the Research Secretary of the Urban League of Greater
New York encouraged the organization to use the machinery in place and trusted tactics to
achieve further economic gains for the city’s black residents. Frost wanted the Urban League to
increase the number of complaints filed with SCAD.303 This tactic however was hampered by
the Urban League’s lack of financial resources which adversely affected its activities and
therefore stemmed the opening of new job opportunities for black workers.
In a self-assessment of its activities, achievements, and failures, Dr. Lloyd Bailer, the
new Director of the Industrial Relations Department of the Urban League of Greater New York,
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recognized the organization’s inability to continue the full arc of activities it had undertaken
during the war due to a shortage of funds. Bailer, former field examiner for the National Labor
Relations Board, believed that the ULGNY needed more staff but had no money to hire
additional personnel. The industrial departments of most other cities’ Urban League branches
expanded black employment opportunities, provided vocational guidance and training, had a
labor consultant service, provided worker education, and conducted research into labor markets.
Recent operations of the Industrial Department of the ULGNY were confined largely to
employment service activity – interviewing job applicants, accepting job orders, and making
referrals. In 1948 the office was not geared towards obtaining new employment opportunities
according to Bailer.304
The lack of field staff and personnel prevented the Urban League of Greater New York
from performing one of its essential duties – enforcing the Ives-Quinn law. Perhaps this was
because the New York Urban League focused more of its financial and personnel resources now
on expanding the scope of its activities to address the issue of integrated education. One of the
NYUL’s major campaigns centered on eradicating discrimination in higher education through
the passage of the Austin-Mahoney Act in the New York State legislature. The League also
engaged heavily in fund-raising efforts to expand the breadth of its activities in its Harlem,
Brooklyn, and Queens offices as well as the creation of an office in the Bronx in response to the
demographic changes in the city.305 It seems as if the priorities of the New York Urban League
shifted away from employment. Though there is no evidence directly saying so, this may be
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attributed to the achievements in opening new areas of employment to African Americans.
Perhaps the passage of the Ives-Quinn Act signaled an important legal triumph over employment
discrimination and Urban League leaders felt they should use the majority of their limited
resources to tackle new issues.
The Urban League saw itself as bearing a heavy responsibility to contribute to the
enforcement of the Ives-Quinn Law, but was derelict in this duty by the end of the decade. In
fact the League stated that enforcing the law “represents the most important single function we
can perform. It cuts across all occupational and industrial lines, affects males and females,
veterans and non-veterans. If full compliance with the letter and spirit of the Law could be
effected the bulk of the Department’s job would disappear.”306 Bailer wanted the Industrial
Department to return to the activities it had undertaken during the war - to seek out instances of
employment discrimination, file complaints for aggrieved individuals, follow the progress of
cases turned over to SCAD, and insist the Commission effectively handle such cases. He also
wanted to educate blacks on the importance of using the Ives-Quinn law to widen employment
opportunities. The League had begun to set up machinery for filing complaints, but
implementation had hardly begun in 1947 when the report was written.307 Instead it focused on
increasing the number of blacks placed in clerical and sales positions believing those that were
employed were token hires because the number of blacks in sales and clerical positions remained
extremely small.308
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Despite the Urban League’s decrease in placements of black men in skilled and semiskilled positions, this did not indicate a loss of all the war-time employment gains black men
won. Between 1940 and 1947 the percentage of employed black men working in service
occupations declined from 40 percent to 23 percent, while the proportion of black men in the
crafts increased by 25 percent and those in semiskilled work increased by 50 percent. The ratio
of employed blacks in salesman and clerk positions also increased by over 27 percent; and that of
proprietors, managers and officials by 40 percent.309 These changes represented the entry of
thousands of black workers into industrial plants and into new white collar positions. Therefore
though many black men were ousted from industrial jobs at the end of the war, many others
retained their positions or found industrial and white collar jobs after reconversion.
These gains are also evident in the employment figures at the end of the decade. In 1950
40 percent of working black men remained employed as service workers and laborers (51,716
and 39,293 respectively) which were typically unskilled positions. However significant
numbers of African Americans remained in skilled and semi-skilled occupations. More than a
quarter of the 234,349 employed black men in the city worked as Operatives and Kindred
workers (63,774); a class of workers which encompassed occupations that typically required
some training in a skill. Also significant numbers of black men worked in the Clerical and Sales
sector (27,646), and as skilled craftsmen and foremen (24,954). Moreover about 7,000 were
employed in occupations classified as professional or technical.310 These figures show that in the
five years following the war black men in New York City had access to white collar, skilled and
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semi-skilled jobs. Therefore the employment gains made during World War II were not
completely lost when the war ended. New, better-paying occupations remained open to blacks in
the post-war period.311
The changes in occupation distribution were even more striking for black women. In
New York City in 1940 three quarters of employed black females had been in domestic service.
Only one half were in domestic service in 1947. The proportion of black women workers
311
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employed in retail and clerical occupations quadrupled. The proportion of African American
women in semi-skilled jobs, particularly laundries and manufacturing establishments, increased
from 16 to 31 percent of black females in the labor market.312 In 1940 64 percent of all black
women workers were in domestic service compared to only 8 percent of white working women.
By 1947, only 36 percent of black women were in domestic work and 3 percent of white women
worked in this area. The wide discrepancy between black and white women workers was cut
almost in half. The sales and clerical field showed a striking disparity in 1940. Only 3 percent
of black women were working in these occupations in comparison to 41 percent of white women.
By 1947, there were 13 percent black women in that field compared with 45 percent white
women.313
By the beginning of the next decade black women continued to find employment other
than domestic work. In 1950 of all the employed black women in New York City (193,402) less
than 40 percent (71,442) labored as private household (domestic) workers. A significant number
of black women were operatives (61,207) and service workers (24,651). There was also a
marked increase in the number of black women in clerical positions; 17,716 black women or 9
percent of employed black women worked in clerical positions. Almost 9,000 black women
were employed in professional or technical positions in the decade after the war. 314
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Despite the fear blacks felt at the prospect of the loss of jobs during reconversion, the
post-war employment situation for blacks was not nearly as bleak as it was after the First World
War. Even though many African Americans were displaced from skilled and semi-skilled
industrial positions after the war, many were able to maintain jobs paying higher salaries than
they had before. Black men found jobs in crafts and semi-skilled positions and black women
moved into retail, restaurant, and other service positions. Due to the new types of jobs open to
blacks, many of which were better paying than the service and unskilled positions they were
relegated to before the war, the gap between the earnings of blacks and whites in New York
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Service workers includes – Attendants and ushers in amusement places; Bailiffs, Barbers; Bartenders; Beauticians;
Boarding house keepers; Bootblacks; Bridge tenders; Charwomen; cooks, except in private households; Detectives;
Doorkeepers; Elevator operators; Firemen (Fire protection); Fountain workers; Guards; Hospital attendants; Janitors;
Lodginghouse keepers; Manicurists; Marshals, Midwives; Policemen; Porters; Practical nurses; Sextons; Sheriffs;
Stewards; Waiters; Watchmen.
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers includes – Annealers; Bakers; Blacksmiths; Boilermakers; Bookbinders;
Brickmasons; Cabinetmakers; Carpenters; Cement finishers; Compositors; Concrete finishers; Coppersmiths;
Cranemen; Derrickmen; Die makers; Die setters; Electricians; Electrotypers; Engravers; Excavating machinery
operators; Forgemen; Glaziers; Goldsmiths; Grading machinery operators; Heat treaters; Hoistmen; Lens grinders
and polishers; Lithographers; Locomotive engineers; Locomotive firemen’ Log and lumber scalers and graders;
Loom fixers; Machinists; Mechanics; Metal molders; Metal rollers; Metal roll hands; Millers; Millwrights; Motion
picture projectionists; Opticians; Organ tuners; Painters (Construction and maintenance); Paperhangers;
Photoengravers; Piano tuners; Pipe fitters; Plasterers; Plate printers; Plumbers; Power linemen and servicemen;
Printing pressmen; Road machinery operators; Roofers; Sheet metal workers; Shoemakers except in factories;
Silversmiths; Slaters; Stationary engineers; Stereotypers; Stone carvers; Stone cutters; Stonemasons; Structural
metal workers; Tailors; Telegraph and telephone linemen and servicemen; Tile setters; Tinsmiths; Tool makers;
Typesetters; Upholsterers; Watchmakers; Window dressers.
Laborers, except farm and mine includes – Car washers; Fishermen; Garage laborers; Groundskeepers;
Longshoremen; Oystermen; Raftsmen; Stevedores; Teamsters; Woodchoppers.
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decreased over the course of the 1940s.315 The Urban League, though not as successful at
placing black workers in industrial jobs, found jobs for black workers in white collar, clerical,
and sales positions. The NNC and NLVC found less success in preserving black jobs and union
membership after the war. Though many CIO unions accepted black members, when veterans
returned from war seniority rules necessitated the laying off of many black workers who had
been recently hired.

Conclusion
1943 proved to be a pivotal moment for black employment in war industries. The labor
shortage along with black activism and fair employment agencies led to the integration of some
war industries. African Americans who were previously relegated to domestic, janitorial and
unskilled jobs found industrial jobs in the war-time economy.
There were a number of factors that contributed to these industries agreeing to hire black
workers. One was a labor shortage that took hold of some industries in New York beginning in
July of 1943. The shortage prompted companies to seek black employees, subsequently offering
more training for black workers. The Harlem Riot in August of that year was another factor that
prompted black employment by war industries. The disturbance also caused the COD and other
government agencies to intensify their investigations of war industries. Moreover the riot
prompted New York City mayor Fiorello LaGuardia and New York governor Thomas Dewey to
more closely examine race relations in the city and state. As a result more black workers were
trained for and placed in skilled and semi-skilled industrial positions. Moreover, the New York
State assembly passed legislation outlawing racial discrimination by any employer.
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It was in this opening and shifting labor market that black migrants from the south were
able to find more and better paying employment opportunities. Though most employers seemed
not to make any difference in their treatment of black workers from New York and those who
had recently migrated from the south, the migrants were no doubt in the pool of black applicants
for jobs in war industries, as better employment opportunities was a major reason for their
migration. There is very little evidence that the migrant experience was different from those of
native born black New Yorkers. Neither the companies nor the Urban League or the newspapers
distinguished between the two groups, which indicates that unlike World War I there was less
conflict between longtime residents and the new migrants.
Integration of the workforce did not happen wholesale in any one industry or geographic
area in the city. It tended to happen in larger companies with war production contracts that
experienced labor shortages and were targeted by the Fair Employment Practices Committee and
the Committee on Discrimination (later SCAD) for ignoring fair employment legislation.
Factories in the scientific instruments, electronic instruments, and shipbuilding industries hired
black workers, especially after 1943.
Integration of these industries also did not mean an end to discrimination. Hiring
discrimination persisted in many industries. Even in the war industries that integrated, black
workers were treated unfairly. Therefore black organizations continued to pressure for fair
employment after 1943. The Brooklyn Urban League and the National Negro Congress
continued to pressure war industries to hire blacks and fair employment agencies to continue
their investigations of discrimination by war industries. They also brought cases of racial
discrimination against blacks employed by war industries to the FEPC and COD as well. Other
groups such as the Negro Labor Victory Committee and Negro Labor Committee targeted unions
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to achieve black employment. They pressured New York City locals to accept black workers
and cooperated with those that did to pressure industries to treat black workers fairly.
The most significant and effective tactic used to secure black employment, specifically in
war industries, was the cooperative relationships forged by the Brooklyn Urban League, the
National Negro Congress and the Negro Labor Victory Committee with government offices
dedicated to protecting the rights of African Americans. The National Negro Congress and the
Industrial Department of the Brooklyn Urban League acted as liaisons between black workers
and these government agencies.
The Brooklyn Urban League proved to be the most effective agency for the placement of
black workers in war industries. Federal government offices like the Fair Employment Practices
Committee and United States Employment Service considered the Urban League the premier
organization for the placement of black workers. Therefore when these agencies needed
information on the situation of black workers and wanted to place black workers in war
industries they worked with the local Urban League offices. The Brooklyn Urban League took
on a role of particular importance in that many of the war industries in New York were located in
Brooklyn, therefore the BKUL worked with state and federal fair employment agencies to
facilitate the hiring of black workers. Moreover the relationship between the Brooklyn Urban
League and the New York State Committee on Discrimination was further strengthened by the
personnel ties between the two organizations. There was a great deal of communication and
partnership between Lorenzo Davis, the industrial secretary of the Brooklyn Urban League and
COD head Charles Berkley who was the former BKUL industrial secretary as the two
organizations collaborated to end discrimination in war industries and place black workers in
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higher paying industrial jobs. The BKUL was successful in opening new areas of industrial
employment to African American New Yorkers.
The activities of the Brooklyn Urban League, the National Negro Congress, the Negro
Labor Victory Committee, and Negro Labor Committee indicate that civil rights organizations
focused on achieving economic parity in the 1940s. A continuation of their activism in the
1930s, the civil rights struggle of the war years was one centered on employment. As historians
Nelson Lichtenstein and David Korstad have argued employment was the major civil rights issue
in the 1940s.316 The activities of the city’s civil rights organizations in the 1940s were focused
on opening employment in war industries to black New Yorkers. These black organizations,
particularly the Urban League, viewed the passage of the Ives-Quinn Law prohibiting hiring and
employment discrimination as a major victory in their struggle for equal employment
opportunities and weapon for future battles against employment discrimination.
As reconversion approached African Americans, local politicians, and agencies against
discriminatory practices in war industries took actions to maintain black industrial employment.
They feared that widespread black lay-offs would result in the racial violence that broke out in
cities after World War I. Despite their efforts many industries let black employees go as they
reconverted. Violence however did not accompany black dismissals because the type of jobs
open to black workers had expanded.
Though many African Americans men were ousted from skilled and semi-skilled
positions as soldiers returned from battle and industries reconverted, black men were not
completely displaced by returning veterans. By the end of the decade a larger number of black
men worked in skilled and semi-skilled industrial positions than had before the war. Black
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women in particular benefitted from expanded employment opportunities as they found jobs as
sales women, clerks, and phone operators. The jobs open to African Americans during the war
were better paying than the jobs they had previous to the conflict. These new employment
opportunities opened to African Americans helped expand the black middle class in the next
decade.

150
Chapter 4
The Sperry Gyroscope Corporation: A Case Study

During World War II access to better-paying employment in war industries was a major
reason for black migration to cities across the nation. Many blacks found expanded
opportunities for employment in war industries as well as in non-essential areas of the New York
economy. War industries hired blacks for skilled and semi-skilled positions allowing many
black New Yorkers to find jobs other than the service positions to which they were relegated
before the war. However, not all industries opened their doors to black workers. A combination
of factors prompted management in some industries to hire African Americans.
The passage of state and federal anti-discrimination legislation, black activism which
forced state and federal agencies to enforce laws barring hiring discrimination, as well as labor
shortages combined to pressure many companies to hire black workers. The Harlem Riot in
1943 and the problems it made apparent also prompted further action. Still not all New York
City industries and factories employed African Americans in skilled and semi-skilled positions
during the war. The Sperry Corporation was one of the war production plants that opened its
doors to black workers. Examination of the process by which Sperry Gyroscope hired black
workers illustrates how some of the larger trends discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 worked with
regard to one company. Through a study of Sperry’s hiring process it is also clear that unions
and individuals in management also affected the process by which industries integrated their
war-time workforce.
Employing no black workers before the war, Sperry management hired more than a
thousand African Americans during the course of the war. Black leaders and organizations
publicized Sperry’s discriminatory hiring practices which pressured the company to hire its first
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African American employees. These organizations emphasized the hypocrisy of discrimination
against blacks at the time when the nation was waging a war against fascism and xenophobia.
African American leaders pressured state and federal government agencies to investigate
allegations of hiring discrimination by Sperry and its affiliates. The Fair Employment Practices
Committee and the New York State Committee on Discrimination investigated and monitored
the employment policies of the Sperry Corporation, forcing company management to adjust their
hiring procedures. Moreover the workers at Sperry were represented by the United Electrical,
Radio, and Machine Workers of America (UE), a union that actively advocated equal
employment for all workers. The activities of the UE also pushed Sperry’s management to hire
black workers. A labor shortage in 1943 further drove Sperry to employ more African
Americans.
As the war wound down African Americans, black organizations, and United Electrical
were anxious about what would happen to black jobs at Sperry during reconversion. As
government contracts dried up, production slowed causing factories to cut jobs. Black
organizations appealed to war industries to maintain their levels of black employment. The
National Negro Congress and the Negro Labor Victory Committee along with the UE urged
Sperry management to adapt seniority laws to keep blacks in skilled and semi-skilled positions.
Though members of upper level management had changed their attitude about the capability of
black workers, they and the UE were unwilling to adjust seniority laws and displace workers to
keep blacks employed in the positions they held during the war. Therefore black employment
levels dipped immediately after the war.
Due to economic forces and war demands many New York factories turned to blacks for
labor. Though each company had a very specific story behind why and how it employed African
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Americans, there were similarities in the process. By examining the employment trends at
Sperry as a case study, the reasons for black employment and the process by which New York
companies hired African Americans will be made clear. Though Sperry was exceptional because
its management reversed its policies on black employment in a short amount of time, Sperry’s
history illustrates the profound effects World War II had on hiring policy of New York firms and
the employment of blacks in the city.

Black Pressure for Negro Hires
The Sperry Company mainly produced precision instruments for navigating airplanes
and ships. When Sperry Company was founded in 1910 it produced gyroscopes for aviation and
maritime industries. The company had a decades-long relationship producing instruments for the
military before World War II. During World War I Sperry worked closely with the Navy to
provide steering and navigation instruments in their vessels. By the 1920’s the Sperry
Corporation had become known as the “Brain Mill” for the United States military because the
corporation developed and produced goods for military use. In 1933 Elmer Sperry sold his
company to Curtiss Aero and Motor which was absorbed by General Motors. The Sperry
Corporation was created as a larger holding company. In the years between the wars, Sperry
developed the automatic pilot, the first airplane stabilizer, gyrostabilized bomb sight and other
instruments.317 This close manufacturing relationship between the Sperry Corporation and the
military continued during World War II. Sperry Gyroscope produced highly technical precision
instruments for the military during World War II.
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Before the war Sperry was a comparatively small company that produced small quantities
of goods and mostly employed very skilled workers.318 Sperry Company workers were initially
represented by a company controlled union the Brotherhood of Scientific Instrument Makers.
While the workers at the Sperry Corporation’s subsidiary company Ford Instruments were
represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, a union affiliated with the
American Federation of Labor.319 The skilled nature of the work Sperry employees did
combined with discrimination in training programs and exclusion of blacks from trade unions
barred blacks from jobs at Sperry.
Sperry Gyroscope’s employment policies reflect common employment trends among
New York companies during the early years of the war. Sperry’s management, like many other
employers in the city, refused to hire black workers in skilled and semi-skilled positions when
the war broke out. Though the company converted to war-time production earlier than most
other industries in the city, management did not consider black workers for employment in jobs
in areas other than service positions. Few African Americans had the training to work in these
skilled positions because of prejudice in trade unions and training facilities as well as
discriminatory hiring practices.320 As a result it is no surprise that the company did not employ a
single African American prior to the war.
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During the war the Sperry Company became one of the most important factories in the
state. Sperry, unlike many other industries in the city, received large government contracts
during the first two years of the war. The company was paid large sums of federal money to
produce sound locaters, anti-aircraft searchlights, fire control equipment and other instruments
for the nation’s armed forces. In July of 1941 the war department requested thirty-one
companies begin work on Air Corps orders, pending an award of formal contracts. Sperry
received the largest allotment of federal money, $80,000,000. In the following three months the
company received more contracts worth an additional $22,000,000.321 In November of 1941 the
War Department announced that the Sperry Gyroscope Company had been awarded additional
contracts totaling $56,403,980.322 In total, over a period of just four months, Sperry received
more than $100,000,000 in defense contracts. Around the same time Sperry Corporation, Sperry
Gyroscope’s parent company, was building a new facility in Nassau County, Long Island in
which 7,000 people would be employed.323 For those employees homes were developed by the
company in New Hyde Park, Long Island.324 It is clear by Sperry’s expansion that the company
was making large profits from government contracts in 1941.
Despite these large contracts African Americans did not readily find jobs at Sperry in the
early years of the war. Though there are no statistics on black employment in 1940 and 1941,
hiring statistics do show that in early 1942 the Sperry Corporation had only 86 black employees
of a total 19,260, therefore blacks comprised a mere .45 percent of company workers. The racial
disparity in employment levels was even more evident in the Sperry Gyroscope Company. Only
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21 of the company’s 14,184 workers were black. Blacks comprised a mere 0.1 percent of the
plant’s workers.325 Therefore, black organizations and other groups representing the interests of
blacks targeted Sperry to protest racial discrimination in employment. The National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Negro Congress (NNC) used
rallies, press releases, and investigations to publicly call attention to the company’s racist hiring
practices.
In January of 1941 the Brooklyn Joint Committee on Employment (BJCE), which
included representatives of the Urban League, NAACP, YMCA, YWCA, and members of
Brooklyn’s black clergy, asked Executive Secretary of the NAACP Walter White to head a
delegation from the Joint committee to the Flatbush Avenue extension of the Sperry Gyroscope
Company.326 White agreed to head this delegation and in February of 1941 went to the Sperry
plant to try and attain employment for black workers.327 Sperry ignored communications from
the committee, ignored requests for interviews, and refused to admit the delegation. Company
management did speak with a second delegation in March but would not commit to hiring black
workers. Following this unsuccessful and unproductive meeting, the BJCE began picketing the
plant and organized letter writing and telephone campaigns.328 Picketers from the NAACP also
rallied outside of the company headquarters in Manhattan.329
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These efforts to pressure Sperry to hire black workers failed. In March, after several
protests at Sperry’s offices, an official from the company admitted to a National Negro Congress
delegation that Sperry management was not interested in hiring Negroes. A company
representative used the standard industrial excuse for refusing to hire black workers – that having
blacks and whites working together would be problematic. The spokesman insisted that he had
no racial prejudice himself, however he claimed that the large government contracts Sperry
received necessitated that the company have the “very best machinery, the very best tools, the
very best techniques, the very best morale, and the very best men.” Apparently the “very best”
did not include black workers. R. E. Gillmor, General Manager of the Sperry Gyroscope
Company did however promise to bring the question of hiring black labor up to the firm’s
executives.330
In the meanwhile black organizations continued to protest. The New York branch of the
NAACP, led by Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Industry Eardlie John, picketed
Sperry’s Manhattan offices at 30 Rockefeller Plaza in April.331 In the summer of 1941 these
efforts found measured success. In July the Brooklyn Council of the National Negro Congress
pressured Sperry into allowing a black Cooper Union College graduate take an employment
placement exam.332 Though the NNC achieved this symbolic victory, its effect was small as
blacks remained largely absent from the Sperry workforce. Another tactic would prove to be
more successful in the long term. In addition to pressuring industrial management to hire
African Americans, black activists and organizations focused their efforts on the government as
they looked to both state and federal agencies to stamp out discrimination at Sperry.
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Black organizations pushed the federal government to outlaw discriminatory hiring
practices in all companies with government contracts including Sperry Gyroscope. In January of
1941 the NAACP sought to introduce a resolution in Congress asking for an investigation of the
status and treatment of African Americans in the defense program. The resolution called for
public hearings with testimony from Army, Navy and Air Corps officials, employers, leaders of
trade unions, and those who had gathered information for the association.333 Brooklyn was a
focal point for the NAACP’s campaign because of the large number of plants with government
contracts in the area.334 Sperry one of the largest and most lucrative companies in the borough
was naturally a subject for investigation, especially after Walter White’s failed talks with
Sperry’s management in February.
In preparation for the hearing the NAACP and NUL gathered all available material on
discrimination.335 Walter White contacted Lieutenant Governor Charles Poletti who served on
the State Defense Council with Thomas Morgan, president of the Sperry Corporation and
chairman of the Sperry Gyroscope Company, to inquire about Sperry’s hiring policies.336 Poletti
denied having any personal knowledge of Sperry’s hiring policies as he had spoken with Morgan
only in his capacity as a fellow member of the State Defense Council. According to Poletti the
two had never discussed Morgan’s activities as president of Sperry Corporation. The Lieutenant
Governor explained to White that he had brought the issue of discriminatory hiring practices in
war industries to the Defense Council as it related to the efficiency of war production, but was
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given the general arguments for refusing to hire blacks used by most employers – foremen in
these factories advise managers that employment of Negro workers would disrupt production
indicating that white workers did not want to work with blacks.337
White did not believe Sperry managements’ claims that they could not hire black workers
and made his position clear to Lieutenant Governor Poletti. White cited the garment industry as
an example of factories in which blacks and whites worked together and were in the same unions
without incident. He also noted that blacks and whites worked together peacefully in the steel,
automobile, rubber, and mining industries throughout the country, even in the south. White
further argued that companies with government contracts, which were by extension funded by
taxpayer dollars, did not have the right to discriminate against black workers who were
taxpayers.338 These arguments were part of the organization’s tactics to achieve integration of
war industries. Walter White and the NAACP hoped to dispel the myth that blacks and whites
could not work together peacefully and productively, therefore undercutting the justifications
many employers used for refusing to hire black workers. The NAACP planned to use examples
of companies with integrated work forces as evidence of the falseness of management’s claims at
the Senate hearing.339
A Senate investigation into the discriminatory hiring practices of companies with
government contracts never happened. Introduction of the resolution for the investigation into
discrimination in the armed forces and war industries was postponed because Senator Robert
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Wagner, who with Senator W Warren Barbour had taken the lead in plans for the probe, was
ill.340 After Senator Wagner’s illness, the NAACP seemed to abandon its campaign for the
Senate hearings. It is not clear what caused the organization to desert this particular drive.
Perhaps the passage of the Mahoney Act outlawing discrimination in New York State war
industries in April and the success of the March on Washington Movement in pressuring
President Roosevelt to issue Executive Order 8802 outlawing hiring discrimination in June
prompted the NAACP to shift its focus. Since the organization’s main approach to alleviate
racial discrimination was the passage of legislation, when the Executive Order and Mahoney Act
were issued NAACP leadership felt that battle had been won and moved on to try to pressure the
state and federal governments to enforce those laws.
It was difficult for black leaders and organizations to push employers into hiring blacks.
This was especially true in the case of Sperry management because the interests of the company
and the New York State government were intertwined. The Sperry Corporation’s president was
a member of the New York State Defense Council. Though it is unclear what effect this
relationship had on Sperry’s hiring practices, White worried that this connection would afford
the company protection from state prosecution for discrimination.341 Despite White’s fears, the
initial protests of the NAACP, the Brooklyn Joint Committee on Employment, and the NUL did
have some positive results. Sperry first hired African Americans in May 1941, a month after the
passage of the Mahoney Act.342 By July, 1941 the Sperry Gyroscope Company had hired its first
crew of skilled black production workers. Five black workers were hired by the company, and
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the four who accepted were put to work assembling sound locater horns. The company also
instituted an upgrading program for unskilled black workers already employed as shipping
clerks, platform workers, and maintenance men. Skilled work was to be offered to a number of
shipping clerks and loading platform workers employed in the plant. Some of these workers
were already skilled in the trades needed, while others would be trained for skilled positions.
The new policy extended to Sperry’s subsidiary company Ford Instruments whose management
had hired its first black workers - an elevator operator and five maintenance workers - a week
earlier, and would hire its first black skilled workers within the next two weeks.343
These first black hires seem to have been a result of the campaigns and public protests
waged by black leaders and organizations. Years later General Manager R. E. Gilmore stated
that though there was no labor shortage at the time, top management believed that more workers
were needed and the most logical people to employ were qualified African Americans. Gilmore
also attributed management’s change of heart to the work of Negro organizations which had
“much to do with convincing us of the logic and ethics of this policy.”344 Considering the small
number of blacks hired by Sperry in the summer of 1941 it is unlikely that management hired
them because of any need for new workers but more likely to alleviate the pressure for
integration coming from black organizations.
If Sperry management hired their first black workers to alleviate public pressure, the
tactic did not work. Leaders in the NAACP at the time did not believe Sperry’s new black hires
constituted full integration of the work force and the organization continued its efforts to
pressure the company to hire more African Americans. The NAACP embarked on new tactics
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after Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 in June of 1941. The organization aimed
to bring a suit against Sperry that would use the new state law outlawing discrimination in war
industries to force the company to end its discriminatory employment practices. Sperry in effect
would be a NAACP test case of the new anti-discrimination law.
William Johnston Jones, an African American man, applied for a position in the
development laboratories at Sperry in March of 1941. He was very well qualified as he had been
trained in scientific coursework in high school and attained a Bachelor of Science in Electrical
Engineering from Tufts College in Medford, Massachusetts. Besides formal training, Jones also
had work experience as a radio service man and sound recording technician.345 Sperry granted
Jones an interview which he could not make because he was in school in Massachusetts at the
time, therefore Sperry conducted a phone interview.346 The personnel department was
sufficiently impressed with Jones’ qualifications that they offered him a position in the
engineering department for which he would receive onsite training by the Engineering Training
Committee. Upon completion of his training, Mr. Jones was to be placed in the Research,
Design, Product, or Service Engineering Departments.347 William Johnston Jones gladly
accepted the position and was to report to work on June 2. But when Jones reported for his eight
week training he was told that the company could not employ him because he was a Negro. On
the following day Jones accepted a civil service job at Signal Corps Laboratories in New Jersey.
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It was generally easier or blacks to find skilled positions in government agencies such as the
Signal Corps Laboratories which was part of the US Army Signal Corps. He worked as a regular
engineer there with ten to twenty white men under him, making more money than he would have
at Sperry. Though happy at his current place of employment and with no reason to leave, Jones
still wanted Sperry prosecuted for their discriminatory practices.348
The NAACP and the Harlem YMCA tried to bring William Jones’ case to court in order
to prosecute Sperry for breach of contract. Henry Craft, Executive Director of the Harlem
Branch of the YMCA approached White about using Jones’ situation to bring attention to the
bigoted employment practices of Sperry. Craft hoped that the publicity and embarrassment of a
court case would “help them to realize that they can not with impunity snap their fingers in the
face of the entire Negro group.”349 White turned over the case to Thurgood Marshall, Chief
Council for the NAACP, for legal consultation.350
Thurgood Marshall never pursued Jones’ case. William Hastie, civilian aide to Secretary
of War Henry Stimson, believed that Jones’ case would be an ineffective test case because Jones
was no longer willing to take the job at Sperry. Moreover Hastie argued that Sperry could very
well use the defense that their hiring policies had changed since Johnston applied for
employment. In addition if the case was won there would be no way to test Sperry’s sincerity in
employing Jones because he no longer wanted the position. Hastie believed the resources of the
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NAACP, the FEPC, and the Office of Production Management would be wasted on this case.351
Robert Weaver, the Chief of Negro Employment and Training for the Labor Division of the
OPM, agreed with Hastie’s opinion, telling Marshall it was important to find a better case to test
the company’s new stated policy of hiring all qualified black workers without discrimination.
He suggested finding a qualified applicant available for work to use to test for hiring
discrimination.352 No such case against Sperry was brought to the court but the NAACP began
to bring cases to the FEPC.
In August of 1941 Walter White notified the FEPC of discriminatory hiring practices by
Sperry in violation of Executive Order 8802. Though the company had hired some new black
workers, White argued Sperry was in violation of the President’s orders to fully utilize available
local labor before recruiting elsewhere. He alleged that Sperry recruited white workers from
Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia to fill the labor shortage. White asserted that these practices
are bringing white laborers into Brooklyn creating a housing shortage.353 These claims were
investigated by the FEPC and placed on the agenda for the FEPC’s August 28 meeting.354 The
FEPC received corroborating information about Sperry’s hiring practices from the New York
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State Committee on Discrimination and Robert Weaver but the organization at that time did not
have enough field staff to investigate.355 The FECP investigation would wait until the next year.
By September of 1941 the Sperry Company had hired 4 black assemblers. It also
published advertisements for help, pledging that there would be no discrimination in
employment.356 The decision to hire black workers, some in skilled positions, was very
significant given the level of discrimination exercised by the company’s management. Despite
the fact that Sperry changed its hiring policy by integrating its workforce, the actual number of
blacks hired was less than one percent of the corporation’s total workforce. These initial black
hires seemed to be an attempt by Sperry management to satisfy those advocating equal
employment in hopes that token hires would end the protests and bad publicity. The company in
fact did not hire blacks in any significant number until later in the year. The most important
outcome of black protests surrounding Sperry’s hiring practices was that they led to government
investigations into allegations of discrimination against blacks seeking skilled and semi-skilled
jobs. By mid-1941 the NAACP had changed its tactics to pressure government agencies to
eradicate discrimination at Sperry. Other organizations aimed at racial uplift joined in this effort.
The NAACP, NNC, and NUL brought discrimination cases to the FEPC in hopes that they
would investigate and eradicate discriminatory hiring practices using the new anti-discrimination
laws.
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The UE Fights for Black Rights at Sperry
The actions of black organizations like the NAACP, Urban League, and NNC brought
public attention to Sperry’s discriminatory hiring practices which created pressure on company
management to hire black workers. The organizations also helped workers file complaints with
the New York State Committee on Discrimination and local offices of the Fair Employment
Practices Committee which eventually launched investigations into Sperry’s hiring policies.
Black organizations however were not the only groups aimed at opening employment in war
industries to African Americans. Unions, especially those affiliated with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO), worked towards that aim as well. The activities of the United
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) contributed to the employment of black
workers at Sperry. When the UE, a racially inclusive union, became the bargaining agent for
workers at subsidiaries of the Sperry Corporation the prospect of union membership, and
therefore employment, became available to blacks.
The United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, an affiliate of the CIO,
strongly advocated for the membership and employment of black workers. From its founding in
1936 the UE’s policy was to admit to membership all workers in the industry “regardless of skill,
age, sex, nationality, color, religion, or political belief or affiliation.” The union rejected
discrimination in any form under the premise that “it is only by uniting all workers in the
industry that it is possible to defend effectively the interests and improve the working conditions
of the membership.”357 These policies were reflected in the union’s constitution as well as the
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constitution of UE’s District 4 which included the greater New York metropolitan area and
Northern New Jersey.358
United Electrical first won the right to represent workers at the Sperry Corporation’s
subsidiary Ford Instrument Company in 1939. Ford Instrument workers had been formerly
represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) an affiliate of the
American Federation of Labor. Local 425 of the UE came to represent workers at Ford
Instrument Company.359 The relationship between the UE and the IBEW was quite contentious
with conflict between the New York locals stemming from the decision of 1200 workers at the
Air-King Radio Company in Brooklyn to leave IBEW local B-1010 and affiliate instead with
Local 430 of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America.360 The UE and
IBEW competed to organize the workers of the radio and electrical instruments industry.
The conflict between the UE and IBEW originated from events that led to the
establishment of the UE. James Carey, a professional labor organizer and one of the founders of
the UE, was a young radio worker who organized a group of employees interested in union
membership at Philadelphia’s Philco Radio. Originally an AFL staff member, Carey had
initially attempted to organize the local electrical workers in Philadelphia under the IBEW, but
IBEW leadership, afraid that electrical workers would take over the union, offered them “Class
B” non-voting membership. Carey rejected the IBEW offer, instead collaborating with
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independent local unions to form the UE.361 Carey founded the UE in response to the policies of
the IBEW and subsequently worked to supplant the IBEW as the main union organizing
electrical workers.
Though the IBEW had a closed shop agreement with Sperry, United Electrical had
developed tactics to organize workers in companies with closed contracts. The UE had been
founded to improve benefits for electrical workers during the Depression when company unions
were cutting back. However the founding of the UE coincided with increasing production levels
and recovery in the electrical industry and as prosperity returned, electrical workers had less
incentive to join the new union. In response, UE leadership devised a strategy to convince
company workers to vote for UE representation. The union infiltrated the existing electrical
industry unions by getting UE supporters elected to positions within the unions. Once those UE
supporters were elected they would win over workers support for the UE by illustrating that their
tactics were more effective at getting acquisitions than the negotiations of the unions currently
representing the workers. These gains would persuade electrical workers to vote for UE
representation when company elections were held.362 Using this strategy United Electrical
challenged the IBEW and company run unions for the right to represent the electrical industry’s
workers.
These challenges were not always successful. Air-King’s manager, who was also the
chair of the Employers’ Association, locked out about 320 company employees who had voted
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for UE representation.363 The matter went to arbitration by the US Conciliation Service of the
US Department of Labor.364 Though the UE argued that they represented the company’s
workers when the majority voted for UE representation, the arbitrators decided differently.365
Arbitrators sided with the IBEW, declaring the labor contract between the Air King Corp and
IBEW local B-1010 a closed shop agreement. This meant that workers had to unanimously
agree to change union representation which had not happened. On that basis the arbitrators ruled
that the UE local did not represent Air King Radio Corp workers.366 Despite this loss United
Electrical continued their efforts to organize workers formerly represented by IBEW local B1010 and later that year won a similar case involving workers at the Fada Radio and Electric
Company, Inc. In that case an arbiter found in favor of the UE reasoning that the agreement the
IBEW had made with Fada was not a closed shop agreement therefore allowing those
represented by other unions to work in the plant.367 In this way United Electrical began
representing the workers in electrical machinery industries.
African Americans had a stake in the competition between the IBEW and the UE as their
access to jobs in the industry was affected by which union represented the industry’s workers.
Years earlier James Hubert, Executive Director of the New York Urban League had charged that
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Local 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers discriminated against black
workers. Hubert cited a case in which twenty-five black workers were fired from Standard
Electrical Equipment Corp. in Long Island City because the union had denied them membership.
These blacks who had been employed for many years lost their jobs when the IBEW unionized
the shop where they worked.368 The IBEW’s exclusion of African Americans was symptomatic
of its affiliation with the American Federation of Labor. The AFL and its affiliate unions
excluded African Americans from membership and therefore employment at the companies
whose workers they represented. For African Americans the United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers of America, with its inclusive ethos and constitution, offered them a much
better chance of employment than the racially exclusive IBEW.
When United Electrical took over representation of workers at Ford Instruments in 1940,
those workers’ bargaining position was strengthened. The UE was able to negotiate higher
wages for the workers at Ford Instruments despite the fact that both Ford Instruments and Sperry
Gyroscope were controlled by the same interests. 369 The union representing Sperry Company’s
workers was a company union, one unaffiliated with the AFL or the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO).370 Subsequently, the UE then set its sights on organizing the workers at
Sperry Gyroscope.371 Union organizers regularly distributed leaflets, held outdoor meetings, and
visited contacts.372 By early 1941, the UE had taken the Brotherhood of Scientific Instrument
Makers of America (BSIM), also formerly known as Sperry Hourly Employees Association, and
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the Independent Instrument and Mechanical Workers Union, to the Labor Board a number of
times to have them disbanded.373 The UE charged that the Sperry Company dominated the
BSIM prohibiting the union from effectively advocating for the workers.374
Prompted by the UE’s claims, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) investigated
whether the Brotherhood of Scientific Instruments Makers of America should represent Sperry
workers. The NLRB issued a complaint against the union on February 19, 1941 and hearings
began on March 24, closing on April 12. The NLRB issued its intermediate report on July 24,
recommending disestablishment of the Brotherhood of Scientific Instruments Workers.375 The
report provided United Electrical with a chance to move in. 376
The UE focused on establishing effective committees in the various departments at
Sperry to persuade workers to support a change in union representation. With the possibility of
the NLRB ruling against the BSIM, the UE needed to persuade workers to vote for the union to
represent them. In an attempt to garner worker support the UE organizing committee prepared
and distributed 4,500 cards with a petition to the Labor Board to hold an election and give the
UE authorization to bargain on the behalf of Sperry’s workers. In July 1941 the UE distributed
the cards in pre-paid, self-addressed envelopes, which also contained an explanatory leaflet.
According to some UE representatives Sperry workers received the petitions well, only a very
small number were thrown away within their sights. 377
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By the end of 1941 United Electrical was poised for victory. In November the NLRB
handed down its ruling on the case. The Board found that the company dominated the employee
organization and directed the Sperry Gyroscope Company to disestablish the Brotherhood of
Scientific Instrument Makers as the bargaining agent of its employees at its Brooklyn plant. The
NLRB also directed Sperry to stop discouraging membership in Local 1202 of the UE or
engaging in any other form of employee interference.378 After an appeal of the decision The
NLRB conducted elections to determine who would represent Sperry workers. In December of
1942 the majority of workers at the Sperry Gyroscope company’s plants in Brooklyn and Nassau
County, Long Island chose the UE to be their collective bargaining agent.379 In light of the
NLRB ruling it is not surprising that the BSIM did not make headway towards black hiring. The
union had been controlled by the Sperry Company whose management had demonstrated in no
uncertain terms that they had little interest in employing black workers. Therefore when the UE
became the bargaining agent for workers at Sperry, it signaled a better chance for black
employment at Sperry as well.
Though blacks were not in leadership positions in the UE and black involvement was not
that important to the union’s victory because of the small number of blacks working in the
factory; the change in union representation was important in facilitating black employment. It
opened up jobs to blacks and contributed to the shift in the company policy on hiring black
workers. This belief was held by black leaders and activists in the city as black organizations
lobbied for black inclusion in labor unions. In 1942 the New York Urban League accused the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, among other unions, of discriminating against

378
379

“Sperry Union Ruled Out,” NYT, November 29, 1941, 8.
“C.I.O Wins in Poll,” NYT, December 24, 1942, 11.

172
black workers and brought these charges of discrimination to the FEPC.380 The idea that union
membership was important to black employment was shared by other black organizations, which
cultivated good relations with unions open to black membership. The UE developed a reputation
for being one of the premier labor organizations dedicated to equality of opportunity of all
workers including African Americans. Thomas Jasper, the Chairman of the Labor Committee
for the National Conference on Negro Youth expressed his gratitude to James Fitzgerald, the
new President of the UE, for the work of the union in advocating unionism for blacks. Jasper
invited Fitzgerald to participate in the organization’s National Conference in 1941.381 The late
1942 change in union representation to the UE was significant in that Sperry’s workers were now
represented by a union that was not only open to African Americans but actively advocated black
employment.
Black support for the UE was predicated on the work the union did in fostering equal
rights for all workers including African Americans. During the war years the national leadership
of United Electrical openly criticized employers and unions that did not accept African American
workers. In June 1942 the leaders of the UE stated that World War II was waged for equality
and freedom for all, a principle that had not been recognized or practiced by war-time employers.
The union published an official statement underscoring the need for companies to mobilize all
Americans including African Americans for full support of the war. The union asserted that
blacks did not have the full equality in “all endeavors, political, economic and cultural” promised
by the Constitution as they could not get jobs in skilled occupations and were segregated in the
armed forces. The UE condemned labor unions that did not treat Blacks equally and resolved to
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speak up on the question of racial discrimination and put an end to the unfair treatment of
blacks.382 That same year the UE conducted a concerted drive for the employment and
upgrading of black workers in organized plants in Pennsylvania, New York and Connecticut.
The union designed specific steps to speed integration. In New York City Local 1227 announced
that 20 percent of all union trainees placed in jobs since January were Negroes. In announcing
this development the president of that local Carl Geiser declared that to win the war, all-out
production was necessary and that could only be achieved by utilizing all available manpower.
Believing that Negroes must be given equal opportunity not only to fight, but to work for this
country, Local 1227 focused on breaking down the barrier of discrimination in their shops.383
With the outbreak of war the UE conducted special campaigns to integrate war industries.
UE leadership seemed to want to uphold the tenets of the union’s constitution which advocated
unity and solidarity of workers regardless of race or religion. There was also a more practical
reason for the UE’s inclusive stance. Union leaders believed that if blacks were not brought into
the union, blacks would be paid lower wages and would therefore depress the wages of workers
in the industry as a whole. Several locals worked out agreements with management guaranteeing
that there would be blacks among all new people hired. In some instances this required
discussion among the workers, as well as community activity, which invoked the support of
black organizations. According to the UE the best example of the union successfully integrating
a company was the Sperry Corporation, where the Negro organizations and the UE cooperated to
pressure management to hire black workers.384
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Though there is insufficient direct evidence with which to quantify the exact influence
the UE had on the hiring of black workers, it is clear they had an important role in facilitating
integration of Sperry’s workforce. When United Electrical became the union representing
workers at Sperry the doors opened for black employment at the Sperry Corporation’s
subsidiaries. Prior to UE representation the unions bargaining for workers in the company did
not advocate black membership or employment. The IBEW did not admit black members and
the company dominated BSIM did not effectively advocate for the inclusion of black workers.
The UE promoted equal employment opportunities for workers of all races, creeds, religions, and
ethnicities, a factor that eliminated Sperry management’s argument that white workers would not
work side by side with African Americans. The FEPC, the NYS War Council’s Committee on
Discrimination, and a 1943 labor shortage dealt the final blows to Sperry’s discriminatory hiring
policies.

Full integration in 1943: Government Activity for Fair Employment
Under increasing pressure from black organizations like the NAACP, the National Urban
League, and the National Negro Congress the federal government began to take a stand against
the discriminatory hiring practices of war industries. As Sperry’s business boomed, both the
federal and state government used Executive Order 8802 and the Mahoney Act to monitor and
combat the company’s biased employment policies. Both the Fair Employment Practices
Committee and the New York State War Council’s Committee on Discrimination investigated
Sperry for discrimination against African Americans.
In February of 1942 the FEPC investigated complaints of discrimination against black
workers in the Sperry Gyroscope Company and the Ford Instrument Company. In the complaint
against Sperry, black workers represented by the Urban League accused company management
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of discouraging Negro applicants, maintaining a separate file for black’s applications, and
considering Negroes only for certain jobs. According to the complaint, the company employed
only 21 black workers out of a total 11,212 employees. African Americans filed a separate
complaint of discrimination against the Ford Instrument Company.385
The FEPC held a public hearing in New York City on February 17 and 18, 1942 where
complaints against both Sperry and Ford were heard. At the hearing complainants, company
representatives, and government officials testified. Edward Lawson, field employment agent of
the War Production Board, stated that while he had been assured that the company would employ
blacks and give them equal opportunities, it had failed to do so. Lawson declared that although
the company had hired black trainees, they had not been given equal opportunities with white
trainees for advancement. A worker from General Agency, an employment agency used by
Sperry, also supported allegations of discrimination when he testified that Sperry had specified to
the agency that no Jewish or black workers were wanted. All accusations were denied by the
company’s counsel.386
The FEPC found that neither company was in violation of Executive Order 8802 because
each had hired black and Jewish workers in the time between the complaint and the hearing. The
committee ordered the case be held in abeyance for possible further action if the circumstances
changed. The FEPC did direct Sperry to instruct its labor supply sources and others responsible
for administration of its employment policy to comply with the Executive Order.387 Though the
FEPC did not directly instruct Sperry to hire black workers, it required the corporation’s
subsidiaries to periodically submit its hiring statistics to the FEPC to ensure compliance with the
385
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Executive Order.388 Though Sperry was not found to be violating fair employment mandates,
government oversight of hiring practices prevented Sperry from firing the blacks it had hired and
prompted the company to hire even more African American workers.
After the hearings the company hired seventy-five African American employees by June
with the new Long Island facility employing twenty-eight black workers.389 By mid-1942 Sperry
reported further progress in black employment increasing the number of black workers from 35
to 300.390 By August of 1942, six months after Sperry’s FEPC hearing, the Sperry Company
employed 395 African Americans of a total 21,752 workers.391 Management at Ford Instruments
also increased black hires. In March of 1942 Ford employed only seventy-five blacks but by
July had added forty more African American workers.392
The increase of black workers at Sperry coincided with an increase of the number of
blacks working in war industries in the city and state. Though levels of African American
employment by war industries remained low, in August 1942 Committee on Discrimination
Chairman Frieda Miller declared that Negro employment rates were steadily rising and
thousands more would be employed by the end of the year.393 Despite war industries increased
employment of African Americans, this did not always indicate a change in the occupations
blacks held. Many of the blacks hired by war industries worked in positions traditionally open to
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African Americans. This was the case at the companies of the Sperry Corporation. Of the 115
blacks working for Ford Instruments, 65 were porters indicating that the company, though hiring
black workers, was hiring them for the unskilled service positions blacks had traditionally
occupied.394
Black women were also placed in jobs at Sperry, however these women seemed to be
token hires. The COD placed eleven Negro women in training for war work by August of 1942
and eventually the company hired twelve black women.395 But that same month the company
turned down approximately forty female black job applicants in its new Long Island City plant.
Given a tip that they would be hiring women John Singleton, the head of the Jamaica, Queens
branch of the NAACP referred the women there. Sperry employment officials made these
women wait for three hours for an interview, while white women were promptly called in for
their interviews. After the wait a single interviewer impatiently called in all of the black women
and interviewed them at the same time. The interviewer was not shy about expressing his
reservations about employing the women greeting one woman by saying, “Oh you are from
South Carolina too.” as if migrant workers were not acceptable. Moreover, an American born
woman of West Indian parents was denied a job because the interviewer said she was an alien
though she had a proof of her American citizenship. The interviewer asked all of the black
applicants if they had experience working with precision instruments, although white women
without experience were being hired without previous training or experience.396 Though Sperry
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Gyroscope hired small numbers black women after their FEPC hearing, black female job
applicants did not receive equal consideration as their white counterparts.
Full acceptance and integration of black workers at Sperry began in the latter half of 1942
with black employment peaking in 1943. During that period there was a vast increase in black
employment at the corporation as well as a diversification of the types of positions open to
blacks at the company. The continued scrutiny by the FEPC and a labor shortage in 1943 caused
Sperry Corporation management to change their hiring policy. In May of 1942 of
24,361employees, only 586 (2.41 percent) were African American.397 However one year later, in
May of 1943 there were a total 1,024 blacks employed out of 39,087 total employees (2.61
percent).398 Though the change in the percentage of African Americans hired was minimal, the
number of blacks nearly doubled.
Even more significant than the increased number of blacks hired by the company, was the
shift in the types of work for which black were hired. Employment statistics submitted to the
FEPC show that the number of skilled and semi-skilled blacks employed by Sperry increased as
well. In May of 1942 there were no African Americans in skilled positions throughout Sperry
Company Inc., nor were there any blacks in jobs categorized as “other” (a category that usually
included clerical help). In fact the vast majority of those African Americans employed by Sperry
were unskilled workers (83 percent). Only 100 of the 586 (17 percent) black workers at the
corporation worked in semi-skilled positions.399

397

All figures include stats for both Sperry Company and its subsidiary Ford Instruments.
Table 3 – Total and Non-White Workers Employed in 8 Firms Appearing Before the FEPC at New York
Hearings, February 16th and 17th, 1942,” Compliance Data for Firms Involved in Old Committee Hearings, FEPC
Papers, Entry 75, Box 546, Statistics Folder.
See Table 4.2 in Appendix.
399
“Table 7 – Total and Non-White Workers Employed in Skilled, Semi-Skilled, Unskilled, and “Other” Categories
for Six Firms Appearing Before the FEPC at New York Hearings,” Compliance Data for Firms Involved in Old
Committee Hearings, FEPC Papers, Entry 75, Box 546, Statistics Folder.
See Table 4.1 in Appendix.
398

179

Chart 1
Negro Labor at Sperry Company Inc., May 1942
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This changed significantly by May of 1943. According to FEPC records small numbers of
African Americans were employed in both skilled positions and in jobs categorized as “other”.
More significantly the number of blacks employed in semi-skilled positions dramatically
increased. Of 1,024 black employees, 386 (nearly 38 percent) were in semi-skilled positions. As
the chart below illustrates, the percentage of black workers in semi-skilled positions more than
doubled over a twelve month period. Moreover, the percentage of black workers in unskilled
positions decreased to 61 percent.
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Chart 2
Negro Labor at Sperry Company Inc., May 1943
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A labor shortage in 1943 contributed to Sperry’s increased employment of black workers.
Thomas Morgan, President of the Sperry Corporation, contacted John Coleman, Chairman of
Selective Service Board #5, about the labor problem at Sperry. The company needed more
workers because the draft was taking so many employees abroad to fight the war. After a study
of the metropolitan area revealed the best possible source of additional labor was available in
Harlem, Mr. Morgan, upon Coleman’s recommendation, requested a conference with Roy
Wilkins of the NAACP hoping to recruit black workers to fill open positions. At this meeting
Morgan said that the necessity of war had convinced him of the need to use all available labor,
and to therefore make it easier to secure more Negro workers. Morgan admitted that there was a
lot of “red tape” that had to be negotiated when getting a job through the usual channels. After
conversations with black workers at Sperry Morgan also admitted that it was even more difficult
for Negroes to obtain jobs with the company and expressed interest in making the process easier.
To that end Morgan considered opening an employment office training center in Harlem to
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attract black workers.400 Morgan assured Wilkins that the Harlem office would not be used to
create a segregated unit in the factory, although a considerable number of black workers might
work in certain departments. He also pledged that the company was not hiring blacks to work
for lower wages as a scheme to weaken the union as African American workers were accepted
for membership by the UE.401 A few weeks later Morgan took steps to put his plan for black
employment into action.
On February 19, 1943 Sperry executives held a meeting to discuss the details involved in
creating the Harlem employment office. Roy Wilkins, Elmer Carter, member of the NYS
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, Thomas Morgan, and other Sperry officials attended.
At the meeting the men decided that black job applicants would be given one week training at
the Harlem office, and then two weeks of training in the plant. When one Sperry official
expressed concern with black applicants’ lack of experience with machine precision work,
Morgan replied that many men with no formal education had mechanical aptitude and that these
applicants would be considered with that in mind. Wilkins observed that though there were
discussions about preparedness of Negro workers for industrial work, all those present supported
the hiring of black workers and the creation of a Harlem employment office to facilitate this.402
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Consequently in April, the Sperry Corporation opened an employment office in Harlem to recruit
black workers for its subsidiary companies to fill those shortages.403 Frank Thomas, the
Employment Supervisor of the Harlem office, promised that those who met minimum
educational and vocational requirements would be trained for skilled and semi-skilled work.404
The creation of Sperry’s Harlem office was just one tactic used by the company to recruit
black workers. The company also continued to accept applications through the United States
Employment Service and the Urban League.405 Sperry management applied to the USES for
assistance in finding black workers.406 The labor shortage further motivated Sperry’s efforts to
expand black employment in 1943 and amplified the FEPC’s efforts to prompt company
management to hire African Americans.
Not only did Sperry begin to employ black workers in skilled positions, they also altered
the methods of production in order to hire fewer skilled trade workers and more general workers
with less training. Prior to the war, the Sperry Company, according to Morgan, employed about
3,500 highly skilled workers. In early 1943 the company was hiring 46,000 workers and
expected to hire an additional 14,000 by the end of the year. Because of the necessity for more
workers and faster production Morgan explained the company had broken down the skilled
production processes so that they could employ workers whom they never would have employed
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before the war.407 Those workers included more African Americans. This process was not
unique at Sperry. A host of war industries all over the country similarly deskilled skilled jobs to
hire more workers.
In 1943 Sperry’s management had significantly increased the number of African
American hires. By January of 1944 the number of blacks employed by the company had nearly
doubled from the number employed in December of 1942, increasing from 650 to 1,316.408 By
early 1944 black workers comprised 3.7 percent of the total workers in the corporation, up from
2 percent the previous year. The corporation had added 658 black workers to their work force
during 1943. The most marked increase of black workers took place in the Sperry Gyroscope
factory, as the number of black employees more than doubled from December of 1942 to January
of 1944. This is even more significant because this increase occurred after a four month period
of declining black employment.409 In fact in 1944 the Sperry Corporation had achieved levels of
black employment well above the 1.5 percent the FEPC declared was necessary for companies to
be classified as having a “good or fair” number of Negro employees.410
According to historian Martha Biondi, the employment of blacks during the war had
prompted the Sperry management to change its philosophy about hiring black workers. In 1944
the company’s president, a new proponent of racial brotherhood, gave a speech about the
benefits of industrial integration at the NAACP’s national convention in Chicago.411 In August
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1944 Sperry Company General Manager R.E. Gilmore paid high tribute to the company’s black
workers. Gilmore said that black workers’ industrial efficiency equaled that of white workers
and their habits were often superior. In an extensive statement reviewing three years of
experience in the employment of African Americans Gilmore said they were neither so prone to
absenteeism as other workers nor did they change their jobs as frequently.412 This change in
philosophy is evident in the attitudes of Sperry’s leaders.
At the top levels of Sperry management discrimination would no longer be tolerated.
The corporation’s president personally dealt with hiring discrimination at the employment
offices of his company. Thomas Morgan tried to recruit an African American worker for a better
position in the building where the corporate offices of Sperry were located. Morgan had
observed the man’s work and deemed him a good mechanical worker who would be an asset to
Sperry, however when the man applied and passed a preliminary test for a job at Sperry’s
employment offices, he was offered a job as a porter. Mr. Morgan intervened on the man’s
behalf, calling the employment office and “gave them hell.” The man was subsequently
employed in a skilled position at Sperry and proved to be a good mechanic.413
Robert Weaver who served as the leader of the War Manpower Commission’s Negro
Labor Service, pointed to the labor shortage as being the primary reason discriminatory bars to
black hiring were relaxed after 1943.414 It should be noted however that the investigations
conducted by the FEPC and the State Committee on Discrimination and subsequent supervision
of the Sperry Corporation’s hiring practices also played a significant role in achieving increased
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black employment. FEPC statistics show that the hiring levels in all Sperry subsidiaries during
1942 in the wake of the initial FEPC investigations were comparable to those made in 1943 after
the labor shortage. From February to December of 1942, 564 blacks were hired by the
corporation. This was only 100 less than the number of blacks hired during 1943, despite the
labor shortage. Moreover by August of 1942 both Sperry and Ford Instruments had reached
“fair” levels of black employment according to the FEPC’s standards.415 According to the FEPC
in January of 1944 all plants with non-white workers comprising 1.5 and 4.99 percent of their
employees had a “good or fair number of Negroes.” The FEPC rightly contended that though
these percentages seemed low, considering that Sperry had very few black workers before the
investigations, these small increases were appreciable.416 Therefore it seems that the FEPC, in
conjunction with the New York State’s COD which had the power to prosecute state industries
discriminating against black workers, had made an important impact on the hiring practices of
the Sperry Gyroscope Company. The hiring of blacks begun in the wake of the FEPC and COD
investigations was expanded due to the labor shortage of 1943, allowing blacks access to jobs
previously closed to them at Sperry.

Preserving Victory: Retaining Black Jobs in the Race of Reconversion
As of 1944 Sperry employed African Americans in twenty-eight different occupations. A
third of black workers were in highly skilled positions, another third in semi-skilled occupations,
and the last third in other jobs. A small number of African American workers occupied office
positions and there were three black engineers. A considerable number of African Americans
415
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acted as leaders (Sperry’s designation for people who were instructors and tool setters for groups
of ten to twenty) and another was a foreman in charge of all internal transportation in one of the
corporation’s plants. White workers’ threats to refuse to work with blacks were just threats as
few racially motivated conflicts were reported. White workers’ doubts about the preparedness
and ability of black workers disappeared as well. Out of 300 shop stewards, 22 were black. In
fact an all white department had chosen an African American to represent them as shop
steward.417
Not only did blacks attain positions in the company which were once closed to them,
black workers participated in the social activities sponsored by the company as well. According
to Sperry General Manager R. E. Gilmore, African Americans participated in many of the
company’s social and recreation activities. Sperry’s symphony orchestra had several black
musicians. African Americans also participated in the company’s choral society. White workers
in other recreational societies at Sperry including the ball teams, bowling teams, and the camera
club accepted the company’s black workers as well.418 The social integration at the factory
proved wrong management’s earlier claims that white workers would not accept and could not
get along with black workers.
The hiring wave at Sperry in 1943 allowed African Americans to fully integrate the
company’s workforce. The continued efforts of organizations advocating fair employment
practices facilitated this integration. In 1943 and 1944 the National Negro Congress, its offshoot
the Negro Labor Victory Committee (NLVC), and the United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of America worked independently and cooperatively to continue the gains blacks won
at Sperry. One major hurdle to their efforts was reconversion. As war production slowed and
417
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soldiers returned from Europe at the end of World War I, industrial management laid-off black
workers en masse and labor unions lost their influence over the government and factory owners.
The NNC, NLVC, and UE worked to prevent the same from happening at Sperry at the end of
World War II.
United Electrical considered its efforts at Sperry a prime example of its achievements on
the civil rights front and towards the end of the war actively worked to maintain black
employment. In a 1945 District 4 report to its locals the UE cited integration at Sperry as a
prime example of how “we were able to secure jobs for Negroes, assure them equal pay, and win
promotions and upgrading.” The New York district sent this statement out to their locals to
encourage them to keep up the efforts towards this end and for discussion with the membership.
Victories such as the one the UE achieved at Sperry fostered black support for the union.419
The work of the UE in integrating war industries and their focus in extending industrial
employment to African Americans and other minorities is not a story that is limited to Sperry.
The national office of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America sent
memos to all General Vice Presidents and International Representatives expressing national
union support for proposed legislation for a permanent FEPC. National UE leadership urged
locals to pressure state senators to vote in support of a full FEPC budget to support full
mobilization for the war.420 The work of this particular union in integrating war industries is
apparent in other major factories in the New York area. It is not a coincidence that UE also
organized workers at Babcock and Wilcox, a company that was investigated by the FEPC and
subsequently changed their hiring policy. The UE also organized workers at Becton and
419
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Dickinson which was investigated by the FEPC, as well as Bulova which was investigated by the
New York State War Council’s Committee on Discrimination.421 Representation by the racially
inclusive UE helped facilitate integration of these war industries.
With the prospect of reconversion looming on the horizon the UE worked to preserve the
employment advances blacks made during the war. This was an especially difficult task in the
face of reduced demand, decreased production, and returning workers who had served in the war.
In an effort to continue integrating war industries the UE signed an agreement with the FEPC to
cooperate with the agency in investigations of discrimination complaints and adjustments of
valid grievances. After the war the UE formalized its existing fair employment practices by
establishing a National Fair Practices Committee and directing Districts and Locals to follow
suit.422
With the end of the war in sight, in April of 1945 the UE began to consider what effect
reconversion would have on black employment levels. Officials of UE District 4 knew
reconversion would bring the most severe cutbacks in the areas where its black union members
had made their greatest advances – semi-skilled work. Moreover, black workers made their
biggest advances in industries which the union feared would experience the greatest post-war
declines. If that were the case, blacks were more likely to be laid off than the average worker in
these occupations. The UE acknowledged the “grave and immediate responsibility” of the union
to address these issues.423 UE Local 1225, the local representing electrical workers in many
Brooklyn and Queens factories, actively advocated equal employment opportunities for African
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Americans. In their annual “State of the Union” report, leadership of Local 1225 said they were
nearing complete victory in all of their shops in the struggle against discrimination in hiring,
upgrading and equal pay. The major concern of the union moving forward was layoffs of black
workers during reconversion. They were grappling with the idea of making special applications
of seniority laws to prevent the total ousting of recently hired black workers. Their biggest goal
was full employment but they were also looking to guarantee blacks the right to work in the
industry.424
The NLVC looked to collaborate with United Electrical in ensuring black employment in
war industries during reconversion. In September of 1944 Charles Collins, Secretary of the
NLVC, asked Julius Emspak, Secretary Treasurer of UE, to gather a group of UE members to
attend a conference to discuss job security for black workers during reconversion and after the
war. The meeting, sponsored by the NLVC, was to be conducted with various unions who
included black workers. The NLVC was quite worried about the ousting of new black hires
because of seniority rules and the organization leadership wanted to begin discussing how
reconversion may affect black employment.425
The Negro Labor Victory Committee, its parent organization the National Negro
Congress, and United Electrical worked to maintain integration of the work force of the Sperry
Corporation. At Sperry, the problem was particularly acute, as a return to the pre-war
employment policies without adjustments to seniority laws and lay-off rules would mean the
ousting of nearly all black employees. In order to ascertain if employment opportunities would
still be open to blacks at Sperry after the war, the NNC sent an investigator to the company’s
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Long Island firm which by late 1944 had the highest percentage of black workers. Local 450 of
the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America, the union representing Sperry’s
workers, cooperated with the NNC on this study. At the plant seniority was based on
occupation, and operated plant-wide and company-wide, therefore employees who changed from
one occupation to another within the company carried their seniority with them making it
cumulative.426 This meant that blacks who had been employed as porters or janitors and then
upgraded to skilled or semi-skilled positions would have cumulative seniority. This fact
withstanding, the company had not hired its first black employee until 1941 and the majority of
those working at that moment had been hired within the past four years. Consequently
cumulative seniority or not African Americans would be the first workers laid-off if Sperry did
not adjust its seniority rules.
This reality was borne out in the NNC’s study. According to the National Negro
Congress African Americans comprised 7 percent of the 549 filers and burrers at Sperry’s Long
Island plant. In the case of a 50 percent layoff with unmodified seniority policies, the number of
African Americans working in this capacity would drop from thirty-six to nine, comprising only
3 percent of the workers in this occupation. Negroes comprised 2 percent of the assemblers at
Sperry’s Long Island plant. If there were a 50 percent layoff with the same seniority rules
practiced by management there would only be one of the thirty-seven Negro workers left. The
percentage of Negro workers in that occupation would drop from 2 to 0.1 percent. There were
23 black operators out of a total 973 (2 percent) working at Sperry. If there were a 50 percent
lay-off without changes to the seniority policy, no blacks would be employed as operators.
These findings were similar to what would happen in many other plants, illustrating the need for
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a modification of seniority rules in order to protect the gains blacks made in industrial
companies.427
The New York District of the UE supported the position of the National CIO protecting
the gains blacks achieved by preventing anti-union employers from taking steps designed to
discriminate against black workers. The district urged UE locals to find a compromise between
sticking rigidly to seniority laws and retaining black workers who would all be lost under strict
adherence to seniority. The union’s objective was to maintain the gains won for blacks and the
present levels of black employment.428
To keep companies from returning to their discriminatory hiring practices, the District
Executive Board developed a campaign for a permanent FEPC in New Jersey, for the
appointment of trusted personnel of New York’s State Commission Against Discrimination, and
the creation of a permanent federal FEPC. The UE also advocated close cooperation between the
union and the FEPC to eliminate any and all forms of discriminatory employment practices in
plants where UE locals or organizing committees were in existence. To minimize black
unemployment and prevent blacks from being relegated to unskilled jobs the district was to work
closely with the WMC to make sure that where lay-offs were unavoidable, black workers be
given job referrals for jobs that utilized their highest talents and maintained their current pay
rates. In addition leaders of District 4 wanted the WMC to furnish lists of critical plants with
manpower shortages, so that the UE could refer laid-off members there and work with black
communities to man these shortages with black workers. The district also pushed locals to
concentrate on filling vacancies as far as possible with black workers and to push upgrading of
black workers to help break through the still-existing practice of discriminatory hiring. To
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accomplish this, the locals were to provide special training courses to local blacks. The District
also wanted locals to include black members in leadership roles in shops, in locals, and within
the district. Perhaps most importantly, the UE urged locals to continue to engage in the tactics
that had successfully secured jobs for African Americans – to initiate campaigns with the FEPC
and black organizations to pressure companies with discriminatory hiring practices to hire black
workers.429
Though many locals of the UE supported the larger goal of maintaining black
employment, changing the seniority laws was a hard prospect. Labor unions had at all costs
worked to implement and follow seniority laws as a way to protect workers from arbitrary abuses
and firings by factory management. Union leaders feared that tampering with seniority laws
might mean the destabilization of the entire seniority system. Moreover it would be indefensible
to the public for unions to protect black employment at the expense of veterans returning from
war who may lose their jobs if seniority laws were adjusted. The UE recognized the problem of
maintaining black employment during reconversion and acted boldly, stopping just short of
altering seniority policies.

Fulfilling the Vision: Black Employment after the War
In 1945 the government had begun terminating some of Sperry’s production contracts
and the company had reduced production levels. The company did however continue to produce
goods for the military as it had done before the war.430 In compliance with FEPC orders to
continually send information on the race and religion of its workers in order to prevent
429
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discrimination, the FEPC arranged a meeting with Sperry officials on May 4, 1945 to get
information on current employment practices and indications of compliance with FEPC
directives.431 At that time the number of black employees had declined to 852. Though the
number of black workers decreased, they comprised 7.5 percent of 11,321 employees at Sperry
Gyroscope were non-whites.432 Even as the company’s black employment began to decline in
1945, the black employment levels at Sperry were higher than the average percentage of blacks
comprising the workforce of other state war industries. According to 1944 COD investigations
conducted all over the state, in almost every type of war industry the average percentage Negroes
made of the workforce was 2 percent. The rate of black employment at Sperry was also more
than that of the 4-plus percent of the state population African Americans comprised according to
the 1940 census.433 There is no exact way to tell what proportion of the city’s residents were
African American in 1945 but the 7.5 percent black workers comprised of the Sperry Company’s
employees was in the range between what the 1940 and 1950 percentage of the black population
was in the city (6 percent in 1940 and 9.5 percent in 1950).434 Sperry unlike many companies
employed a percentage of black workers comparable to their population in the city.
Not only had black employment levels increased at Sperry but blacks continued to work
in higher-paid, trained positions. Of the 713 black workers at Sperry the majority (almost 60
percent) were in skilled or semi-skilled positions. Another 37 percent of black Sperry employees
were unskilled workers and under 4 percent of African American workers were in skilled
positions. Though blacks made advances in semi-skilled positions, clerical and engineer posts
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remained closed to them at the end of the war.435 In looking at the 1945 figures it was clear that
Sperry, in response to FEPC directives and manpower needs, had changed its hiring policy
resulting in a substantial increase of non-white employees in a wide range of categories.436
Table 8: Classification of African American and other Non-White workers at Sperry Gyroscope,
1945437

Job Classification

Negro

Skilled
Semi-Skilled

28
424

Other NonWhite
1
4

Unskilled

261

1

262

713

6

719

3
1
0

0
0
1

3
1
1

4
717

1
7

5
724

totals

Totals
29
428

Other
Clerical
Guards
Jr. Product
Engineers
Totals
Grand
totals

Sperry’s president, Thomas Morgan, had accepted the value of black workers and
advocated equality for blacks at Sperry and beyond. Morgan unequivocally maintained his belief
in equal opportunity – that skilled workers of any race, creed, or religion should be able to work
where they are qualified. He believed the major reason for prejudice was economic and that
division between the races would vanish as opportunity was equalized. Key in this process
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according to Morgan was access to education for blacks.438 Morgan became national chairman
of the second annual campaign to raise funds for the United Negro College Fund in 1945.439
Morgan pointed out the economic potentials of an educated black population and emphasized the
importance of granting African Americans all the benefits of citizenship as “the Negro would
play a large role in the welfare of this country.” The institutions the fund was raising money for
would also, he argued, have a major role in educating the quarter million blacks in the Army who
planned to return to school and college.440 Norman Pickering, musician and engineer, conducted
the Sperry Symphony Orchestra in a benefit Concert at Carnegie Hall which raised almost
10,000 dollars for the United Negro College Fund. The seventy piece orchestra was composed
of Brooklyn and Long Island company workers.441 Black newspapers celebrated Thomas
Morgan’s acceptance of black workers and activism to improve black access to education,
training, and ultimately jobs. Both the Amsterdam News and Chicago Defender ran articles
chronicling Morgan’s activities and achievements in 1945.442 Many black editorialists hoped
Sperry would remain a bastion of integration through the reconversion process.
As reconversion began Sperry’s management attempted to find ways to maintain high
production levels in order to maintain their employment rolls. In an effort to expand its
production capacity during the post-war slow-down Sperry Corporation purchased a one-half
interest in Wright’s Automatic Machinery Company a producer of packing machines. Sperry did
so with the belief that “American industry will need and use more labor-saving machines in
order that American working-men can continue to receive high wages and short working hours
438
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and at the same time meet world competition.’”443 Sperry also continued a large program of
research on military projects and focused on producing and developing new products for
commercial sale. The company tested its radio communication system for use in railroad
applications, tested its long range location devices for use in navigating ships, and tested its
automatic pilot navigation instruments.444 This was all done in the hopes of applying technology
developed during the war to commercial items which would keep the factories producing and
employing workers.
Morgan was optimistic on the prospects of post-war black employment, believing blacks
would maintain their industrial positions after the war. He explained that there would be high
demand for consumer goods that had not been manufactured during the war. He also said that
factories could put the new techniques learned producing war goods to good use producing civil
goods for consumption, therefore maintaining and improving production capacity and preserving
jobs. The changed methods of production also created a situation in which production jobs
needed less training.445 Be this as it was Sperry Gyroscope laid off a significant number of black
workers (1,500) by the end of the summer.446 The reality of the employment situation at Sperry
was that both black and white employees were being laid-off as the company ended war
production.
The United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America, was the only major
labor union for a company employing large numbers of black workers to enact affirmative action
reconversion policy. UE locals in District 4 proposed a very limited affirmative action plan at
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Sperry. According to the seniority policies of the company the newest hired, which would
include virtually all black workers in the company, were the first fired.447 Under this policy the
numbers of black workers employed in the company began to dwindle during 1945 as the war
ended and former soldiers reclaimed their jobs.448 As Sperry laid-off workers both black and
white, the number of black Sperry workers represented by the UE fell from a high of 600 in
1944, to 100 in December of 1945.449 In December of 1945 Sperry Local 450 voted
unanimously to press for a new seniority plan designed to prevent the number of skilled black
employees from dipping even further. That local representing 5,000 Sperry workers, voted to
make a maintenance of black employment clause a major part of the contract negotiations with
the company. Sperry Local 450 proposed a plan designed to prevent the number of skilled black
employees from dropping below the level employed as of November 15, 1945. The proposed
plan created a black to white worker ratio that was to be maintained regardless of length of
service. Within the ratios seniority rules would still be observed. This would allow some black
workers to remain in skilled positions at Sperry.450
The union was largely unsuccessful in convincing Sperry’s management to alter their
seniority policies to allow skilled and semi-skilled black workers to retain their positions.
Management agreed to adjust seniority rules for veterans but not for African Americans. In
some cases Local 450 found jobs for laid-off workers in other departments and in at least one
other case “white workers in a department ‘unanimously agreed to allow a skilled Negro worker
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to stay instead of one of them.’”451 These instances withstanding not even the racially
progressive United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America could implement
policies that would protect the jobs of skilled and semi-skilled black workers in the wake of
conversion.452 Though Sperry President Thomas Morgan advocated and actively worked for
black employment, company management was not willing to change seniority laws which had
been enacted to protect the fundamental rights of workers. The loss of black skilled and semiskilled positions at a racially integrated and tolerant company like Sperry illustrates the fate of
many black workers in former war industries.
The story was not completely bleak however for blacks in the post-war period. Though
blacks were laid off from Sperry, not every black worker was ousted from his job with the
company. In line with the larger employment trends of New York City black men at Sperry
experienced displacement from their industrial jobs in the wake of the war. Though doors closed
to some black men at Sperry many gained valuable training and experience that allowed them to
find jobs in industries elsewhere.
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More importantly Sperry, unlike many other companies, increased the number of black
workers it employed in the wake of reconversion. In 1950 the Defense Production Act
prohibited discrimination against any employee or applicant for employment on the basis of race,
color, creed, or national origin. To enforce this law President Truman issued Executive Order
10308 in 1951 establishing a temporary Committee on Government Contract Compliance.
(CGCC). The CGCC was to examine and study the rules, procedures, and practices of the
contracting agencies of the government to ensure the companies were complying with
Government contract provisions prohibiting discrimination.453 Sperry retained its government
contracts for production of weapons and technology for the armed forces after World War II and
as the Cold War intensified the company expanded and diversified its manufactures. Therefore
the company was under the purview of the Defense Production Act as well as the CGCC and was
expected to treat black applicants and employees equally despite their race. This fact, along with
the racially progressive attitude of the company’s President Thomas Morgan, and perhaps the
fair employment laws in New York State, facilitated Sperry’s employment of black workers at a
time when many other industries around the country did not.
After President Truman issued the Executive Order the National Urban League did a
survey of thirty industrial cities to ascertain if blacks were being discriminated against by
industries. The study, which the NUL sent to the CGCC, revealed that war industries embarked
in widespread discrimination against black workers especially those applying for skilled and
white collar positions. Black women were generally excluded from industrial positions and few
black men were included in in-plant training courses. The study, which was funded in part by
grants from the Marshall Field Fund, the United Community Defense Services and the Rosenstiel
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Foundation, concluded that the discrimination appeared to depend on local conditions. The
Urban League described discriminatory employment practices in the South and Southwestern
airplane industries; in Columbus, Ohio where forty plants with defense contracts did not employ
blacks in clerical or technical jobs; and in Baltimore factories where blacks were excluded from
most production jobs and all technical and clerical positions. The report found that two defense
employers in New York, unlike industries in other areas of the country, were employing black
workers. One of these New York plants was Sperry. In fact the Urban League proclaimed that
“the Sperry Corporation was employing Negroes in substantial numbers.”454 Despite the fact
that this article does not give hard numbers on black employees, it is significant that the National
Urban League deemed Sperry’s number of black hires substantial given that the organization had
targeted the company just a decade prior for refusing to hire blacks. Though the company had
laid-off workers of all races at the end of the war and the lay-off of black workers was
disproportionately high because of seniority regulations; company management hired black
workers when production picked up after reconversion a practice that was not common among
factories in the rest of the nation.
The change in black employment at Sperry from the beginning of the war to the end is an
example of how jobs opened to blacks at industries during World War II. In just three years a
company that had virtually no black workers, employed African Americans in skilled and semiskilled positions. In this case, as in many other factories, it was a combination of factors that
prompted Sperry’s management to do this. Black activism for employment brought public
attention to the discriminatory practices of the company and prompted the State Committee on
Discrimination and local offices of the FEPC to investigate the corporation’s hiring policies.
Moreover the radical United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America advocated for
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black employment as they organized workers at Sperry’s plants. Black employment steadily
increased after the FEPC hearings and was amplified by a labor shortage in 1943 which
prompted the company to actively recruit black workers. Though these factors did not work
exactly the same way in all war industries, in many of those industries that did hire black
workers a combination of these events occurred. Sperry continued its war-time policy of racial
integration after reconversion as the company provided technology and produced weapons for
the growing Cold War military industrial complex. Part of this had to do with the nature of
goods produced by the company, but it also can be traced to its racially liberal president, as well
as the anti-discriminatory employment regulations imposed at the federal and state levels. In
these ways, Sperry represents both the larger trends and particularities of black employment
during the 1940s and early 1950s and exemplifies the opportunities attracting blacks to migrate
to New York City and other war production centers.
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Chapter 5
Busting Out: Black New York in the 1940s

For the African Americans who left the Jim Crow south to find better paying jobs in the
North and West a primary concern was finding a place to live. Blacks could not live wherever
they pleased in northern cities. Most cities had a black district. In cities like Detroit, Los
Angeles and Chicago, traditional black neighborhoods became overcrowded, crime increased,
and social services were never able to keep up with the influx of new residents. At the same
time, many whites moved out of cities to the suburbs during and especially after the war as
higher wages created an expanding middle class and the GI Bill provided white Americans home
loans to purchase houses in areas not open to black settlement. As whites left the city, housing
opened for African Americans.455
As in other cities the World War II migration indelibly changed the face of New York,
sparking trends that continued for the rest of the 1940s. More than 200,000 African Americans
moved to New York in the 1940s. As in other urban areas, larger numbers of city whites began
moving to the suburbs as home loans became more available to them after the war. In addition
the areas of black settlement in the city had many of the same problems as black areas in other
cities - namely overcrowding, high rents, and insufficient social services. The effects of the
migration in New York however differed in some ways from other cities. Most significantly,
African Americans began moving outside the primary area of black settlement in the city –
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Harlem – to other boroughs, creating by 1950 a second major area of black settlement in the city
as well as integrated neighborhoods in other boroughs. The dispersal of the city’s blacks into
several neighborhoods created varying and complex dynamics in race relations in the city.
Blacks began moving outside of Harlem in the 1940s due to the lack of housing and
overcrowding in the neighborhood. The vast increase of blacks moving to New York during the
war years coupled with the lack of available housing exacerbated problems present in Harlem
since the 1930s. In 1940 there were nearly 300,000 blacks living in Manhattan and over the
course of a decade an additional 100,000 came to the borough. Overcrowding intensified,
already high rents rose, and mortality rates worsened causing the living conditions of Harlem’s
residents to further decline.
Blacks reacted to this decline in living conditions in varied ways. Some black leaders in
the city advocated rent reductions and stabilization. Many black New Yorkers took a different
approach - they looked to live elsewhere in the city. As blacks migrated to New York during the
1940s Harlemites were moving to the Bronx, Brooklyn, Long Island, and Westchester.
Moreover, some of the newly arriving, black southern migrants chose to make Brooklyn their
home instead of Harlem. It is no surprise then that over the course of the decade Harlem
experienced less growth in comparison to other sections of the city.456
Harlem’s blacks paid an inordinate amount of their income for rent. On average Harlem
residents paid 60 percent of their earnings to rent apartments that landlords neglected to
maintain.457 Harlem building owners charged residents exorbitant rents because discrimination
prevented blacks from moving elsewhere in the borough.458 Harlem proprietors claimed they
were charging blacks higher rents to make back the money they lost due to the vacancies caused
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by white flight.459 The high rents landlords charged blacks coupled with the low wages blacks
earned caused economic hardship for blacks in Harlem.
Many black leaders and organizations advocated rent control laws to ease the financial
burden of Harlem residents. African American leaders tried to use the newly created Office of
Price Administration (OPA) to exact rent control in the city. Due to the nationwide decline in
housing construction, which was exacerbated by a surge in the number of blacks migrating from
the South, the housing market rapidly tightened in many urban areas. The federal government
responded to the housing shortage (and the shortage of other consumer commodities) by passing
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and establishing an Office of Price Administration
(OPA). The OPA had the power to freeze rents and prices in designated localities. The United
Tenants League, a Communist influenced tenant organization, the Citizens Housing Council a
high-powered housing reform organization founded in 1937, and other consumer organizations
pressed Mayor La Guardia to have the OPA immediately freeze rents in New York City. La
Guardia made the request, but the OPA refused action claiming the city's vacancy rate (7.5
percent in 1940) was too high for mandatory controls. Instead the OPA declared the city a
"defense rental area," and called for a voluntary limit on rent increases, monitored by the mayor's
office.460 This refusal angered many African American leaders and prompted them to take action
to ensure that New York City rents would be regulated by the OPA.
The failure of the OPA to impose rent controls became the rallying point for some black
activists; and the fact that New York was one of the last major cities to come under rent control
during the war prompted a concerted movement to influence the OPA to declare New York a
459
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defense area subject to price control. Activists from other cities came to New York to participate
in the campaign for lower rents. Edgar Brown, a leader in the National Negro Council, an
organization aimed at uniting civil rights organizations and the labor movement, came to New
York to conduct a similar campaign. Brown, who had waged successful fights for rent control in
Chicago and other major cities, wrote President Roosevelt a letter in August of 1942 protesting
the discrimination directed against African Americans in the government’s administration of
price control and rationing. He urged the President to include Harlem as an OPA rent-controlled
area since “half a million Negro residents are paying exorbitant and disproportionately high rents
and suffer intolerable congestion and diminishing services.”461 The following month Brown held
mass meetings in Abyssinian, Metropolitan, and Union Baptist Churches to recruit supporters for
the fight for rent control. Meeting attendees signed petitions that were sent to Leon Henderson,
head of the Office of Price Administration, demanding he designate Harlem a war area in which
rents could be controlled.462
In addition, Brown and Donelan Phillips, President of the Consolidated Tenants’ League,
opened a ten-day drive to get 100,000 Harlemites to sign a petition calling on the Federal Price
Administration to designate New York City a defense area and to set a rent ceiling. To continue
the drive the March on Washington Movement and representatives from most of the city’s black
churches formed a permanent committee under the leadership of the Consolidated Tenants’
League.463 The Tenant’s League partnered with other organizations in the city to up the pressure
on the OPA to cap rents in the city. Newly-elected Harlem city councilman Adam Clayton
Powell, Jr., mobilized his People's Committee to support the petition to have Harlem declared a
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"war emergency area.” The National Negro Congress joined the drive by collecting petitions
among its followers and even organizing rent strikes in individual buildings. In other parts of the
city the American Labor party made the struggle for rent control a major political priority.
Congressman Vito Marcantonio, an advocate of rent control and public housing, pressed the
issue on a federal level, as did American Labor Party councilmen Michael Quill, (Bronx),
Benjamin Davis, Jr. (Harlem), and Peter Cacchione (Brooklyn).464 The campaign for the OPA to
enact rent control did not achieve immediate success but would in November of 1943 when the
OPA finally declared New York City a War Rental Area.
Though many black organizations acknowledged the migration’s contribution to
Harlem’s social problems, the black press generally did not. While publishing articles on the
troubles Harlemites faced, the Amsterdam News ran virtually no articles focused on the migration
itself during the war years. This was a stark contrast from World War I when black publications
such as the Amsterdam News, New York Age, Crisis, and Opportunity constantly published
articles on the expanding black population of Harlem. Since the flow of blacks had never really
stopped since World War I, perhaps black newspaper editors believed the continued trend did not
warrant attention because it had become an accepted reality. Though there is no definitive
answer to explain the editors’ choice not to run articles on the migration, the absence of articles
indicates that the migration in their opinion was not noteworthy. By the 1940s black migration
to the city had been going on for more than twenty years and Southern migrants were well
integrated into the native New York community. Moreover the problems Harlemites faced in the
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war years were not new problems. High rents, overcrowding, and crime were magnified with
this increased wave of migrants to Harlem.
Though the black newspapers did not believe the migration was noteworthy of news
coverage, the mainstream press focused on the migration and its contribution to the deterioration
of living conditions in Harlem. Mainstream newspapers published articles linking the migration
with the worsening conditions Harlem residents lived under. Several such articles appeared in
the New York Times. An editorial blamed the sudden increase of blacks in the city for the
inability of the New York City administration to provide the services necessary for their
survival.465 Another argued that the migration of southern African Americans was the reason for
overcrowding in Harlem and conditions prompting New York’s blacks to move out of that
neighborhood.466 Another opinion piece blamed congestion, which was worsened by the
migration, for many of the social problems in Harlem and advocated the dispersal of the black
population in other boroughs.467 The migration and the social problems it wrought were everpresent in the New York Times in late 1941 and early 1942.468
As the editorials in the Times indicated, the migration worsened many of the social
problems in the Harlem community. Not only did the 100,000 additional African Americans
who moved to Harlem intensify overcrowding and the need for housing, it also enabled landlords
to continue to charge high rents because of the increased demand. Very few of the census
districts immediately adjacent to Harlem became black during the 1940s and the general
geography of Harlem remained the same during the war years.469 Moreover, the additional
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residents in Harlem also taxed the already inadequate educational and social resources available
to area residents. The National Urban League, which dealt specifically with the condition of
blacks in cities, emphasized the migration’s role in the problems plaguing Harlem in an effort to
find solutions. James Hubert, Executive Director of the New York Urban League, at an annual
meeting for the organization, linked the increase in Negro population with declining conditions
in Harlem and the increasing crime rate.470 Likewise, Lester Granger, Assistant Secretary for the
National Urban League, concluded that the social and economic problems of Harlem were in fact
national problems because the horrible living conditions in the South pushed migrants to come to
New York. Granger asserted that the conditions in northern cities could be improved by
implementing a national program to achieve higher unemployment insurance and other social
security measures, as well as better schools, hospitals, housing and judicial process for African
Americans living in cities. Responses to these problems were necessary because Granger
believed the migration, and the difficult living conditions it exacerbated in Harlem, would
continue.471
These declining living conditions caused displeasure among Harlem residents and an
undercurrent of discontent that contributed to the Harlem Riot in 1943.472 The police believed
that the migrants had a direct role in causing the Riot. The New York Police Department had
received a report that “organized gangs of hoodlums from certain Southern cities” had been sent
to Harlem to cause trouble and had been trickling in for some time.473 This line of thinking,
though erroneous, reveals the mind-set of the police, and other New Yorkers, about the character
of the migrants and the increasing black population’s negative effect on New York City.
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The idea that black migration adversely affected northern cities was a belief held by some
government officials. United States Attorney General Francis Biddle linked black migration to
the outbreak of riots in cities during the summer of 1943. Biddle urged President Roosevelt to
respond to the wave of urban race riots in various cities such as Detroit, Los Angeles, and
Harlem, by forbidding the migration of African Americans to northern and western cities.474
According to reports in the black press, the suggestion came as part of a six-point “Anti-Riot
Program” submitted to the White House based on a study made by the civil liberties division of
the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Biddle believed
overcrowding in centers of war production and increasing racial tensions could be alleviated by
stemming black migration to the areas. This would be accomplished through the War Manpower
Commission which would close work sources to Negroes therefore eliminating the draw of better
employment that attracted blacks to urban areas.475 Biddle denied heading any program that
would prohibit the movement of black workers explicitly but did note that war employers and
organizations needed to more carefully consider the effects of overcrowding before advocating
or facilitating the migration of large numbers of black or white war workers into urban defense
production areas.476 There was little provision made for housing for black or white migrants in
the new war production areas. The housing shortage in New York was indicative of a larger
national problem. Though there is no direct evidence that Biddle recommended a systematic end
to black migration to northern cities, it is clear that he blamed the migration of southern blacks
and the subsequent pressure the increasing black population put on the limited resources in urban
areas for the outbreak of violence in summer of 1943.
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New York’s black press quickly criticized Attorney General Biddle’s suggestion,
highlighting the racism, discrimination, and social problems America’s blacks endured. One
author accused Biddle of colluding with “Southern plantation owners and Dixie industrial
exploiters” to keep blacks in the south for cheap labor.477 The Amsterdam News published A.
Philip Randolph’s response to Biddle’s proposal. In his letter to the Attorney General, Randolph
argued that if the government enacted Biddle’s proposal, it would in effect limit the employment
opportunities of southern blacks migrating to improve their quality of life, and would therefore
violate their constitutional rights. Moreover Randolph asserted this kind of policy would amount
to gross segregation and discrimination. Randolph ended his letter with some suggestions about
how to alleviate the racial problems facing America’s cities. In Randolph’s estimation the only
way to avoid future disturbances was to provide equal opportunities for blacks. He wrote, “It is
not the increase of the Negro population in war production centers that causes race riots, but it is
the fact that Negroes have never gotten a fair break, and just and reasonable opportunities in any
phase of American life, that is at the bottom of these conflicts.”478 Many black activists and
organizations agreed with Randolph’s statement and called on Mayor La Guardia and other city
officials to find solutions to the problems the city’s blacks faced – problems that were only
worsened by the renewed wave of migration to New York during the war.
A month after the Harlem Riot 554 delegates from religious, education, civil rights, labor,
economic, and fraternal groups attended a two-session meeting at Hunter College to find ways to
eliminate discrimination against African-Americans in order to prevent another riot. The
resulting organization, the Citizen’s Emergency Conference for Interracial Unity, demanded that
Mayor La Guardia appoint an interracial committee to study conditions among African
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Americans in the city. They also wanted black representation on bodies in the City
administration including the Board of Education, Board of Higher Education, Police Department,
and Health Department. The conference resolved to end employment discrimination and urged
the use of the FEPC and COD to fight discrimination in war industries. They also demanded that
unions remove bylaws that denied admission of members by reason of race, creed, or color.
Moreover the Conference advocated more rigid enforcement of OPA regulations and urged the
state government to develop a consumer department to prevent price gouging in under-privileged
areas. Lastly the organization wanted to take steps to end residential segregation and provide
needed social services.479
Mayor La Guardia responded to the riot and the Hunter College conference by creating
the Mayor’s Committee on Unity (MCOU). The new organization aimed to prevent future racial
disturbances by promoting interracial unity and identifying conditions that contributed to racial
conflict.480 In February of 1944, Mayor La Guardia appointed members of the committee, which
acted as a watchdog for racism throughout the city. Civic and social agencies also called on the
organization for advice on matters concerning better integration of African Americans.481 The
creation of the Mayor’s Committee on Unity meant that La Guardia had officially made race
relations a priority and prevention of discrimination a duty of the city government.
Though no more major riots occurred in the 1940s, racial confrontations continued in
Manhattan as African Americans moved into Washington Heights. In October 1943, only two
months after the Harlem Riot, skirmishes between new black residents and the white residents of
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Washington Heights broke out. Police broke up an alleged plot to run black residents out of the
neighborhood, vandals damaged property recently occupied by blacks, and minor interracial
clashes threatened to develop into a full-fledged race riot in the fall of 1943.482 As black families
moved into Washington Heights, vandals painted swastikas on the buildings where African
Americans resided. Detectives investigating the vandalism said that white residents of the
neighborhood resented the fact that Negroes had recently been moving in larger numbers.483
Despite these incidents of racial antagonism, a large-scale violent riot between blacks and whites
did not occur. Similar racial antagonisms in other cities around the country prompted violence in
1943. Perhaps the dispersion of blacks into other areas of the city played a part in the prevention
of a major race riot from erupting in New York City.
Just as the Harlem Riot of 1943 impelled organizations and city officials to seek solutions
to the problems plaguing Harlem, it also prompted the government to more closely regulate
rents. The upheaval of August 1943 prompted a nervous OPA to open a branch office on 135th
Street and begin monitoring Harlem rents and prices. The Consolidated Tenants League, Adam
Clayton Powell's People's Committee, and left wing unions and neighborhood groups began
flooding the OPA office with complaints. At the same time, the city's CIO unions, especially
Mike Quill's Transport Workers Union and the left-led National Maritime Union, argued that
when lease renewals came up on October 1, 1943, landlords would violate voluntary restraints
and institute massive rent increases. The mayor, in response to the pressure and complaints of
these various groups, escalated his pressure on the OPA to control Harlem rents as well. On
November 1, 1943, the OPA finally relented and declared New York City a War Rental Area
with mandatory ceilings retroactive to the levels of March 1, 1943. From this point on those
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advocating fairer rents in Harlem focused their attention on the OPA as it became a mechanism
to achieve rent control.484 The OPA ordered a freeze on rents in Harlem designed to prevent
indiscriminate rent gouging by Harlem landlords but the OPA did not effectively enforce the
mandate. 485 Black activists and leftist groups would focus future fights for enforcement of rent
control and lower rents in Harlem on the OPA.486
Despite the creation of the Mayor’s Committee on Unity to improve race relations in the
city and the freezing of rents by the OPA many blacks chose to settle outside of Harlem to avoid
the declining living conditions there. Overcrowding in Harlem prompted new migrants from the
South to settle in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn an area of the city that had a small pocket of
black settlement before the war. Black New Yorkers looking to escape the high rents and
dilapidated housing in Harlem also moved to Bedford-Stuyvesant. Other Harlemites chose to
move to the south Bronx, an area with very few black residents before the war. The dispersion
of African Americans to different areas in the city created new black neighborhoods, allowing
New York’s Negroes to escape the confines of a single black ghetto. Though some whites
opposed black residency outside of Harlem, whites did not mount any effective campaigns
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preventing black settlement in Bedford-Stuyvesant or Morrisania as was done in Detroit.
Perhaps this was the primary reason there was no major race riot in the city.
The dispersal of the black population into other areas of the city relieved some of the
pressure building up in black New York. Though African Americans in the city still faced job
discrimination, overcrowded neighborhoods, higher rents and substandard living conditions, the
problems were not as acute as they surely would have been if all the city’s blacks were confined
in one neighborhood. In 1943 riots broke out in cities all over the country – the most notably in
Detroit, Los Angeles, Beaumont, Texas, and New York. In Detroit and Los Angeles the
conflicts involved violence between whites and minorities and the violence was widespread. In
Detroit, where the worst violence occurred, rioting took place in districts covering approximately
75 percent of city. Thirty-four people were killed and more than 700 were injured.487 The
dispersal of blacks into Bedford-Stuyvesant and Morrisania may well have prevented this level
of violence and destruction in New York City.

Brooklyn’s Little Harlem: Bedford-Stuyvesant in the 1940s
The migration of blacks to New York City and the declining living conditions blacks
experienced in Harlem ushered in significant demographic changes in Brooklyn during the
1940s. The racial composition of some Brooklyn neighborhoods – most notably BedfordStuyvesant and Brownsville – changed. There had been a small number of blacks living in
Brooklyn since the turn of the century, however the creation of a single predominately black area
of settlement in the borough occurred as a result of the large influx of blacks into central
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Brooklyn and subsequent white flight in the World War II era. Bedford-Stuyveant became the
second major area of black settlement in the city during the 1940s.
Brooklyn from its establishment had black residents. In the eighteenth century Brooklyn,
like Manhattan had many slaves.488 Throughout the nineteenth century the population of blacks
in Brooklyn increased, however the white population did as well, and by 1870 blacks comprised
only 1.2 percent of Brooklyn’s population. Brooklyn’s blacks did not live in one concentrated
area of the borough, but were instead disbursed over various neighborhoods. 489 The elite black
community in Brooklyn formed in the wake of the Draft Riots during the Civil War as
Manhattan blacks moved to escape the violence.490 The most distinct black district emerged in
the Weeksville-Carrsville community in present day Crown Heights.491 Brooklyn’s black
population increased at a modest rate during the first two decades of the twentieth century. As
tens of thousands of blacks moved to New York during the Great Migration, the increase in the
black population in Brooklyn lagged well behind the skyrocketing black population of
Manhattan. Subsequently Harlem became the center of black settlement in New York City and
obscured the much smaller black communities in Brooklyn until the significant influx of black
residents to Bedford Stuyvesant in the 1940s.492
Though Bedford-Stuyvesant would not become a predominately black neighborhood
until the end of the decade, blacks had lived in the Bedford area as slaves since its earliest
development and by the turn of the twentieth century blacks resided along Atlantic Avenue from
the western border of Bedford-Stuyvesant to Weeksville and beyond. This settlement of blacks
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in Bedford Stuyvesant was connected to the urbanization of the area in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century. Between 1875 and 1900 the black population in the wards constituting the
greater Bedford Stuyvesant area increased from 1,540 to over 7,000, accounting for over 40
percent of Brooklyn’s black population by 1900. Blacks lived in the homes along Atlantic
Avenue and Fulton Street but did not find housing on the residential streets adjoining those
major thoroughfares. Despite the increase of black residents, Bedford-Stuyvesant remained
overwhelmingly white in 1900.493
Though most of Brooklyn’s black residents worked in unskilled low-paying jobs as
domestics, janitors, common laborers, and servants; some blacks moved to the borough for better
living conditions. Brooklyn became known for its post-Civil War “aristocratic” Negro
settlement as the Brooklyn Eagle noted the existence of a black elite they referred to as the
“Negro 400.” Better housing and less overt racism attracted a group of black leaders and
intellectuals to the borough. Affluent black residents founded institutions such as the Brooklyn
Literary Union of the Siloam Presbyterian Church, the Concord Literary Circle, the Turner
Lyceum and the Progressive Literary Union which engaged in concerts, lectures, and discussions
in addition to running lending libraries. Despite the absence of overt racism, whites in Brooklyn
did not readily welcome African Americans into their neighborhoods. The primary reason for
white resistance to black residency was the anticipation of the devaluation of their property.494
World War I stimulated increased black migration as war production and deployment of
soldiers served as pull factors attracting blacks to the North, and the boll weevil infestation and
dropping cotton prices pushed southern farmers and sharecroppers out. The flow of black
southerners continued through the 1920s a decade in which the black communities in northern
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urban centers were created. In this period Brooklyn’s black population more than doubled from
31,912 to 68,921. Most of these migrants came from the South, and to a lesser degree the West
Indies. Brooklyn’s black population continued to be confined to the narrow axis extending along
Fulton Street and Atlantic Avenue from the downtown and Fort Greene areas through the
Bedford and Stuyvesant sections.495 Beyond these streets the districts of Bedford, Stuyvesant,
and Crown Heights remained primarily white.496
During the 1930s, the general northward migration of blacks slowed, but Brooklyn’s
black population expanded at a more rapid rate than most northern urban centers. Blacks moved
into parts of Bedford-Stuyvesant adjoining the major avenues that were already dominated by
blacks.497 The construction of the IND subway in the 1930s connected Harlem to BedfordStuyvesant. This new train line helped to promote the movement of blacks from Harlem into the
area. The new black residents lived mostly above stores on Fulton Street and Sumner Avenue.498
This small community of black residents provided an alternative neighborhood for blacks who
did not want to live in Harlem. In the next decade Bedford-Stuyvesant became a black
neighborhood. 61 percent of the borough’s black population resided in Bedford-Stuyvesant and
as blacks moved in white residents moved to other neighborhoods.499
Apartments became available for black settlement as whites left Bedford-Stuyvesant.
Bedford-Stuyvesant was one of the older areas of Brooklyn that had emerged before extensive
expansion of rapid transit. Most of the housing had been constructed before 1900 and was
growing old by 1930. Newer more attractive housing was being built in areas such as Bay
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Ridge, Coney Island, and Flatbush and new train lines were being constructed to these outlying
areas.500 The availability of newer, affordable housing prompted white residents to leave
Bedford-Stuyvesant, opening up space for black residents. The actions of local real estate
developers also contributed to the process of white flight.
Real estate developers in the mid 1930s looked to recreate white middle class BedfordStuyvesant, but their actions in the end facilitated black settlement. Developers renovated area
brownstones, believing that property values would increase with the construction of the Fulton
Avenue subway line which would provide rapid transit to the area from Manhattan making the
area attractive to white collar workers. They also expected the subsequent dismantling of the el
to raise property values. These developers looked to renovate older one and two-family
brownstones into more modern multifamily dwellings that would make more money for building
owners therefore increasing property values as well. These real estate developers mistakenly
thought the higher rents they would charge for renovated apartments would discourage blacks
from purchasing or renting homes in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Their plans backfired. The subway
construction and the temporary blight it brought to the neighborhood, as well as delayed
dismantling of the el, contributed to decline in property values in Bedford-Stuyvesant
precipitating white flight. Moreover when the Fulton Avenue subway was finally completed it
linked Bedford-Stuyvesant directly to Harlem while cutting the time of the commute nearly in
half. Therefore, blacks could live in the less crowded atmosphere of Bedford-Stuyvesant and yet
be reasonably proximate to the entertainment of Harlem.501 The very changes white realtors
believed would return Bedford-Stuyvesant to being a middle class white neighborhood actually
encouraged black settlement.
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White flight was further precipitated by New Deal policies of the 1930s. New Deal era
Federal Loan agencies began red-lining districts in an expanding New York City. Subsequently,
banks and loan agencies, most significantly the Home Owners Loan Corporation, began giving
ratings to communities which were used to determine the property value as well as the ability of
its residents to obtain loans for buying and renting homes. Federal loan agencies gave the lowest
ratings to areas with African American residents, causing property values to decline in these
areas. Moreover the agency steered federal funding for development away from these areas
because of the low ratings, concentrating funding for new housing in outlying, middle class areas
of Brooklyn. As blacks moved into neighborhoods, whites moved to areas with better ratings
which caused property values in black communities to decline. White North Brooklyn residents
were forced to choose between holding on to devalued property in declining areas and selling
their homes and moving to perimeter districts with government guaranteed mortgages. The redlining caused blacks to be trapped in the communities where they settled. In New York those
areas were Harlem and after the 1940s North-central Brooklyn. In Brooklyn blacks had, prior to
red-lining, been the least segregated ethnic group in the borough but were increasingly being
relegated to a handful of neighborhoods.502
The growing numbers of black defense workers in Brooklyn industries such as the
Brooklyn Navy Yard (BNY) solidified the African-American presence in Bedford-Stuyvesant.
Many black navy yard workers moved into the hundreds of rooming establishments that
landlords subdivided out of the older houses in the neighborhood. The Navy Yard, one of the
largest war time employers in the city, was at the western end of the Bedford-Stuyvesant district
and for some within walking distance. As the population of blacks in Bedford-Stuyvesant grew
so too did the number of blacks and minority workers employed by the Brooklyn Navy Yard.
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During the war the Navy Yard employed approximately 5,500 people. Many of these workers
were temporary and most were let go at the war’s end. However, because of the large presence
of blacks in Bedford-Stuyvesant the Navy Yard again hired black workers after reconversion.
By the time the Navy announced the closing of the Brooklyn yard in 1964 non-whites composed
about 19 percent of the workforce (more than 1,900 employees).503
The migration of blacks to Bedford-Stuyvesant ushered in some of the same problems
that plagued Harlem. One of the most pressing problems for Bedford-Stuyvesant’s black
residents was high rents. Landlords in the area charged the new black tenants higher rents to
increase their profit. In 1944 Louis Pink, the rent director of the New York City defense area,
accused landlords of exploiting black residents by spending less money to maintain their rental
properties while charging black residents higher rents than their former white tenants. BedfordStuyvesant proprietors looked to optimize their profit as they assumed that property values
would depreciate rapidly as blacks moved into the neighborhood. Moreover financial
institutions were unwilling to make loans in these areas which also diminished property prices in
Bedford-Stuyvesant.504
Rents were so high in black areas of Brooklyn, that writer Richard Wright took the roll of
aggrieved tenant when he led sixty-four families of a Brooklyn apartment building on a rent
strike. The Bedford-Stuyvesant building was converted for black tenancy and the building
management increased rents by as much as $25 per month. The Fansirene Realty Corporation,
owner of the building, contended that it had made building improvements and on those grounds
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petitioned the Office of Price Administration for the right to maintain the higher rents. Wright
and members of the building’s Tenant’s League, which he organized in the summer of 1943 soon
after he moved into the building, were prepared to take the case to court. They vowed not to pay
a cent in rent until the corporation “puts the rent back … as the OPA ruled.”505 Though there is
no evidence to point to the success of Wright and the tenant council’s initiative, the call to action
by such a prominent figure points to the hardship the high rents placed on black tenants and the
importance of the issue.
Coinciding with the growth of the black population in Bedford-Stuyvesant was
deterioration of the housing in that area. As blacks moved into the neighborhood in greater
numbers in the 1930s, realtors saw an opportunity to make profits by dividing homes into
apartments and rooms for rent. These realtors bought brownstones and homes and converted
them into apartments for the new black residents. Many of these homebuyers were absentee
landlords who failed to maintain their properties, causing overcrowding and bad living
conditions for the blacks who moved into their buildings.506 Despite the efforts of community
groups to get federal authorities to take action against banks who made loans to these
speculators, nothing was done. This process continued through the 1930s and 1940s. Homes
continued to be subdivided and rented as apartments and private rooms.507 The living conditions
got so bad that in 1941 tenants living in a tenement of Myrtle Avenue launched a rent strike to
protest their living conditions. There was no central heating in the building, and it had loose
wiring, and gas and oil leaks. Moreover the building was infested with roaches and rodents.508
This was not the only building in the area with these kinds of sub-standard living conditions.
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As blacks continued to move into the area, Bedford-Stuyvesant became overcrowded and
residents clamored for the construction of quality housing to alleviate some of the congestion.
The result was the Kingsborough Houses, a public housing project located at Rochester Avenue
and Bergen Street which opened in 1941. Construction of the housing project was the direct
result of a three-year fight by local civic and welfare organizations to better the conditions of the
people living in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section. Leading the campaign for this project was
Albert Clarke, director of research for the Brooklyn Federation for Better Housing. Clarke made
a statistical survey of the conditions of blacks and whites in the uptown section of the
neighborhood and submitted it to the New York City Housing Authority. This report showed
that congestion ills, juvenile delinquency, automobile accidents, lack of playground and
recreational facilities, and overcrowding were the main contributors to the troubles arising in the
vicinity. With the belief that better housing would eliminate these problems, Clarke with the aid
of Congressmen Emanuel Cellar and Andrew Sommers, kept the pressure on NYCHA until some
effort was made to build better housing in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area.509 In 1941 just outside
of Bedford Stuyvesant, the New York City Housing Authority opened the Kingsborough houses.
The complex consisted of over 1,100 units just blocks from Atlantic Avenue the center of black
settlement in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Situated on the then border of Bedford-Stuyvesant and Crown
Heights near Weeksville the city intended to admit both black and white residents to the new
housing complex. Blacks occupied less than half the units and NYCHA remained committed to
keeping the project open to white residents as well. Though NYCHA had finally constructed a
housing project that was integrated, this very integration decreased the number of units available
to black residents in the Bedford-Stuyvesant and Crown Heights neighborhoods. The complex
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provided better quality housing units for blacks in the area, but not as many as advocates for
better housing for Bedford-Stuyvesant’s blacks wanted.510
Another problem blacks in Bedford-Stuyvesant faced was school segregation. As the
black population of Brooklyn became increasingly concentrated in Bedford-Stuyvesant, de-facto
segregation and the neighborhood school system prompted segregation in public schools as well.
The Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) of PS 35 on McDonough Street, in Bedford-Stuyvesant
charged that the Board of Education’s zoning fostered segregation and needed to be corrected.
Board of Education zoning directed black children to PS 35 because it was located in a black
neighborhood and its students overwhelmingly were black. Even when there was a closer
neighborhood school, black children were sent to School 35 because the school board wanted to
keep black children in one school. Black students residing just four blocks from PS 210 at
Rochester Avenue and Park Place would have to travel approximately twelve blocks to attend PS
35 while there were almost 1200 vacancies in PS 210. The result was substandard conditions in
School 35. PS 35 was overcrowded and antiquated with lower grades holding classes in the
dark, inadequate basement.511 These early efforts to desegregate public schools in Brooklyn
were not successful. Perhaps the focus of black civil rights organizations on equal employment
caused them to delay activism on this issue. School segregation remained a problem Brooklyn’s
black leadership would confront in the 1960s.
Social service agencies grew concerned that there were not enough recreational and
community programs for the growing number of black residents in Bedford-Stuyvesant. The
Greater New York Fund asked the Riis House, a non-profit community organization in
Manhattan aimed at ameliorating the living conditions of poor New Yorkers, to make a survey of
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conditions in the area. The November 1941 Riis House report showed bad economic, social, and
health conditions and a high delinquency rate; an almost total lack of cultural and recreational
facilities; and inadequate social agency activity, particularly among the black population, which
resulted in “acute need for social service.” The Board of Education (BOE), in cooperation with
Riis House, offered after-school use of Public School 3 on Jefferson Avenue in Bedford
Stuyvesant to serve as a part-time community center. The BOE offered free custodial care and
maintenance six days a week with boys’ and girls’ gymnasiums, game rooms, club rooms, stage
and auditorium, health and dental clinics, and rooms for other activities, as well as several Works
Progress Administration workers as assistants to the regular staff. The Board of Education
approved the idea and offered its cooperation while the Greater New York Fund promised money
to implement Riis House’s recommendations.512
As more and more African Americans moved to Bedford-Stuyvesant, the area
increasingly became the subject of newspaper articles on black crime. The New York Times
printed articles highlighting the crimes committed in the sections of Brooklyn inhabited mainly
by African Americans. In the article on Harlem crime, complaints about crimes in the BedfordStuyvesant section of Brooklyn were reported. A rector at a Catholic church in the area
complained that he cancelled evening services because parishioners were afraid to venture out at
night.513 Crime in Brooklyn was again brought up in “Curbs on Crime in Kings Sought” in
which the author suggested keeping Negro schools open during the evening hours for recreation
so that black youths would be occupied instead of committing crime on the streets.514 White
Brooklynites and publications linked the increase in black residency with increase in crime in the
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Bedford-Stuyvesant district. Whites in opposition to blacks living in the area cited increased
crime as the reason for their antipathy.
Crime and juvenile delinquency rates were indeed higher in Bedford Stuyvesant than in
other areas of Brooklyn during the1940s and beyond. According to the 1943 crime statistics for
Brooklyn the ratio of Negro defendants was far higher than white defendants. The crime rate for
the Bedford Stuyvesant and Ft Greene Health Districts where many blacks lived was the highest
in the borough. Furthermore residents from these two areas committed 42 percent of all crimes
in the borough.515 White opposition to black settlement in Bedford-Stuyvesant coalesced around
the issues of black crime and juvenile delinquency to protest increasing black residency.
The foundations for organized white opposition to black settlement in BedfordStuyvesant during the 1940s were laid in the 1920s and 1930s. One of the earliest leaders of
white opposition to black residency in Bedford-Stuyvesant was Monsignor John Belford, the
white pastor of the Roman Catholic Church of the Nativity. He overtly advocated separate
houses of prayer for each race. Belford had come to the church in 1905 and as his parish faced
the rising black population of Bedford-Stuyvesant and declining parish resources in 1922 he
supported the erection of a separate Catholic church, St Peter Claver’s Church, for blacks in the
neighborhood. In his monthly parish newsletter Belford stated, “’our people do not want the
Negroes in their church, in their homes or their neighborhood.”’ 516
Belford continued his public campaign against black settlement in Bedford-Stuyvesant.
In a 1939 letter to the Brooklyn Eagle, the Monsignor characterized the blacks moving into the
area as ignorant, uncivilized, dirty, and destructive. This was especially true of those coming
from the south as “The South has kept the Negro in ignorance, superstition and vice.” Belford
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charged that assaults and crime committed by blacks in the area kept his parishioners from
coming to service because they were afraid. In his view the increasing black population
adversely affected the quality of life for others living in the area.517
White residents also organized to protest the decline in the property values in BedfordStuyvesant. Area whites formed the Midtown Civil League in 1938 to protect their interests in
the neighborhood. As stated by its president Sumner Sirtl, the organization’s primary purposes
were to better conditions in the vicinity and stabilize declining real estate values, which was a
direct result of the reluctance of mortgage companies to loan money to homeowners in the area
due to the influx of Negro residents.518 Several leaders of the Civic League were prominent men
in the Bedford-Stuyvesant community. Sirtl was also the president of the board of directors of
the Bedford YMCA, which would not allow black to use their pool. Edward E Fay, a member of
the League’s board of directors, was a United States Commissioner for the Eastern District of
New York.519 Father Belford, Monsignor of the Roman Catholic Church of the Nativity in the
neighborhoods cooperated and publicly supported the league.520
The Civic League therefore focused on stopping black settlement in Bedford-Stuyvesant.
Sirtl and other whites in the community proposed several ideas to keep blacks out of their
neighborhood. Sirtl urged that relief recipients, many of whom were black, be returned to their
original townships. He later joined with local realtors in advocating a segregated black
community removed from direct contact with whites.521
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African Americans accused the Civic League of even more nefarious activity to prevent
black settlement. According to the black press Sirtl led a group of the League’s members to the
police department for pistol permits in an effort to threaten blacks living in the area. Blacks also
charged that when whites vacated houses in the Negro area, members of the League boarded
them up to discourage blacks from moving in. 522 According to Reverend Theophilus Alcantara,
an area minister and aspiring black politician in Brooklyn, the Civic League aimed to prevent
blacks from holding property in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section by cooperating with area
bankers who pressed the few black property owners in the area for early payment of the interest
on their mortgages in an effort to make them default on their loans and lose their homes.
Alcantara also accused white Brooklyn politicians of cooperating with the Midtown Civic and
supporting their efforts to drive blacks out of Bedford Stuyvesant.523 Black community leaders
also accused the civic league of circulating incendiary “propaganda calculated to stir up feelings
against blacks.”524
Racial tensions in Bedford Stuyvesant came to the fore in both the community and the
press in the wake of the Harlem Riot. In August 1943 the Midtown Civic League pressured the
King’s County Grand Jury to study the condition of blacks living in Brooklyn, particularly the
Bedford-Stuyvesant area.525 The Kings County Grand Jury charged the La Guardia
administration with failure to check the crime in Bedford-Stuyvesant. These charges, according
to the NAACP, was a political attack on Mayor La Guardia who they thought was soft on
Negroes and a racial attack on Bedford-Stuyvesant’s African Americans.526 After hearing more

522

“Cops Itch to Mop Up Brooklyn,” New York Amsterdam News, November 20, 1943, 1.
“Candidate for Assembly Reveals Odd Information,” Amsterdam News, September 17, 1938, A1.
524
“Reporter Quizzes Sirtl on Crime Problem,” Amsterdam News, March 18, 1939, 13.
525
“Brooklyn Crime Smear Unearths Grave Neglect,” Amsterdam News, November 27, 1943, 2A; Marylinn
Johnson, Street Justice: A History of Police Violence in New York City (Boston: Beacon Press, 2003): 201.
526
“Brooklyn Crime Smear” Along the NAACP Battlefront,” The Crisis. January 1944, 19.
523

228
than 100 witnesses, most of whom were white, the Grand Jury presented a grim picture of the
living conditions in Bedford-Stuyvesant. The jury claimed that lawlessness pervaded the area,
that school children had been robbed and mistreated, and that the area was too dangerous for
residents to travel after dark.527 According to the report gangs of hoodlums had assaulted,
robbed, insulted and murdered innocent, law abiding people and prostitution marred a section of
the area. It also alleged that many of the area residents were on relief illegally.
In a scathing condemnation of the La Guardia administration, the grand jury attributed
these conditions to the insufficient number of police in the area. They recommended that the
city flood the area with law enforcement to solve the problem. In addition, the jurors suggested
the mayor add special auxiliary patrolmen drawn from the law-abiding citizens of the area. The
presentment also stated that a lack of spiritual training for area youth and lack of parental
supervision also contributed to the lawlessness. The Grand Jury demanded city and state
regulatory and administrative agencies fix conditions in the area.528
The recommendations of the Grand Jury were never pursued, but there was an enduring
legacy that left negative popular perceptions of the area. Perhaps in an attempt to downplay the
role of race in their findings, the changing racial character of the area only received passing
notice in the report. However, if whites did not consciously do so already, they now increasingly
identified Bedford-Stuyvesant as a Negro slum.529
For well over a month the investigation, report, and reactions produced front-page
headlines in the local press so that few citizens were likely to remain unaware of the area’s
evolving demographics and problems.530 In the face of the World War II migration other whites
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believed the area crime and vice was an outgrowth of black migration to the city. In 1943 some
whites voiced these feelings at a meeting held by the Midtown Civic League which was attended
by both black and white Brooklynites. At the meeting many whites called on Governor Dewey
to fire Mayor La Guardia. A white off-duty police officer from Brooklyn blamed black migrants
for the social problems in Bedford-Stuyvesant, attributing the crime wave to “’the influx of
sunburned citizens who come up from the deep South mistaking liberty for license.’”531 In his,
and countless others’, view black migrants from the south were one of the major causes of crime
and delinquency throughout the city. Sirtl’s arguments against black settlement belied a racist
undertone expressed by others.
Father Belford, like Sirtl, continued to place the blame for increased crime and vice in
the area squarely on the shoulders of black residents. Belford was not shy in expressing this
belief not only to whites in the area but to blacks as well. In an interview with the Amsterdam
News Belford said that he believed one way to make matters better in the area was to “Quit
teaching Negroes biology and instead teach them how to use modern home conveniences, how to
live in a civilized community.” Belford claimed that was not a “Negro hater” and said that he
did not want to punish anyone but also admitted that he believed the majority of Negroes who
have moved into Bedford-Stuyvesant were destructive, and that they further wrecked property
that was already partially dilapidated. In his estimation, the perhaps the best remedy was to
colonize blacks in an agricultural area of the state where “they could learn how to live and act
like other people.”532 Clearly in these statements Belford laid blame to conditions in BedfordStuyvesant not just to the presence of blacks but to their depraved character.
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The Grand Jury’s report was also tinged with racist undertones, although it never
explicitly named race as the reason for the crime in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Despite the fact that the
report claimed it was not a race problem, the authors were sure to point out that the area was
predominately inhabited by Negroes.533 Algernon Black, the chairman of the City-Wide
Citizen’s Committee on Harlem, acknowledged the racial assumptions and implications within
the report. Black issued a statement saying that the Kings County grand jury statement “on the
face of it [is] a severe indictment of the Negro community in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area.
However the grand jury has apparently failed to take into consideration the underlying social and
economic causes giving rise to such conditions.” Black specifically pointed out the restricted
economic opportunities as a major reason for conditions in Bedford-Stuyvesant. 534 Though
disagreeing with the causes of the situation in Brooklyn, Algernon Black agreed that social
services provided by the city administration would be the best solution.
Given the racism underlying the arguments made in the Grand Jury’s findings it is no
surprise that African American leaders, organizations, and press condemned the report. Walter
White acknowledged that social problems did exist in Bedford-Stuyvesant, but argued that the
jury’s report ignored the great number of law-abiding, church-going, home-owning black
citizens who have been calling for remedial action on the conditions which produced the crime
plaguing the Bedford-Stuyvesant area. In his view the report criminalized the entire black
population in the area when in fact those committing crimes comprised only a portion of the
blacks living in the area.535 The National Negro Congress and the Bedford-Stuyvesant Congress
of Industrial Organizations Community Council held a meeting to protest against the Kings
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County grand jury report.536 Herbert Miller, Executive secretary of the Carlton Avenue YMCA
appointed a committee of seven to conduct its own investigation of conditions in the BedfordStuyvesant area to repudiate any statement which was falsely made by the Grand Jury. They
were also to prepare and make recommendations as to how residents of the community could
better conditions.537
The Amsterdam News criticized the Grand Jury for having no black jurors and only one
black witness, George Wibecan, during the investigation. The author of that article complained
that the Grand Jury gave no credence to the testimony of Wibecan who pointed out the
underlying reasons for crime in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Wibecan, a postal employee and former
assistant to the late borough President Raymond Ingersoll, was a longtime resident and home
owner in the area. He was also a community activist and local political leader. In his testimony
Wibecan recounted the history of Brooklyn’s blacks blaming relegation of blacks into the
Bedford-Stuyvesant ghetto with high rents and dilapidated living conditions as one reason for
crime in the area. Wibecan also criticized blacks for not working together to ameliorate the
situation.538 The Grand Jury’s findings ignored Wibecan’s views and the structural and social
causes contributing to crime in Bedford-Stuyvesant.
Black newspapers published articles that proposed solutions to the underlying problems
that fostered crime in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Acknowledging the crime in the Bedford-Stuyvesant
section, the editors of the Amsterdam News ran an article laying out eight ways to resolve the
issue. The editors believed that if the city made provisions to lower over-crowding in schools to
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improve education and constructed more play areas and recreation centers, and to supervise
children better; juvenile delinquency would decline. They also suggested the city disband the
Midtown Civic League or make it operate as an interracial organization in order to better race
relations in the area. Editors believed the police department should hire more black patrolmen
and detectives familiar with the area to precincts in the uptown (Bedford-Stuyvesant) area in
order to improve relations between black residents and law enforcement and prevent police
brutality. The newspaper also recommended rent regulation to deal with the problem of inflated
rents in Bedford-Stuyvesant. The newspaper editors also suggested the uptown groups unify to
create a plan to remedy the problems of Bedford-Stuyvesant for the majority of those decent,
law-abiding people living there.539
Like the black newspapers, Father S. J. Campion a priest at St. Peter Claver’s Church, the
only Roman Catholic Church serving African Americans in the borough, believed structural
social and economic problems were the main causes of delinquency and crime in the area. He
was quoted in the Amsterdam News as saying that until blacks were treated better in this country,
given better economic opportunities, access to better living conditions and recreation facilities,
they were bound to protest through crime and delinquency. Campion believed the “so called
outbreak of lawlessness in this area is but a symptom of the alarming growth of delinquency in
every city of the country… due to war conditions.” An opponent of the actions and ideology of
Monsignor Belford, he believed it was unfair to put the blame for increasing crime and
delinquency in the area solely on African Americans.540
The social service solutions proposed by local African American leaders and Father
Campion were also proposed by social welfare organizations. The Brooklyn Council For Social
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Planning, a consultative body whose membership was comprised of approximately eighty
welfare agencies, recommended creation of a constructive social welfare program to alleviate
crime and deteriorating social conditions in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Shortages in the field of family
welfare and the lack of a health center within the district were among the worst problems. The
council suggested better housing, construction of a health center building, additional public
playgrounds and parks, school community centers, new and modern school buildings and more
services from voluntary social agencies for the area.541 .
As social service agencies, the black press, and Father Campion proposed solutions
addressing the structural problems causing crime and delinquency in Bedford-Stuyvesant, they
also attempted to debunk ideas that these conditions were caused by the inherent nature of
African Americans. These ideas which were expressed by Sumner Sirtl, Father Belford, and
other whites in Brooklyn helped sour race relations in Bedford-Stuyvesant. The New York City
Urban League increasingly focused its efforts on alleviating the racial tensions in the
neighborhood. In a 1945 fundraising pamphlet the New York Urban League asserted that they
were working towards the alleviation of racial tensions through cooperation with the War
Manpower Commission, police, industry owners and war agencies to improve employment
opportunities, working conditions, and housing for blacks. In its projected budget for the
coming year almost half of the regional budget of $55,285 was allocated to Brooklyn, with
Manhattan having the second largest allocation followed by Queens, the Bronx and Staten
Island. 542 As it had since its founding, the New York Urban League in 1945 focused its efforts
on helping southern migrants adjust to their new surroundings in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Clearly
the Urban League clearly believed the increasing black population of Brooklyn required their
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attention to alleviate the problems of African Americans in the developing black communities of
Brooklyn.
Despite the heightened racial tension in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn remained an
attractive place for African Americans to settle. According to Brooklyn Urban League Executive
Secretary Robert Elzy, Brooklyn was not such a bad place for blacks in the latter half of the war.
In 1944 Brooklyn was showing a sharp and increasingly steady decline in unemployed blacks
and an increase in the numbers and types of jobs available to them. Housing conditions for
blacks in Brooklyn were like those available in other centers of black concentration.543 Elzy
articulated the view of many of the blacks moving into Bedford-Stuyvesant.
Despite the many problems plaguing Bedford-Stuyvesant’s residents, in the perspective
of blacks it was a better alternative than Harlem in the 1940s. Though blacks paid higher rents
than whites to live in Bedford-Stuyvesant and the housing there was beginning to deteriorate,
blacks moving to New York believed they could make a better life in Brooklyn than they could
in Harlem. According to an article published in the Amsterdam News the housing available in
Brooklyn was better than that in Harlem and that the “homes are rated high” in the BedfordStuyvesant area making that community one of the best rated in the city. Though landlords
aimed to make a profit from the higher rents they could get from black tenants, the Amsterdam
News commended realtors in the area for finding apartments for black tenants, thus making the
migration of blacks to Brooklyn possible. In 1940 African Americans considered the Bedford
Stuyvesant sector a prominent area with middle class black residents living there with buildings
“remodeled on numerous occasions, and clean, modern homes were made available for
boroughites.” The article made clear that there was a vast difference between the flourishing
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Bedford-Stuyvesant and Brownsville, the “sore spot in Brooklyn.”544 The author of this article
made it plain that the blacks who migrated to Bedford-Stuyvesant could make a good life for
themselves there.
During the 1920s and 1930s Bedford-Stuyvesant emerged as the center of black Brooklyn
and by the start of the 1940s Bedford-Stuyvesant had become the center of the borough’s black
middle class. The Brooklyn branches of the NAACP and Urban League, bastions of the black
middle class, were located in Bedford Stuyvesant. The Brooklyn NAACP was controlled by the
borough’s black elite and did not focus on grassroots organization. Its activities were generally
non-confrontational, taking the form of voter registration drives, political lobbying, and
campaigns against police brutality. The local branch avoided movements supporting workingclass blacks. Neither of these organizations was active in the Brownsville community where
many of the borough’s lower class blacks lived. Many Bedford-Stuyvesant residents perceived
black Brownsville as low-class, and the area’s crime did nothing to decrease these prejudices.545
Brownsville had been a working class community from its early years. The area was full
of low-lying marshes that were prone to flooding and had few aesthetic attractions and industrial
development in the area discouraged middle and upper class settlement. Though the
neighborhood’s housing was shoddily constructed, in the mid nineteenth century living there was
still a better alternative than living in the congested conditions of the Lower East Side of
Manhattan. By the turn of the twentieth century Brownsville was primarily inhabited by
working-class Jewish immigrants who worked in textile factories. Brownsville was home to
working class blacks since the 1910s. In the 1910s Brownsville expanded to the west and south,
and many residents moved to buildings in the new sections. Working-class blacks, desperate for
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housing in a crowded Harlem, moved into these ageing and deteriorating buildings.546 As in
other urban areas, the black population of Brownsville exploded during the 1940s as an effect of
the World War II migration of blacks to the area. Race relations in Brownsville were tranquil in
comparison to other cities as black and white activists successfully fostered interracial
acceptance and coexistence there. 547 Despite the good race relations the shoddy and dilapidated
housing in Brownsville prompted blacks with the financial means to settle in Bedford-Stuyvesant
instead.
Even those blacks who lived in older black enclaves in other areas of Brooklyn moved to
Bedford-Stuyvesant to improve their living conditions. Some of Brooklyn’s black residents
moved to Bedford Stuyvesant to escape the poor quality housing they inhabited in the downtown
area of Brooklyn. Many buildings downtown had been converted into furnished rooms occupied
by more than two persons with the cooking done in the same room. In some houses toilet
facilities were in the yard, though generally they were in the hall with had as many as four
families sharing one toilet. Given the poor quality of housing in the downtown area, it is not
surprising that blacks fled to new neighborhoods when they could. The buildings in BedfordStuyvesant offered more substantial construction and better living conditions.548
Many of the migrants moving to Bedford Stuyvesant were middle-class and stable
working-class blacks while poorer working class blacks moving to Brooklyn settled in
Brownsville in the 1940s. This created a more homogenous black population in BedfordStuyvesant. Little discussion appeared in black publications about class conflict between
working and middle class black residents in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Perhaps Bedford-Stuyvesant’s
blacks suppressed class differences as they faced organized white protests to black settlement. In
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their indictments of the character of African Americans, whites residents like Sumner Sirtl and
Father Belford did not make a distinction between middle and working class blacks; therefore it
is conceivable that blacks did not either.
The influx of blacks into Bedford-Stuyvesant allowed African Americans in the borough
to have more political power at the local level. As Brooklyn’s blacks were more concentrated
into a few districts in the borough, they could elect African Americans to local offices. Before
the 1940s local politicians rarely solicited the black vote because it would not make a difference
in the election. The black population for the most part was not big enough to vote in a bloc and
therefore rarely determined the outcome of local contests.549 Given the geographic segregation
in Brooklyn and the relatively small size of assembly districts which rendered racial
gerrymandering more difficult, black candidates were successful in local elections by the late
1940s. Bertram Baker led the breakthrough of blacks into borough politics when he was elected
to the State Assembly in 1948. Electoral victories in contests for municipal judgeships and City
Council followed in the 1950s and as blacks took over local party machinery political patronage
added more blacks to government positions.550 Therefore the migration and the concentration of
blacks into Bedford-Stuyvesant increased their local blacks’ political power in the years to come.
The demographic shifts of the 1940s indelibly changed the face of black Brooklyn. The
influx of African Americans into the Bedford-Stuyvesant area had soured race relations,
prompted an unsuccessful attempt by white organizations to bar black settlement, and had
precipitated white flight. By 1950 blacks no longer lived in dispersed communities throughout
the borough and the black population of Brooklyn had become concentrated in BedfordStuyvesant. Three quarters of the 200,000 residents in this formerly all white area were black.
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Despite emerging social problems like high crime and delinquency rates, inadequate community
recreation and resources, high rents and dilapidated housing, Bedford-Stuyvesant remained a
better alternative to Harlem and Brownsville for middle and working class blacks in the city.
The new demographic trends begun in the 1940s solidified during the 1950s resulting in the area
becoming “solidly black as Central Harlem.” 551 By 1960 Bedford-Stuyvesant like Harlem had
become a code word for everything black.552

Movin’ on Up: Morrisania in the 1940s
Though the largest number of blacks settling outside of Harlem chose to make BedfordStuyvesant their home, some looked northward to the Bronx for reprieve from Harlem’s
overcrowding and high rents. Hundreds of Harlem’s black families began moving out of the
historic center of black settlement and into the southwest Bronx in the hopes of finding cheaper
rents and better living conditions. To many Harlem residents the Bronx provided nicer
apartments for less money, as well as better schools and more fresh air. An area in the
southwestern Bronx, a section referred to today as Morrisania, became home to thousands of new
black residents as families relocated from Harlem. During the 1940s most African Americans
moving to the Bronx settled in the area from 161st Street to 169th Street and from Franklin to
Prospect Avenues. African Americans also lived in the blocks adjacent to the area of heaviest
black settlement.553 These new residents significantly changed the demographics of Morrisania.
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African Americans and Puerto Ricans joined, and in some instances displaced, the German,
Jewish, Italian, and Eastern European residents of the area.554
The Boulevard-Prospect area, located directly east of today’s Morrisania, exemplified the
demographic changes that occurred in the south Bronx during the 1940s.555 This area, which had
been overwhelmingly white at the start of the decade, became an interracial neighborhood by the
end of the decade. Boulevard-Prospect, also called East Morrisania and Crotona Park, was 95
percent white in 1940. More than a third of the area’s white residents were foreign born, mostly
from Russia, Poland and other areas of southeastern Europe. The majority of BoulevardProspect residents were wage earners employed in skilled trades, crafts, clerical, and sales jobs.
Generally, those living in the area were not as affluent as the general populations of the Bronx or
New York City. In 1940 the black population in the area was only 4 percent. Despite the small
black population at the start of the decade, there was evidence of a higher concentration of black
residents in Boulevard-Prospect than in other Bronx neighborhoods.556 It was into this
neighborhood that middle-class blacks moved in the early 1940s causing the number and
concentration of African Americans to increase throughout the decade.
African Americans were joined by Puerto Ricans, who also moved into East Morrisania.
At that time, when school enrollment was indicative of the racial composition of neighborhoods,
both African American and Puerto Rican school enrollment increased in area public schools.
By mid-decade 40 percent of school children were from these new groups. This was a
substantial change. Just seven years earlier in 1938 only 3 percent of the total school population
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in the Boulevard Prospect area had been black. East Morrisania transformed from an area that
was racially homogenous into one that was “racially diverse.”557
Most of the blacks moving to the area in the 1940s were from Harlem. Many of those
black families who moved in the late 1930s and early 1940s were relatively well-off black
workers. According to occupation classifications these workers would have been classified as
working class, but they held steady jobs in occupations other than service jobs or unskilled labor,
the traditional areas of black employment. Many of the black men moving to Morrisania were
postal workers or building superintendents. Historian Mark Naison observed that there were two
general paths African American families took in coming to the Bronx. The first was that the man
of the household got a job as a Pullman porter or postal worker in the borough. The other was
that black families moved into apartments in the Bronx because the man of the household
worked as the superintendent of the building.558 In these ways many blacks found the economic
means and available housing to relocate to Morrisania.
Evelyn Melrose’s family exemplified the process by which Morrisania’s early black
residents came to the area. The family moved to 1618 Washington Avenue in the 1930s.
Evelyn’s father worked as a mail handler in the post office on Tremont Avenue and took a
second job as the building superintendent in a mainly Jewish building.

Her mother who was

originally from the south did not work. According to Evelyn there had been a nation-wide drive
to recruit postal workers prompting many of her fathers’ male friends to come to New York to
work for the post office. The post office required that workers live in the neighborhood in which
they worked, so those African Americans assigned to post offices in the south Bronx found that
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acting as the super in buildings was the only way they could obtain apartments in the area.
Evelyn’s father took the superintendent job as a means to get an apartment in the neighborhood
because at that time most landlords were not renting to black tenants.559 It was, in part, through
the position of building super that black residency in the Bronx became possible.
Many other black families used similar means to facilitate their move to the Bronx.
Ronald Marshall’s parents who were born in Savannah, Georgia, had moved to Connecticut
during the 1930s. His father took the civil service exam to work in the post office, and upon
passing the test moved to 3rd Avenue in the Bronx in the late 1930s. The family moved again to
a building on Franklin Avenue between 166th and 167th Streets in 1941. Ronald’s father also
took a part time job as a superintendent of two buildings in the neighborhood. Ronald’s paternal
uncle also moved to the Bronx and took a civil service exam to be a sanitation worker.560 The
draw of better paying employment through government offices and civil service jobs drew blacks
to New York and the Bronx in particular.
Like Ronald Marshall, his wife Gloria was a childhood resident of the Bronx. She moved
there with her family in the early 1940s. Her family had lived in an apartment in Harlem but
moved to the Bronx when her father was offered a position as a building superintendent. So the
family moved to the building her father worked in on Franklin Avenue between 167th and 168th
Street. In addition to his duties as building super, Gloria’s father also worked as a security guard
for First National City Bank (which later became Citibank). Gloria’s mother was a housewife
who sometimes took part time jobs at the supermarket if the family needed extra money.561
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Having a father with a stable blue collar job and a housewife mother signified that Gloria
Marshall’s family was of middle class status.
Elias Karmon, a Morrisania store owner at the time, observed that black women in the
neighborhood had desk jobs, were teachers, and worked in the garment factories on nearby
Westchester Avenue. He also recalled that the men were mostly blue collar workers – many
worked for the railroad and in the post office. According to Karman, whose store had a large
black clientele, many of Morrisania’s black residents had good stable jobs earning respectable
and reliable wages.562 Many of the jobs his black patrons held were well paying union jobs not
widely available to blacks prior to this time.
Several of the areas longest black residents were professionals. They included physicians
Lowell Wormley and Athelstone Giddens; the president of the Bronx Women’s Council, Dr.
Martha Seabrook; prominent realtors George James, James Johnson and Marcell Owens; and
New York State auditor Alvin Morris.563 Long-time Morrisania resident Robert Gumbs’ father
worked as an operating engineer for the US government taking care of internal maintenance of
buildings.564 Gumbs’ father, like many other black men living in Morrisania, worked in an
occupation uncommon for most African Americans in the 1940s.565
The hundreds of African American families who moved to the Bronx in the 1940s
considered Morrisania a better alternative to Harlem and believed settling in the area was an
opportunity to improve their living conditions. This was not just an opinion held by blacks in the
1940s. Many earlier residents of the vicinity viewed the area in a similar fashion. Morrisania
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was one of the earliest developed sections of the Bronx and after the turn of the twentieth century
was ethnically and economically diverse. It was a well-established area with homes, stores, and
businesses and eventually developed into an area with diverse types of housing such as
tenements, frame row houses, and brick flats. At the turn of the twentieth century the
construction of the Third Avenue el provided rapid and reliable transportation to the area which
enticed developers to construct residential housing and attracted Manhattanites to settle in East
Morrisania. This increase in population prompted construction of new apartment buildings.
Therefore in the early 1900s housing in the Bronx was plentiful, and of relatively high quality.
Bronx apartments were usually newer, cleaner, and less expensive than those in Manhattan;
conditions that attracted residents to the area.566
In the first half of the twentieth century, the Bronx came to represent upward mobility for
various ethnic, racial, and socio-economic groups in New York City. The new demand for
housing and a postwar construction boom prompted developers to construct new buildings in the
1920s. These new buildings and complexes were geared towards the middle class. New middle
class neighborhoods sprang up along University, Morris, Bainbridge and Sedgwick Avenues and
along the Pelham and Mosholu Parkways. This spate of construction continued into the 1930s
and 1940s. The new apartments attracted an upwardly mobile, status-conscious group to the
area.567 Since housing was a reflection of social standing for status-conscious New Yorkers, as
Bronxites became more prosperous they moved to better neighborhoods within the borough and
eventually out of the Bronx to Westchester. As the residents of the South Bronx moved to newer
apartments in emerging middle class neighborhoods, those of lower social standing and
economic means took the opportunity to move into the apartments the upwardly mobile left
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vacant. As a result lower income groups found housing vacated by those who had moved up in
status allowing better living conditions to trickle down to lower-income Bronx residents.
African Americans from Harlem took the opportunity to move into newly available apartments
in South Bronx buildings.568 The Bronx “had become one of the places to which one moved in
order to improve living standards,” a fact that prompted some important demographic shifts in
both the borough and the city.569
While many of the new middle class neighborhoods in the borough were growing, the
South Bronx was not because none of the new construction took place there. In fact in the 1920s
the population in Morrisania’s oldest sections declined as residents moved into the borough’s
newer neighborhoods. After the 1920s only the Hunts Point-Crotona Park East area experienced
increases in population as a result of the expansion of the Lexington Avenue subway line. Some
residents of the South Bronx moved out of the neighborhood and across the Bronx River as
transportation became available with the extension of the subway. The steady loss of residents
was only reversed on the blocks where African Americans seeking better living conditions
moved.570 Despite the multifamily housing, the constant residential mobility, aging housing, and
the urban density; to many New Yorkers including African Americans the Bronx was an
attractive place to live. To black New Yorkers the South Bronx represented an opportunity to
live better.
The availability of better quality housing in the Bronx motivated many blacks to move
out of Harlem. Though there were sections of Boulevard-Prospect which were blighted and
others on the downgrade in the 1940s, the housing there was generally better than that in many
sections of Manhattan. Most buildings in the South Bronx were built after the Tenement
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Housing Laws of 1901, and thus constructed according to those standards of light, air, sanitation,
and safety regulations. Though the buildings were relatively new, lack of structural repairs
impaired the soundness of the edifices and created safety hazards. Statistics indicated widespread neglect of structures in the Boulevard-Prospect area. Most residents of the area, black
and white, rented apartments. Only 2 percent of area residents owned homes and less than one
percent of those owner occupied homes were owned by blacks.571 Even though the buildings and
houses of the South Bronx were in various states of disrepair, the living conditions they provided
were better than those available to blacks living in Harlem.
The majority of black families moving into Morrisania came from Harlem.
Contemporary reports of real estate brokers in the Bronx estimated that 200 to 300 black families
were moving into Morrisania each month during 1942. The homes into which most of these
families moved were private houses and apartments formerly occupied by Jewish, Italian, and
Irish families who moved out as blacks moved in. According to long-time black residents of the
area, the buildings blacks moved into were in fairly good condition, some in excellent condition.
There were a few tall apartment buildings and numerous private houses which afforded black
residents more air and sunlight than the apartments in Harlem. When several families new to the
area were asked why they had moved from Harlem, they replied cheaper rents, a better
environment and better schools.572 One such family was Cyril DeGrasse Tyson’s family who
moved to Morrisania in the late 1930s in search of better living conditions.
Cyril DeGrasse Tyson’s family immigrated from the West Indies during the First World
War. Originally settling in the San Juan Hill neighborhood in midtown Manhattan, Tyson’s
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family moved to Harlem in 1934 and again to Morrisania in 1938. Tyson recalls his family
moving often in search of better housing, better quality schools, and a nicer community. Many
of the Jews living at the nexus of Prospect and Westchester Avenues in Morrisania were moving
northward towards Pelham Park. According to Tyson, some of those leaving the neighborhood
kept their buildings and began renting to blacks. Initially these landlords were very selective in
choosing their tenants. His family moved to a building on Longwood Avenue between Prospect
and Westchester Avenues. When they arrived the inhabitants of the area were mostly Jewish and
the janitors were Irish and German. As more and more blacks moved into the building the
landlords stopped maintaining it and the Tyson family moved after three years to a building on
Kelly Street between Intervale and Longwood Streets. At that time Kelly Street was inhabited
by mostly white residents but they had begun moving out.573
Rosemary Brown’s family also moved to the Bronx to improve their quality of day to day
life. The Browns moved to the Bronx in 1940, because Rosemary’s father felt Morrisania would
provide a safer environment to raise his large family of nine, “And, at the time the Bronx was the
place for African American families.” Upwardly mobile black families looked to the Bronx as a
place to find better schools, nicer apartments, and safer conditions. Her parents decided to move
there after hearing testimonies from a family they knew who had moved to Morrisania. The
Brown family moved to a three-bedroom apartment on Prospect Avenue and 168th Street.574
The availability of parks and other green spaces in Morrisania also attracted upwardly
mobile Harlemites to the area. Hetty Fox, a Morrisania resident, remembered her neighborhood
as being lovely with trees lining Prospect Avenue – the main thoroughfare and shopping district
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at the time.575 Many of Morrisania’s early black residents recall Crotona Park as a beautiful area
where they enjoyed various types of recreation. Of particular note among several Morrisania
residents was the swimming pool in the park where they learned to swim.576 In fact Rosemary
Brown’s most vivid memory of her childhood neighborhood was of the trees.577 Robert Gumbs’
family moved from Harlem to Morrisania in 1941 after a doctor advised his mother to do so
because the “air was cleaner” in the Bronx. Robert remembered the Bronx, and his street Lyman
Place, as being very quiet. He described his childhood as “comfortable” as children played
stickball in the street and he went to the after-school centers to play basketball.578 The parents of
these and many other families moved from Harlem to Morrisania to improve their family’s
quality of life.
As more and more blacks moved from Harlem to the Bronx, the new African American
population began to build the bastions of community, none of which was more important than
the church. One indication that a black community was developing in Morrisania was the
opening of the Russell Institutional Christian Methodist Episcopal Church in December 1942.
The church which had a black congregation was purchased from the white Fulton Avenue
Baptist Church. Speaking at a service at the church Frederick A Wurtzback, president of the
Bronx County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, told the audience that the
church was sold because it could no longer render a service to its members who had moved out
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of the area. Wurtzback believed that the new church would provide great services to what had
become in his view a black community.579
Morrisania’s early black residents do not recall racial tensions upon moving to the area.
When she moved with her family in the mid-1930s, Margery Nichols felt the neighborhood was
safe and never feared walking around even at night. She did not remember experiencing racial
tensions living there.580 Hetty Fox, another childhood resident, remembered that when her
family moved into the neighborhood, two white girls teased her by telling her she didn’t belong
in the neighborhood. However Mrs. Fox explained that after that initial incident the girls didn’t
give her any more trouble and eventually became friends.581 Ronald Marshall recalled that
people of different ethnicities lived in his neighborhood but did not remember much racial
tension. Jewish, Italian, and German families lived on his block, but because each ethnic group
pretty much stayed to themselves there was no racial tension that he could remember. Ronald
Marshall’s wife, Gloria Marshall also described her multi-racial block on Franklin Avenue. She
explained that Germans, Irish, and Poles, lived with African Americans in the neighborhood and
most were friendly.582
Many local blacks were proud to live in a multi-racial neighborhood. In 1942 Mr. and
Mrs. Edward Macy, who as sixty-two year residents of the area claimed to be the Bronx’s oldest
black family, proudly noted in a 1942 newspaper interview that there were often interracial
multi-dwelling buildings in the Bronx.583 The Amsterdam News also praised Morrisania in 1943
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because the residents of this interracial community got along remarkably well. Though there
were some racial incidents and confrontations, many residents interviewed by Amsterdam News
reporters found it hard to believe that any racially motivated conflicts or violence occurred
between black and white residents.584
White Morrisania residents also valued the interracial unity of the neighborhood. More
than 6,000 people representing every racial group in the Bronx gathered in a patriotic rally to
support the war during a summer of intense racial antagonism across the country. Revered Elder
Hawkens, pastor of the St. Augustin’s Presbyterian Church said at the rally, “We will defeat the
Axis only through unity.”585 The meeting tried to evoke solidarity among Morrisania’s residents
as racial tensions escalated in cities all over the nation in the summer of 1943. The integration
and relative unity among of the residents of Morrisania may have been connected to the fact that
many of the early black residents were middle-class families who shared many of the same
middle-class values and the social norms as those whites already living in Morrisania.
Though African Americans found better living conditions in the South Bronx, the
migration of blacks to the area produced some negative effects. As the complexion of
Morrisania changed, many residents of the area became unhappy with their neighborhood. A
major concern for the Morrisania community in the 1940s was the lack of recreational facilities
for the expanding population of black youth. Several also complained of inefficient police
protection at night. A 1946 report commissioned by the Mayor’s Committee on Unity (MCOU)
attributed the higher rates of delinquency among Puerto Rican and black adolescents in
Morrisania, in part, to the lack of adequate recreation facilities for the increasing number of
youths in the South Bronx. According to the recognized contemporary standards of the National
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Recreation Association, East Morrisania’s recreation facilities met the needs of only 7,500
youths instead of the 51,000 children and adolescents living in the area. Though other
contributing factors to juvenile delinquency were difficult to eradicate and required complex
solutions, the authors of the report urged the city to provide more recreation programs for youth.
They also urged area churches and synagogues to provide recreation space and activities in
community centers.586
Gang violence no doubt contributed to increased juvenile delinquency in Morrisania.
Fights between black, white, and Puerto Rican gangs concerned area residents. Community
leaders met this problem head on by creating the Bronx Youth Council, a community recreation
organization for adolescents. The association established offices throughout the South Bronx
and workers contacted and collaborated with the gangs to gradually interest members in
participating in council projects, thus diverting their attention away from gang activity.587
Only a third of the residents interviewed by the authors of the MCOU study were
satisfied living in Morrisania. In addition to the rising levels of juvenile delinquency, some of
these residents interviewed for the report complained about the condition of the housing in the
area. Area residents criticized landlords’ poor maintenance of area houses and buildings and
complained that the Department of Sanitation neglected their neighborhood. Many whites were
anxious to move out of Morrisania into better apartments but were held back by a housing
shortage that limited their options. For these folks integration was neither a reason to leave nor
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an effect of a desire to live with African Americans, but a result of the unavailability of better
housing.588
Whites were not the only people concerned about the effects of increased black residency.
Some African American residents of Morrisania were also alarmed at the social changes
accompanying black migration to the area. A number of the more affluent black residents
complained about the social effects of working class blacks moving from Harlem. A candy store
owner and former Harlem resident believed that though the Bronx offered better living
conditions and had less crime than Harlem, things in the Bronx were getting worse as more
blacks from Harlem moved to the neighborhood. According to her, Harlem transplants brought
bad habits with them as some youth were snatching pocketbooks, shooting dice on sidewalks,
and using profane language in public.589 A class rift developed between longer-term middleclass residents of Morrisania and those who had recently moved to the area from Harlem. Many
of the more established black Morrisania residents saw a need for social service organizations
and recreation facilities to alleviate these conditions.
Longtime black residents of Morrisania also complained about rising rents in the area.
Residents of Morrisania paid higher rents as more African Americans moved into the
neighborhood. Because black residents paid higher rents in Harlem landlords charged more to
lease apartments in Morrisania as blacks from Manhattan moved to the Bronx. The Bronx
Council of Social Agencies through a committee headed by Revered Elder Hawkins, pastor of St.
Augustine’s Church the largest black Catholic church in Morrisania at the time, embarked on a
campaign to stop landlords from raising rental prices in the neighborhood.590 A dressmaker who
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had lived in the Bronx for years worried about the new trends. She complained that Harlmeites,
who were used to paying exorbitant rents, were moving into Morrisania and paying higher rents
than they should. Older residents of the area believed these new black residents should have
consulted them to find out rental rates for an apartment in the neighborhood. This would have
prevented these new residents from agreeing to pay higher rents which allowed building owners
to begin charging more to lease apartments in the area. 591
Despite the concerns older residents had about the effects of blacks moving into
Morrisania, African Americans continued to consider the Bronx a better alternative to Harlem
and most were not looking to leave the area. Despite her complaints about the changes the
migration from Harlem caused in the neighborhood, the candy store owner interviewed by the
Amsterdam News still believed a better life was available for blacks in the Bronx. She
highlighted the superior living conditions in Morrisania by pointing out that “living in the Bronx
is one thing” while merely “existing in Harlem is another.” Similarly though she complained
about the recent changes in the neighborhood, the dressmaker also interviewed by the
Amsterdam News still believed the Bronx to be a better alternative than Harlem, as there was
ample playground space, parks and other places to go for relaxation.592 Though the movement of
blacks into the area sparked some undesirable conditions, living conditions were better in
Morrisania and residing in the Bronx continued to be a better option than living in Harlem.
To address some of the problems caused by black settlement in the neighborhood the
churches that served the blacks in Morrisania provided recreation activities for area youth. St.
Augustine’s church hosted many different activities and housed clubs. The church held plays,
basketball games, roller skating, choir rehearsals, cooking classes, and Girl Scout meetings and
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parties. It provided someplace for the neighborhood youth to congregate after school.593
Thessalonia Baptist Church, the largest church for blacks in Morrisania, also provided many of
the recreational activities for new black families living in the area.594 Thessalonia was first
founded in 1892 by migrants from Flavannah County, Virginia and had moved to several
different locations in the Bronx. In 1942 the newly ordained pastor of the church James Polite,
led the congregation to its present building at 951 Stebbins Avenue (now Rev. James A. Polite
Avenue) in Morrisania.595 Thessalonia provided many activities for the neighborhood youth,
sponsoring a youth choir, plays, lectures, and field trips in the summer.596 The church’s focus on
community activism in the 1940s was an extension of the interests of Revered Polite who was an
activist in the black community and involved with the Civil Rights movement.597
Despite the activities of the churches and community organizations there were still
instances of discrimination in Morrisania, but racial antagonisms were sporadic and did not
usually involve violence. In one instance a landlord of a Jackson Avenue building mistakenly
rented an apartment to Mr. Earle, an African American man whose skin complexion was fair
enough to pass for white. After paying for the apartment and receiving the keys, the Earles were
scheduled to move in and arranged for the gas and electricity to be turned on in the new
apartment and put in new flooring. When Mr. Earle arrived at his new apartment he could not
enter because the property owners had changed the lock on the door. The landlords of the
building insisted that they already had tenants renting that apartment and that their father, who
593
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had made the rental agreement with Earle, had made a mistake. They told the Earles that they
did not want Negroes renting their property.598 Despite a general lack of racial tensions in the
area, not all landlords in Morrisania were open to black tenancy or integrated neighborhoods.
But the discrimination in Morrisania was nowhere near as systematic as in other areas of the
Bronx.
In Morrisania’s adjacent sections integration was not as welcome. In fact the
neighborhoods surrounding Morrisania remained off limits to blacks. As a youth Rosemary
Brown remembers not being able to go down the hill to Southern Boulevard or Intervale Avenue
which were mostly Jewish areas. She remembers being chased there as a youth. By the late
1940s, as more blacks moved into the area, those restrictions lifted and black children could go
to Southern Boulevard; but there were still areas in the South Bronx where blacks could not go.
Blacks were not welcome on Bathgate Avenue or in the Hunts Point, Melrose and Mott Haven
sections.599 Despite the integration in Morrisania much of the rest of the South Bronx remained
closed to black residency. The discrimination against black residents was even more acute in the
burgeoning white middle-class neighborhoods of Bronx.
When a black family, the Blocksons, tried to lease a house in Baychester, a middle class
neighborhood in the north Bronx, whites resorted to violence to prevent the family from moving
in. In July 1945 unidentified whites burned down a six bedroom bungalow in a residential
section of Baychester to prevent the Blocksons from occupying the dwelling. Not only did they
destroy the house but they wrote racial slurs and messages on the ruined interior walls. The
vandals scribbled “It stinks, I hate Niggers. I’m glad it burnt. I hope Niggers don’t move in
here.” on the walls. The residents of Baychester were clearly not ready to welcome black
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neighbors even if they were the most respectable of black families. The Blocksons, were
educated and affluent African Americans. Mr. Blockson, who was born in Canada and had
grown up in an affluent section of Providence, had studied pharmacy in Rhode Island,
specialized in perfumes and cosmetics at Columbia University, and worked as an assistant
manufacturer for D’Arsay Perfumes. Racism and discrimination towards blacks were much
more pronounced in more affluent sections of the Bronx than in Morrisania.600
Even though discrimination and racial antagonisms were relatively minor in Morrisania,
community leaders, activists, and organizations aimed to stop race tensions, preserve the
interracial and multi-ethnic character of the neighborhood, and prevent white flight as part of a
larger effort to prevent the South Bronx from becoming a ghetto. Some focused their work on
preventing segregation of neighborhood schools to prevent white flight. This was one of the
main goals of Dr. Jacob Bernstein, principal of Morris High School, and advisor to the Bronx
Youth Council, a group of Bronx students who met to organize recreation activities for borough
youth. As whites moved out of the Morrisania area Bernstein appealed to the Board of
Education for a re-zoning of school districts to prevent white students from fleeing. Though
there was considerable support for rezoning from many parent and community groups,
opponents threatened race riots and one white politician obtained a doctor’s note claiming his
son was unable to psychologically deal with Negroes. Despite the opposition, the Board
approved the re-zoning and a subsequent redrawing of the district lines. The result was an
integrated Morris High with blacks comprising 40 percent of the student population, down from
70 percent. Moreover black students entered Taft and Evander Childs High Schools which were
previously predominately white. The rezoning efforts successfully as the integrated schools and
provided equitable education for black students. The re-zoning had racial implications beyond
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the classroom. White students after associating with their black schoolmates during the day went
home and told their parents that their ideas about blacks were wrong. This would be another way
to ease racial tensions in the area.601 There seemed to be a concerted effort on the part of
Bernstein and other Bronx educators to avoid in the Bronx the white flight and segregation that
plagued Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant.602
With the increase in black students at Morris High School Dr. Bernstein looked for
information on where to send his African American students for guidance and job information.
Dr Bernstein’s request indicated the growing need for social service agencies and community
organizations in Morrisania. They Urban League answered Bernstein’s call. The Urban League
of Greater New York (ULGNY) believed the organization’s services must be extended to the
Bronx. According to Edward Lewis, the Executive Secretary of the New York Urban League,
there were far more employment opportunities available in the Bronx than most people realized,
but fair employment practices agencies had not made much headway in dealing with Bronx
industries. Therefore the League focused more of its job placement resources in that borough.
The increase of the African American population in the Bronx prompted the ULGNY to open its
first office in the Bronx. In response to the World War II migration of blacks to New York, in
1947 the New York Urban League’s leaders appealed to the public to support its drive to raise
$450,000 in funds which would be used to expand its facilities and to hire more staff and
professionally trained experts to work in the employment, vocational guidance, health, and
housing departments. League leaders also said that part of the funds raised in the drive would
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also be used to open the Bronx branch to meet the demands of the borough’s new black
community.603
The Bronx branch of the Urban League opened in 1948. Its creation was funded by a
$10,000 grant from the Nathan Hofheimer Foundation which was to be supplemented by gifts
from Bronx sources and philanthropist Winthrop Rockefeller, a National Urban League board
member. The new branch provided job aid and council to blacks in the Bronx, services that were
increasingly necessary as more and more blacks settled in Morrisania.604 As the 1940s came to a
close, the Urban League of Greater New York worked to provide and expand employment
opportunities to those who lived in this new area of black settlement.
As the black population in the borough increased, William S Jackson, Executive
Secretary of the newly formed Bronx Branch of the ULGNY, tried to prevent the South Bronx
from becoming a black and Puerto Rican ghetto. Like Dr. Bernstein, Jackson believed the key to
preventing the ghettoization of the Bronx was to prevent white flight which would preserve the
interracial and multi-ethnic character of Morrisania. Jackson, the Norma and Murra Hearn
Award recipient for distinguished social service from the New York School of Social Work at
Columbia University, said that it was his aim “to see that the people of the Bronx all worked
together to bring about an integrated population rather than isolation of the different racial
groups.”605 The Bronx office of the ULGNY worked to maintain integrated housing in
Morrisania in an effort to prevent white flight.
In part the Bronx Urban League looked to maintain a racially balanced community.
Leaders in the Bronx branch wanted to maintain a community in which 40 percent of the
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residents were white, 40 percent black, and the remaining 20 percent other races.606 League
officials set up a committee to lobby for a balanced racial population in the proposed Forest
Housing Development being constructed in Morrisania. Jackson wanted to keep the Forest
Houses from being an all black housing project. At the time the New York City Housing
Authority (NYCHA) usually admitted tenants of only one race to public housing projects. The
League’s plan was to prevent segregation of housing projects in the Bronx by having blacks
apply for housing outside of the areas where they lived and educating whites to move into the
“so-called Negro housing areas.” The League pushed NYCHA to address this problem.607
League leaders also wanted the Cooperative Woodstock Terrace, a middle class complex, to
choose residents according to these quotas as well. Neither initiative succeeded - the Forrest
Houses and Woodstock Terrace both became predominately black complexes.608 The failure of
the ULGNY’s attempts to integrate new housing projects proved to be a disturbing trend
signaling the eventual segregation and ghettoization of the south Bronx over the next twenty
years. The fears of Jackson and Dr. Bernstein proved to be well founded.609

Conclusion
World War II was a period of mobility and opportunity for many African Americans.
The employment opportunities in the nation’s war industries, along with Jim Crow laws
discrimination in the south, prompted millions of African Americans to migrate to urban areas
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throughout the country. These demographic shifts caused many social changes in this nation’s
cities including New York.
In Detroit and Chicago new black migrants resided in the already extant centers of black
settlement, increasing the population in already overcrowded ”Paradise Valley” and the South
Side respectively. The migration worsened overcrowding and strained the social services
available in those cities. This was also the case in Harlem. As southern blacks migrated to New
York, the extant center of black settlement became overcrowded and social service resources
inadequate. Landlords increased rents and living conditions declined, prompting Harlemites and
new migrants alike to seek housing outside of the so-called “Black Mecca.”
In the 1940s thousands of southern black migrants moved to the Bedford-Stuyvesant
section of Brooklyn, creating a second area of black settlement in the city. The availability of
better-paying jobs in war industries and the construction of a subway line directly connecting
Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant attracted middle and working-class blacks to the area.
Apartments opened for black residency as whites moved to newly available housing in Queens
and Long Island. As the black population of Bedford-Stuyvesant increased, the area suffered
problems similar to in Harlem. Overcrowding, higher rents, deteriorating housing, and lack of
adequate social service and health facilities accompanied the growing black population. In
response to these changes some area whites organized to protest.
Many white Brooklynites linked the problems in Bedford-Stuyvesant to the migration of
southern blacks to the area. Organizations like the Midtown Civic League led campaigns to oust
black residents and prevent further settlement by blacks. They specifically linked black
residence with declining property values and increased crime in the area. The organization
worked to prevent black settlement in Bedford-Stuyvesant and pressured the Kings County
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Grand Jury to hold hearings on the condition of blacks in the area. The New York Times
coverage of the investigation and findings of the grand jury kept public attention on the negative
effects of black residency in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Therefore the migration played a much larger
public role in Brooklyn than it did in Manhattan in the 1940s, as public interest was focused on
the steadily increasing black population from the south.
The organized white opposition to black settlement for the most part united the black
community in Brooklyn against the activities of organizations like the Midtown Civil League.
Black organizations attempted to provide community programs to decrease crime and juvenile
delinquency in the area. Despite the activities of the Midtown Civic League, black migrants to
the city continued to view Bedford-Stuyvesant as an attractive place to settle. Blacks moved to
Brooklyn by the thousands and the increase in the African American population resulted in
increased political power at the local level for Brooklyn’s blacks by 1950. Increasing numbers
of Bedford-Stuyvesant’s white residents left the neighborhood in response to the migration. By
the end of the decade blacks no longer lived in dispersed communities throughout the borough.
Black residence instead became concentrated in Bedford-Stuyvesant and the area became known
as “Little Harlem.”
A significant number of blacks looking to settle outside of Harlem chose to put down
roots in the Bronx. Thousands of Harlemites moved to Morrisania during the 1940s. The
availability of better housing, lower rents, fewer people, fresher air, and better schools prompted
thousands of African Americans to move from Harlem to the South Bronx. Though African
Americans moved to the Bronx, Morrisania did not become a “Little Harlem” in the 1940s.
While some whites did leave the neighborhood for better housing and in response to black
residency, white flight did not occur in Morrisania in the 1940s. Some of the working class
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white residents of the area did not have the financial capacity to move to the newly constructed
middle class housing in the upper Bronx.
Despite the movement of many blacks into Morrisania, relatively little racial tension
resulted. This was in part due to the fact that many of those moving to Morrisania, specifically
in the first few years of the decade, were black middle class families that shared white residents’
values and social outlook. Evidence of a class rift within the black community emerged in the
early 1940s as long-time black Morrisanians complained about the lower-class Harlemites
moving into the neighborhood. Therefore black and white residents alike worried about the
effects of the influx of residents from Harlem on their community. There was a concerted effort
among community organizations and activists to prevent crime and juvenile delinquency
especially as black working-class residents moved there from Harlem. They worked to keep
Morrisania a safe and desirable neighborhood. Others worked to keep Morrisania from
becoming a “Little Harlem” like Bedford-Stuyvesant. Activists like Dr. Jacob Bernstein and
organizations like the Bronx branch of the Urban League of Greater New York aimed to do this
by promoting unity among the races in Morrisania and preventing white flight. Though it is hard
to pinpoint whether or not these actions were the cause, Morrisania remained integrated. This
was a major accomplishment during the 1940s as many other cities, and parts of New York City,
became racially segregated.
The dispersion of New York City’s blacks to different pockets of settlement is one thing
that set the city apart from others during the 1940s. The spread of black settlement outside of
Harlem provided a valve for the racial discontent building in New York City. It changed the
character and focus of the Harlem Riot of 1943 and ultimately may have prevented a major race
riot from breaking out in 1943 as it did in Detroit, Los Angeles, and Beaumont, Texas.

262
Conclusion

The Second Wave of the Great Migration and the demographic shifts it precipitated in
New York City constitute significant events in the city’s history. The World War II migration
had important effects on the demographics of the city and the formation of black communities in
New York especially in the outer boroughs. Moreover, African Americans in New York found
better paying skilled and semi-skilled employment in some war industries. Blacks were able to
find these jobs because of the passage of federal and state legislation prohibiting discriminatory
employment practices by war industries. Government agencies, prompted by the activism of
black organizations and groups working for racial uplift, investigated these companies and in
some cases forced them to comply with fair employment legislation. The advances blacks made
in employment lasted well beyond the war years.
Chapter 1 demonstrated that most black migrants came from Virginia, North Carolina,
and South Carolina. Black women in their 20s were the largest group to migrate. Harlem, the
existing center of black settlement in the city, and Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn were the
primary areas where black migrants settled. In fact Bedford-Stuyvesant, which in the 1930s was
an overwhelmingly white area, became a black neighborhood during the war years. The black
population already living in New York City also moved to other boroughs during the war. Black
middle class families moved from Harlem to the Morrisania section of the Bronx creating
integrated neighborhoods there.
One of the reasons for black migration to urban areas during the war was the availability
of better-paying jobs in war industries. Industrial work had been largely closed to black workers
before the war and had remained closed to blacks in the first two years of the conflict. Although
many scholars describe employment discrimination in this era, none of them explain exactly
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which jobs were open and which were closed to blacks, the rationale used by employers for
refusing to hire them, or the process that led employers to, for the first time, offer jobs to black
workers. This is the focus of Chapter 2.
Chapter 2 elucidates how the passage of state anti-discrimination legislation and
Executive Order 8802 outlawing discriminatory hiring in war industries set the stage for
integration of the workforce in some of New York’s factories. The New York State Committee
on Discrimination (COD) and Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) investigations of
the hiring practices of factories with government contracts prompted some war industries in New
York City to begin hiring black workers.
The FEPC and COD would not have been as effective in prompting war industries to hire
blacks had it not been for the constant pressure and cooperation from organizations focused on
racial uplift. Chapter 2 also describes how black organizations protested against the
discriminatory hiring practices of war industries and pressured the state and federal government
to prevent companies with government contracts from discriminating against African Americans.
The National Urban League and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People used community meetings, direct action protests, boycotts, and press campaigns to first
pressure the industries themselves to hire black workers, a tactic that was not very effective. The
NAACP, NUL, and black politicians shifted their focus to towards the state and federal
government, pressuring the New York State Assembly and President Roosevelt to establish fair
employment measures and establish government agencies to investigate war industries accused
of discrimination. The FEPC and COD continued to draw attention to war industries’
discriminatory hiring practices.
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Though war industries began hiring black workers in 1942 it was not until 1943 that
some industries fully integrated. Chapter 3 explains how this happened. A labor shortage in
1943, further opened skilled and semi-skilled industrial jobs in the scientific instrument,
electrical instrument, and shipbuilding sectors to African Americans. Black women benefitted
from war-time labor shifts as they found employment in factories that paid more than the
domestic work they had done before the war. The Negro Labor Committee (NLC), the Negro
Labor Victory Committee (NLVC), its parent organization the National Negro Congress (NNC),
and most importantly the Brooklyn Urban League (BKUL) exerted pressure on the management
of war industries and unions that discriminated against black workers. These organizations
cooperated with progressive labor unions and collaborated with anti-discrimination agencies to
help facilitate the employment of blacks in skilled and semi-skilled positions in war industries.
As war industries hired African Americans, the NNC and the Brooklyn Urban League began to
use the FEPC to address cases of discrimination against black workers employed by war
industries. Both organizations were involved in a campaign to register discrimination complaints
from black employees of the Brooklyn Navy with local offices of the FEPC.
The civil rights organizations used different tactics to open new areas of employment for
African Americans, some of which were more effective than others. The NAACP held mass
meetings, letter writing campaigns, press campaigns, and meetings with companies to highlight
discrimination and pressure industrial employers to hire black workers. This drew the attention
of government fair employment agencies to specific cases of discrimination, but did not directly
result in opening of new areas of employment to African Americans. The Negro Labor
Committee and the Negro Labor Victory Committee (a subsidiary of the National Negro
Congress) worked in conjunction with labor unions to secure employment for blacks in war
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industries. Both organizations worked with unions to accept black members and open training
programs to black workers providing them with the skills necessary for industrial jobs. Though
both organizations were led by leftists and had similar goals, the Socialist led NLC and
Communist Party linked NLVC often attacked each other for their political views and
affiliations. Of the two organizations the NLVC was more successful at opening new areas of
employment to African Americans because of their cooperation with the Committee on
Discrimination and their partnership with unions representing workers in war industries.
The Brooklyn Urban League (BKUL) was most successful at opening employment
opportunities in New York City’s war industries to African Americans. The BKUL worked with
the New York State Committee on Discrimination to identify war industries engaging in
discriminatory hiring practices. The Industrial Secretary of the BKUL provided the COD with
information on instances where blacks were discriminated against in order to aid the bureau in
identifying war industries breaking the Mahoney Law which prohibited them from
discriminating against employees on the basis of race. The COD would then conduct
investigations of these companies and in some instances order them to stop their biased
employment practices. The BKUL also continually published reports of this discrimination to
maintain pressure on the COD to continue its investigations. In this way the Brooklyn Urban
League acted as part of the state infrastructure put in place to prohibit hiring discrimination in
war industries and most effectively opened new areas of employment to African Americans.
Unlike World War I, not all blacks were driven back to their jobs as domestics and
unskilled service workers when World War II ended. After the war many black women found
work in clerical occupations, as phone operators, and as clerks in department stores. These were
better paying positions that were not open to black women before the war. The war also caused
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lasting changes in the employment available to black men. Though many of the city’s African
American men were ousted from their skilled and semi-skilled jobs when the war ended, five
years after the war the number of black men working in service positions had declined and
increasing numbers of black men worked in semi-skilled industrial positions, as skilled
craftsmen, and in clerical jobs.
The historical patterns facilitating black employment in New York’s war industries laid
out in Chapters 2 and 3 are made clearer through the examination of how one New York war
industry began to hire black workers. The changing hiring practices of the Sperry Corporation
are the focus of Chapter 4. The Sperry Gyroscope Company, which produced scientific
instruments for the Navy, employed very few blacks before the war. By the end of the war they
employed more than one thousand African Americans and more than half of those workers were
employed in skilled or semi-skilled positions. This represented a stark turnaround in the
company’s employment practices.
Sperry became the focus of black protests for equal employment opportunities because it
held large government contracts to produce scientific instruments for the war but had virtually no
African American workers. The NAACP, the National Urban League, and the National Negro
Congress each worked to pressure Sperry to hire black workers. The initial efforts of the
NAACP in particular prompted Sperry management to hire its first black workers in 1941. But
Walter White, president of the NAACP, did not believe those hires constituted full integration.
He argued that the few blacks employed by Sperry were token hires to alleviate pressure from
black organizations. The NAACP, the NUL, and the NNC brought blacks’ allegations of racial
discrimination at Sperry to the attention of the local offices of the Far Employment Practices
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Committee and the state’s Committee on Discrimination prompting an investigation of Sperry’s
hiring practices.
It was not until local offices of the FEPC and the COD investigated Sperry’s employment
practices in 1942 that the company began to hire larger numbers of blacks and more importantly
placed them in skilled and semi-skilled positions. A labor shortage in 1943 prompted
management to make more black hires. Some historians have argued that government fair
employment agencies were ineffective in prompting war industries to hire blacks, however the
statistics show that this was not true at Sperry. Sperry hired comparable numbers of AfricanAmericans in the years before and after the labor shortage. This indicates that Sperry changed
their hiring policies before the labor shortage, likely in response to the FEPC and COD
investigations.
Chapter 4 also highlights the importance of the United, Electrical, Radio, and Machine
Workers of America (UE) in facilitating black employment. The progressive union, which
advocated inclusion of black members, took over representation of Sperry workers in 1942 and
pressed management to hire black workers as well. At the end of the war, the UE cooperated
with the Negro Labor Victory Committee to prevent lay-offs of all black industrial workers at the
end of the war. New York locals of the UE proposed to create a black to white worker ratio that
was to be maintained regardless of length of service. Within the ratios seniority rules would still
be observed. This would ensure that all the newly hired black workers would not be fired when
veterans returned to their jobs. Though the plan was rejected by company officials because it
undermined the main function of labor unions which was to protect the rights of its workers
through fair labor practices; it shows the union thinking about and experimenting with a form of
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affirmative action. The UE, like other unions, proposed other measures in lieu of seniority
changes to preserve black employment in industries.
The employment of blacks by Sperry also changed the attitude of the company President
Thomas Morgan. He became an advocate of fair employment for blacks in Sperry as well as in
other war industries. Morgan also advocated for black access to higher education, extending his
activism to fundraising for the United Negro College Fund. Morgan’s actions as Sperry’s
President had profound effects on the hiring policies of the company, especially with regard to
the employment of blacks after the war. His actions and their affect on company policy show
how sometimes individuals matter in history.
The particularities in Sperry’s case caused the company to maintain black employment
after the war. Though company management laid-off most of their black workers when the war
ended, when the company began producing goods for the American military after the war,
company management rehired many African Americans. Though this case study presents the
particular conditions that led one business to integrate their work force, Sperry’s story sheds light
on the complex combination of factors that prompted other war industries to hire black workers
as well.
The Second Wave of the Great Migration had profound effects on the urban areas to
which the migrants moved. Historians studying the effect of the World War II migration have
asked important questions about the communities in which these African Americans settled.
Where migrants lived and how they found housing; how whites reacted to black settlement; how
this affected relations between the races; and whether class conflicts within the African
American communities in these areas emerged are questions historians Thomas Sugrue and
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Shirley Ann Moore asked about Detroit and Richmond during the Second World War. They are
questions that this study begins to answer about New York City in Chapter 5.
The migration of thousands of African Americans to New York City strained the housing
and social service organizations in Harlem. High rents and overcrowding prompted black
leaders in Harlem to protest and pressure the federal government to institute rent control.
Moreover the frustration blacks felt at having to endure discrimination and deteriorating living
conditions fueled the Harlem Riot in 1943. The outbreak of violence in Harlem prompted black
leaders and some whites to focus on the social problems in Harlem; problems that were made
worse by the increasing black population. Many African American leaders used the riot to
highlight the poor living conditions blacks in Harlem endured and pressed the city government to
address these problems. Many African Americans took matters into their own hands and settled
elsewhere in the city. New migrants and Harlemites alike moved to the Bedford-Stuyvesant
section of Brooklyn creating a second area of black settlement in the city. Other Harlem
residents moved to Morrisania in the Bronx.
Blacks chose to move to Bedford-Stuyvesant during the war years for several reasons.
Harlemites and migrants alike looked to Bedford-Stuyvesant because of the war jobs available in
close proximity. The Brooklyn Navy Yard, one of the major war-time employers of African
Americans, was within walking distance of Bedford-Stuyvesant. Moreover, a small black
population already lived in the area which attracted more African Americans. BedfordStuyvesant was less crowded than Harlem and had better housing, two of the primary reasons
blacks moved there. Furthermore, the area was easily accessible from Harlem because of the
new train line directly connecting the two neighborhoods. Both working class and middle class
blacks moved to the area.
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As the black population increased, many of the same problems that plagued Harlem
developed in Bedford-Stuyvesant as well. Overcrowding and high rents were the most acute
problems for blacks. Property values decreased which precipitated white flight during the 1940s.
By 1941 poor health conditions, a high delinquency rate, and an almost total lack of cultural and
recreational facilities and social agencies plagued Bedford-Stuyvesant. The New York Times
reported on the higher crime and delinquency rates in Bedford Stuyvesant, linking reported crime
waves in the district with black migration. Consequently, Bedford-Stuyvesant became known as
“Little Harlem.”
The increasing crime rate and declining property values prompted white BedfordStuyvesant residents to organize to protest black settlement in the area. Monsignor John Belford,
a priest at the Roman Catholic Church of the Nativity, led white protests against increased crime
in the neighborhood. He embarked on a campaign against black residency by publishing articles
in his parish newspaper and the Brooklyn Eagle highlighting the ignorant and destructive
character of blacks migrating to the area. He blamed blacks, especially southern migrants, for
crime. The Midtown Civil League, led by Sumner Sirtl, fought decreasing property values in
Bedford-Stuyvesant by trying to prevent black settlement in the area. In 1943 the League
pressured the King’s County Grand Jury to investigate the condition of blacks living in Brooklyn
and allegations that Mayor La Guardia had ignored crime in the neighborhood. The Grand Jury
reported a general sense of lawlessness in Bedford-Stuyvesant detailing the various types of
crime and vice plaguing the area. The report did not mention any of the structural reasons for the
condition of blacks in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Instead the grand jury blamed area crime on
insufficient police presence.
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African American leaders, organizations, and press condemned the report and worked to
discredit its findings. The NAACP, NNC, YMCA, and Amsterdam News argued that
employment discrimination, high rents, overcrowded living conditions, and the lack of
recreational organizations and social service agencies were the main reasons for higher rates of
crime and juvenile delinquency among African Americans.
Despite the racial tension, higher rents, deteriorating housing, and social problems in
Bedford-Stuyvesant, blacks still considered the area an attractive place to live. The borough’s
more modern housing and industrial job opportunities continued to attract middle and working
class blacks from Harlem and the South. Many of the migrants moving to Bedford-Stuyvesant
were middle-class and more stable working-class blacks creating a more homogenous black
population as many poorer working-class blacks moved to Brownsville. Blacks in BedfordStuyvesant, despite class differences, united in the face of white prejudice. The continued
settlement of blacks in Bedford-Stuyvesant and the social effects it created precipitated white
flight from the area and by the end of the 1940s the formerly white neighborhood was
predominately inhabited by African Americans.
Black families from Harlem also moved to the Bronx in the 1940s to escape high rents
and overcrowding. These families settled in present-day Morrisania in the southwest Bronx.
Most of the families who moved were members of the stable working class with fathers and
husbands employed in stable jobs. Very often these families had the economic means to move
because black men were hired as postal workers or Pullman porters. Many of the African
American men who moved to Morrisania in the early 1940s were employed in civil service or
blue collar jobs, while others were professionals. Some of the earliest black residents of
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Morrisania could not find apartments due to discrimination by white building owners; so black
men took jobs as building superintendents to get apartments.
The majority of the families that moved to the Bronx were looking for better living
conditions than in Harlem. The Bronx had better and newer housing, more parks, and better
schools than Harlem. African Americans were increasingly able to find apartments in
Morrisania because many of the white residents were leaving for newer and more modern
housing in the upper Bronx. This left apartments vacant for blacks to occupy. However many
working class whites in the neighborhood did not have the economic means to move to emerging
middle-class neighborhoods. These whites stayed in Morrisania creating a racially and
ethnically diverse neighborhood.
Black Morrisania residents were quite proud of the fact that they lived in an integrated
neighborhood. Integrated neighborhoods were not common in cities across the country in the
1940s. In fact the growing black populations in Detroit, Los Angeles, and Chicago found
themselves even more hemmed into distinct black districts as these cities became more rigidly
segregated. The residents of Morrisania, both black and white, worked together to foster a sense
of unity which resulted in very little racial conflict in the area. Perhaps the middle-class status,
culture, and values of the blacks moving into Morrisania in the 1940s created a common outlook
and fostered good relations between the different races and ethnicities living in the
neighborhood.
As in Bedford-Stuyvesant some negative effects accompanied black settlement in
Morrisania. Higher rents, increasing crime, and juvenile delinquency levels accompanied black
settlement in the area. Moreover the social and recreational organizations in the neighborhood
lacked sufficient resources to deal with the expanding black population. These affects made
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some white residents of the area look for new places to live. More affluent black residents in
Morrisania were also unhappy with the social effects of increasing migration from Harlem,
especially towards the latter half of the 1940s. These black middle-class residents complained
about higher rents, increased crime, and visible vice in the neighborhood as working-class blacks
moved in from Harlem. Despite these complaints, both middle and working class blacks
believed living in Morrisania was a much better alternative to living in Harlem.
Community leaders and organizations aimed at racial uplift attempted to keep Morrisania
integrated by preventing white flight. Men like Jacob Bernstein, principal of Morris High
School, worked to have the school district re-zoned to ensure that his school and others in the
area remained integrated. Similarly the Urban League of Greater New York devoted more of its
resources to address the social changes that accompanied black settlement in the borough. The
organization established a Bronx branch and focused on job placement activities for blacks in the
area. William S. Jackson, Executive Secretary of the newly formed Bronx Urban League, also
tried to prevent white flight. He led an Urban League initiative to pressure the New York City
Housing Authority to keep the Forrest Houses, a proposed housing project for Morrisania, from
accepting only African American residents. Integration of the project they hoped would prevent
the area from becoming all black. Jackson’s plan was unsuccessful, NYCHA admitted only
black tenants to the Forrest Houses. Morrisania, however, remained integrated throughout the
rest of the decade. This changed in the 1950s as more and more whites fled the area leaving it to
become a minority inhabited ghetto.
The study of the demographic and social effects of the Second Wave of the Great
Migration in New York City provides a different lens through which to view African American
history and the history of New York City. Particularities in the New York experience complicate
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the story of the World War II migration of blacks to urban areas as well as the history of World
War II era New York City. This wave of black migration to New York and the subsequent
changes in population distribution it created in the city was the foundation for settlement patterns
of the black population there for the rest of the century.
The creation of black enclaves outside of Harlem set the parameters for New York’s
modern ethnic and racial composition. Since the turn of the twentieth century blacks had been
concentrated in Harlem, but in the 1940s a second area of black settlement emerged in BedfordStuyvesant. Though Brooklyn never became the intellectual and cultural center of black New
York, its significant black population became a political and cultural rival to Harlem. Moreover,
in the 1940s blacks began to move into the Bronx. The south Bronx, which later became the
quintessential picture of urban blight, was a haven for middle and working-class blacks who
were in search of better living conditions in the 1940s. Morrisania was a distinctively integrated
area uncommon in New York City and other urban areas in the country at the time.
The dispersion of New York City’s blacks to different pockets of settlement sets the city
apart from other urban areas in the 1940s. In most cities to which blacks migrated, African
Americans were relegated to distinct and rigidly defined areas of settlement. The spread of black
residency outside of Harlem provided a valve for the racial discontent building in New York
City. In the Harlem Riot, New York’s blacks focused their disgruntlement on property –
damaging and destroying neighborhood stores. Unlike the riots of Detroit and Los Angeles, the
Harlem Riot in 1943 was not a traditional race riot in the sense that there was no violent
confrontation between blacks and whites.
The study of black New York in the 1940s also provides an alternative view of the
activities of fair employment practice agencies. The Fair Employment Practices Committee in
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particular was thought by several historians to be unsuccessful in its goal of prohibiting
discrimination in war industries. They argue that the FEPC did not effectively end
discriminatory hiring practices in war industries because it lacked the means to enforce
Executive Order 8802. Other historians argue that the COD was slow and ineffective in its
investigations of companies with discriminatory hiring practices.610 Examination of the activities
of these agencies during the war shows that their investigations did indeed have a positive effect
on the employment situation of the city’s African Americans. In New York the FEPC through
its work with the Committee on Discrimination successfully expanded black employment into
factories producing goods for the war. The New York State legislation outlawing discriminatory
hiring practices in the state war industries and the ability for the state government to enforce this
legislation made the investigations of the local FEPC and COD relatively effective at
desegregating the workforces of factories with government contracts.
The goal of equal employment opportunity fostered the cooperation of organizations
aimed at uplifting the black race. Older civil rights organizations like the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People and the National Urban League focused their activities
on expanding the types of employment open to blacks in New York. Leftist-led organizations
like the Negro Labor Committee, the Negro Labor Victory Committee and its parent
organization the National Negro Congress focused on working with labor unions to break down
employment barriers to blacks in war industries. These organizations worked separately and in
collaboration to pressure company management and labor unions to accept black workers.
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The most effective tactic used by civil rights organizations was the exertion of pressure
on government agencies aimed at ending employment discrimination in war industries to
investigate companies accused of discrimination. If these agencies, in particular the COD, found
war industries to have discriminatory hiring practices they would then force them to comply with
state anti-discrimination legislation. State legislation made it a misdemeanor for New York war
industries (and the placement agencies that served them) to exclude a citizen of the state by
reason of national origin, race, or color from employment. Moreover, the State Industrial
Commissioner could enforce the laws and require submission of information, records, and
reports pertinent to an investigation of discriminatory hiring practices.
As Nelson Lichtenstein and Robert Korstad argued and as this dissertation has shown the
main issue on the agenda of civil rights activists in the 1940s was equality of economic
opportunity.611 Black leaders found an opportunity during World War II to pressure the
government into defending blacks’ economic rights. African Americans and liberal politicians in
New York believed as citizens of the state and nation African Americans deserved their equal
share in the nation’s war-time prosperity. The activism that publicly forced companies and the
government to face the hypocrisy of employment discrimination by a government fighting a war
for democracy resulted in expanding employment opportunities for African Americans in the
city.
Historian Eric Arnesen cites Martha Biondi among a new cadre of scholars who over the
past twenty-five years have examined the contributions of grassroots campaigns for black rights.
He criticizes Biondi and others for not addressing contemporary critiques and historians’
questions about the effectiveness of the Communist Party affiliated civil rights activists.
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Arneson says this avoidance is facilitated by revisionist historians’ minimizing of the political
effects of Communist Party affiliation.612 Arneson recognizes the genuine contributions
Communist Party members made during wartime in building industrial unions and, within limits,
supporting civil rights but also contends it was not as positive as revisionist historians contend
either.613
This dissertation falls in line with Arnesen’s assessment of the effectiveness of
Communist civil rights activists during the 1940s. Biondi begins her study at the end of World
War II and focuses mostly on Communist affiliated organizations. In New York, the NNC and
its subsidiary the NLVC, did indeed contribute to the gains in employment blacks achieved
during the war years most significantly in the opening of industrial unions to black workers as a
way to expand employment opportunities and occupations available to black workers. However,
the NNC nor the Negro Labor Victory Committee were the most affective civil rights
organizations in New York City in the 1940s. Though these organizations worked to secure
employment for African Americans they were not the most important or effective actors on this
front. The Brooklyn Urban League was the most successful organization to expand the
employment options available to blacks during the war. By examining the activities of the
Brooklyn Urban League it is clear that the Urban League, an organization often thought to be
conservative in terms of its tactics by historians, was at the forefront of civil rights activism
which was focused on equality of economic opportunity in the 1940s. The Brooklyn and New
York Urban league were far more effective in achieving concrete goals with regard to job
placement and expanding war work to blacks and facilitated the most important material gains
for blacks in World War II era New York.
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The 1940s was quite a unique period in the twentieth century fight for black rights.
Organizations with different political and social agendas cooperated to work towards
establishing equal employment opportunities for African Americans – the prevailing struggle of
the day. Middle class organizations like the NAACP and NUL worked together with leftist
groups like the NNC to better the economic standings of blacks in the city. It was a unique
moment in which black activists across the political spectrum collaborated for a common goal.
This changed at the war’s end as Communist influence in the fight for equal employment for
African Americans declined. Despite the end of this alliance, black protest for civil rights did
not stop as Lichtenstein and Korstad have argued.614 The priorities of organizations fighting for
black rights shifted after the war. In the 1950s New York’s black activists focused their efforts
on desegregating the city’s public school system. Moreover the Civil Rights movement of the
1950s and 1960s no longer focused on economic inequality, but on expanding blacks’ legal
rights as citizens.
In New York the opening of skilled and semi-skilled jobs to black workers, the
movement of thousands of blacks into the middle-class, the creation of the FEPC, and the
establishment of a permanent state agency dealing with issues of Civil Rights were important
results of the World War II era. The explicit racial barriers to employment ended with the
passage of the Ives-Quinn Law which outlawed discrimination by all employers in the state; that
was the legacy of the 1940s. That did not mean that there were no other issues facing the black
population. School desegregation, fairer distribution of government services and resources, and
other challenges to structural inequality and institutional racism were issues that had taken a back
seat during the 1940s but would assume prominence in the next decades.

614

Robert Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein, “Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil
Rights Movement,” 786-811.
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Appendix
All figures in Tables 1.1-1.15 and Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.4 have been taken from the 1940 and 1950 United States
Population Census.

Table 1.1: New York City 1940 Statistics
Ages
all ages
15 to 19
20 to 24
25 to 29
30 to 34
35 to 39
40 to 44
45 to 49
50 to 54
55 to 59
60-64

all
classes
7,454,995
606,942
649,153
697,153
691,027
669,421
628,714
550,743
467,020
346,871
267,974

total
white
6,977,501
571,412
607,184
644,590
637,687
614,219
584,118
518,427
444,170
331,865
258,161

white
males
3,455,003
284,588
289,049
301,328
308,050
304,806
294,594
266,165
231,787
170,782
127,865

white
females
3,522,498
286,824
318,135
343,262
329,637
309,413
289,524
252,262
212,383
161,083
130,296

total
negroes
458,444
34,678
41,099
50,978
51,180
52,186
41,789
30,381
21,468
14,251
9,285

negro
males
205,727
15,574
15,251
20,008
21,924
23,418
20,299
14,802
10,251
6,675
4,311

negro
females
252,717
19,104
25,848
30,970
29,256
28,768
21,490
15,579
11,217
7,576
4,974

Table 1.2: New York City 1950 Stats and Difference from 1940 statistics
Ages
all ages
15 to 19
20 to 24
25 to 29
30 to 34
35 to 39
40 to 44
45 to 49
50 to 54
55 to 59
60 to 64

all
classes
7,887,380
5.80%
466,835
-23.08%
592,970
-8.65%
662,020
-5.04%
645,815
-6.54%
656,895
-1.87%
640,995
1.95%
588,420
6.84%
553,645
18.55%
452,330
30.40%
365,035
36.22%

total
white
7,110,275
1.90%
419,210
-26.64%
522,360
-13.97%
574,330
-10.90%
566,900
-11.10%
580,175
-5.54%
577,235
-1.18%
535,035
3.20%
513,115
15.52%
426,360
28.47%
346,385
34.17%

white
males
3,452,480
-0.07%
205,370
-27.84%
246,015
-14.89%
273,470
-9.25%
261,110
-15.24%
273,590
-10.24%
277,555
-5.78%
261,560
-1.73%
253,135
9.21%
213,670
25.11%
174,030
36.10%

white
females
3,657,795
3.84%
213,840
-25.45%
276,345
-13.14%
300,860
-12.35%
305,790
-7.23%
306,585
-0.91%
299,680
3.51%
273,475
8.41%
259,980
22.41%
212,690
32.04%
172,355
32.28%

NYC Difference between 1940 and 1950 as a percentage of 1940

total
negroes
749,080
63.40%
46,400
33.80%
68,330
66.26%
84,790
66.33%
76,480
49.43%
74,125
42.04%
61,265
46.61%
50,680
66.81%
38,155
77.73%
24,405
71.25%
17,515
88.64%

negro
males
336,860
63.74%
20,825
33.72%
27,215
78.45%
36,070
80.28%
32,460
48.06%
31,725
35.47%
27,770
36.80%
23,370
57.88%
18,420
79.69%
11,665
74.76%
7,805
81.05%

negro
females
412,220
63.12%
25,575
33.87%
41,115
59.06%
48,720
57.31%
44,020
50.46%
42,400
47.39%
33,495
55.86%
27,310
75.30%
19,735
75.94%
12,740
68.16%
9,710
95.22%
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Table 1.3: 1940 Census Statistics for Manhattan
Ages
all ages
15 to 19
20 to 24
25 to 29
30 to 34
35 to 39
40 to 44
45 to 49
50 to 54
55 to 59
60-64

all
classes
1,888,942
129,209
158,152
178,462
181,251
186,173
174,962
153,273
132,697
98,996
77,105

total
white
1,577,625
107,957
132,357
143,463
144,586
147,564
143,723
130,767
116,869
88,574
70,514

white
males
780,455
53,271
61,824
67,070
69,353
73,637
73,445
67,421
61,614
46,136
34,773

white
females
797,170
54,686
70,335
76,393
75,233
73,927
70,278
63,346
55,255
42,438
35,741

total
negroes
298,365
20,718
25,173
33,814
35,028
36,292
29,141
21,057
14,725
9,818
6,175

negro
males
133,930
9,430
9,603
13,335
14,948
16,281
14,228
10,229
6,986
4,598
2,816

negro
females
164,435
11,288
15,570
20,479
20,080
20,011
14,913
10,828
7,739
5,220
3,359

Table 1.4: Manhattan 1950 Stats and Difference from 1940 statistics
Ages
all ages
15 to 19
20 to 24
25 to 29
30 to 34
35 to 39
40 to 44
45 to 49
50 to 54
55 to 59
60 to 64

all
classes
1,960,101
3.77%
98,604
-23.69%
152,300
-3.70%
181,601
1.76%
165,172
-8.87%
169,944
-8.72%
164,651
-5.89%
158,069
3.13%
150,130
13.14%
119,960
21.18%
100,945
30.92%

total
white
1,556,599
-1.33%
76,465
-29.17%
117,393
-11.31%
135,675
-5.43%
122,885
-15.01%
127,252
-13.76%
128,340
-10.70%
127,738
-2.32%
126,374
8.13%
104,897
18.43%
89,789
27.33%

white
males
750,940
-3.78%
36,314
-31.83%
53,133
-14.06%
64,257
-4.19%
58,146
-16.16%
59,373
-19.37%
60,977
-16.98%
62,883
-6.73%
62,724
1.80%
52,792
14.43%
45,486
30.81%

white
females
805,659
1.06%
40,151
-26.58%
64,260
-8.64%
71,418
-6.51%
64,739
-13.95%
67,879
-8.18%
67,363
-4.15%
64,855
2.38%
63,650
15.19%
52,105
22.78%
44,303
23.96%

total
negroes
403,502
35.24%
22,139
6.86%
34,907
38.67%
45,926
35.82%
42,287
20.72%
42,692
17.63%
36,311
24.60%
30,331
44.04%
23,756
61.33%
15,063
53.42%
11,156
80.66%

Manhattan Difference between 1940 and 1950 as a percentage of 1940
Red signifies increases of 90% or more.

negro
males
186,898
39.55%
10,074
6.83%
13,990
45.68%
19,859
48.92%
18,435
23.33%
19,043
16.96%
17,362
22.03%
14,954
46.19%
12,126
73.58%
7,602
65.33%
5,402
91.83%

negro
females
216,604
31.73%
12,065
6.88%
20,917
34.34%
26,067
27.29%
23,852
18.78%
23,649
18.18%
18,949
27.06%
15,377
42.01%
11,630
50.28%
7,461
42.93%
5,754
71.30%
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Table 1.5: 1940 Brooklyn Census Statistics
Ages
all ages
15 to 19
20 to 24
25 to 29
30 to 34
35 to 39
40 to 44
45 to 49
50 to 54
55 to 59
60-64

all classes
2,698,285
241,176
250,217
258,285
241,824
233,449
209,508
183,759
157,401
119,469
93,761

total white
2,587,951
231,806
239,457
246,250
230,476
212,368
200,784
177,542
153,026
116,603
91,744

white
males
1,282,485
115,414
114,182
115,542
111,852
105,305
100,976
90,768
79,546
59,764
45,634

white
females
1,305,466
116,392
125,275
130,708
118,624
107,062
99,808
86,774
73,480
56,839
46,109

total
negroes
107,253
9,186
10,612
11,824
11,052
10,622
8,300
5,940
4,191
2,780
1,961

negro
males
47,744
4,093
3,693
4,545
4,729
4,729
3,946
2,901
1,948
1,280
924

negro
females
59,519
5,093
6,919
7,297
6,323
5,893
4,354
3,039
2,243
1,500
1,037

Table 1.6: Brooklyn 1950 Stats and Difference from 1940 statistics
Ages
all ages
15 to 19
20 to 24
25 to 29
30 to 34
35 to 39
40 to 44
45 to 49
50 to 54
55 to 59
60 to 65

all classes
2,738,175
1.48%
173,482
-28.07%
213,318
-14.75%
231,005
-10.56%
222,460
-8.01%
230,698
-1.18%
213,274
1.80%
190,251
3.53%
179,541
14.07%
147,326
23.32%
119,429
27.38%

total white
2,525,118
-2.43%
159,339
-31.26%
192,726
-19.52%
205,792
-16.43%
201,311
-12.65%
210,878
-0.70%
197,774
-1.50%
177,561
0.01%
170,217
11.23%
141,356
21.23%
115,272
25.65%

white males
1,236,097
-3.62%
78,277
-32.18%
93,335
-18.26%
99,324
-14.04%
94,445
-15.56%
98,633
-6.34%
95,909
-5.02%
87,018
-4.13%
84,019
5.62%
71,229
19.18%
57,901
26.88%

white
females
1,289,021
-1.26%
81,062
-30.35%
99,391
-20.66%
106,468
-18.55%
106,866
-9.91%
112,245
4.84%
101,865
2.06%
90,543
4.34%
86,198
17.31%
70,127
23.38%
57,371
24.42%

total
negroes
213,057
98.65%
14,143
53.96%
20,592
94.04%
25,213
113.24%
21,149
91.36%
19,820
86.59%
15,500
86.75%
12,690
113.64%
9,324
122.48%
5,970
114.75%
4,157
111.98%

Brooklyn Difference between 1940 and 1950 as a percentage of 1940
Red signifies increases of 90% or more.

negro
males
97,933
105.12%
6,505
58.93%
8,188
121.72%
10,986
141.72%
9,196
94.46%
8,864
87.44%
7,280
84.49%
6,069
109.20%
4,606
136.45%
2,920
128.13%
1,887
104.22%

negro
females
115,124
93.42%
7,638
49.97%
12,404
79.27%
14,227
94.97%
11,953
89.04%
10,956
85.92%
8,220
88.79%
6,621
117.87%
4,718
110.34%
3,050
103.33%
2,270
118.90%
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Table 1.7: 1940 Bronx Census Statistics
Ages
all ages
15 to 19
20 to 24
25 to 29
30 to 34
35 to 39
40 to 44
45 to 49
50 to 54
55 to 59
60-64

all
classes
1,394,711
117,378
120,681
130,082
129,525
124,739
117,451
103,925
86,439
62,367
46,227

total white
1,370,319
115,052
118,211
127,798
127,175
122,183
115,391
102,329
85,384
61,660
45,764

white
males
677,620
57,342
56,483
59,118
61,488
60,049
57,745
52,628
44,832
31,765
22,926

white
females
692,699
57,710
61,728
68,680
65,687
62,124
57,646
49,701
40,552
29,895
22,838

total
negroes
23,529
2,268
2,423
2,212
2,253
2,436
1,924
1,495
1,023
675
444

negro
males
11,048
957
916
941
1,037
1,170
1,002
789
568
326
230

negro
females
12,481
1,292
1,507
1,271
1,216
1,266
922
706
455
349
214

Table 1.8: Bronx 1950 Stats and Difference from 1940 statistics
Ages
all ages
15 to 19
20 to 24
25 to 29
30 to 34
35 to 39
40 to 44
45 to 49
50 to 54
55 to 59
60 to 64

all
classes
1,541,277
10.51%
93,847
-20.05%
109,615
-9.17%
110,539
-15.02%
109,272
-15.64%
121,755
-2.39%
119,687
1.90%
109,894
5.74%
103,287
19.49%
84,909
36.14%
67,617
46.27%

total white
1,391,662
1.56%
86,566
-24.76%
100,126
-15.30%
99,227
-22.36%
99,582
-21.70%
112,610
-7.83%
112,092
-2.86%
103,730
1.37%
98,541
15.41%
81,903
32.83%
45,509
-0.56%

white
males
697,621
2.95%
42,729
-25.48%
49,161
-12.96%
47,301
-19.99%
45,568
-25.89%
51,269
-14.62%
53,853
-6.74%
50,675
-3.71%
48,471
8.12%
40,903
28.77%
12,799
-44.17%

white
females
694,041
0.19%
43,837
-24.04%
50,965
-17.44%
51,926
-24.39%
54,014
-17.77%
61,341
-1.26%
58,239
1.03%
53,055
6.75%
50,070
23.47%
41,000
37.15%
32,710
43.23%

total
negroes
99,615
323.37%
7,281
221.03%
9,489
291.62%
10,692
383.36%
9,690
330.09%
9,145
275.41%
7,595
294.75%
6,164
312.31%
4,746
363.93%
3,006
345.33%
2,088
370.27%

Bronx Difference between 1940 and 1950 as a percentage of 1940
Red signifies increases of 90% or more.

negro
males
45,966
316.06%
3,317
246.60%
4,095
347.05%
4,738
403.51%
4,135
298.75%
3,978
240.00%
3,615
260.78%
2,914
269.33%
2,341
312.15%
1,448
344.17%
930
304.35%

negro
females
53,649
329.85%
3,964
206.81%
5,394
257.93%
5,954
368.45%
5,555
356.83%
5,167
308.14%
3,980
331.67%
3,250
360.34%
2,405
428.57%
1,558
346.42%
1,158
441.12%
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Table 1.9: New York City Negro population change by Sex and Age
Ages
all ages
15 to 19
20 to 24
25 to 29
30 to 34
35 to 39
40 to 44
45 to 49
50 to 54
55 to 59
60 to 64

1940 males
205,727
15,574
15,251
20,008
21,924
23,418
20,299
14,802
10,251
6,675
4,311

1940
females
252,717
19,104
25,848
30,970
29,256
28,768
21,490
15,579
11,217
7,576
4,974

1950
males
336,860
20,825
27,215
36,070
32,460
31,725
27,770
23,370
18,420
11,665
7,805

1950
females
412,220
25,575
41,115
48,720
44,020
42,400
33,495
27,310
19,735
12,740
9,710

change in
males
131,133
5,251
11,964
16,062
10,536
8,307
7,471
8,568
8,169
4,990
3,494

change in
females
159,503
6,471
15,267
17,750
14,764
13,632
12,005
11,731
8,518
5,164
4,736

total
change
290,636
11,722
27,231
33,812
25,300
21,939
19,476
20,299
16,687
10,154
8,230

largest population increase
second largest population increase
third largest population increase

Table 1.10: Manhattan Negro population change by Sex and Age
Ages
all ages
15 to 19
20 to 24
25 to 29
30 to 34
35 to 39
40 to 44
45 to 49
50 to 54
55 to 59
60 to 64

1940 males
133,930
9,430
9,603
13,335
14,948
16,281
14,228
10,229
6,986
4,598
2,816

1940
females
164,435
11,288
15,570
20,479
20,080
20,011
14,913
10,828
7,739
5,220
3,359

largest population increase
second largest population increase
third largest population increase

1950
males
186,898
10,074
13,990
19,859
18,435
19,043
17,362
14,954
12,126
7,602
5,402

1950
females
216,604
12,065
20,917
26,067
23,852
23,649
18,949
15,377
11,630
7,461
5,754

change in
males
52,968
644
4,387
6,524
3,487
2,762
3,134
4,725
5,140
3,004
2,586

change in
females
52,169
777
5,347
5,588
3,772
3,638
4,036
4,549
3,891
2,241
2,395

total
change
105,137
1,421
9,734
12,112
7,259
6,400
7,170
9,274
9,031
5,245
4,981
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Table 1.11: Brooklyn Negro population change by Sex and Age
Ages
all ages
15 to 19
20 to 24
25 to 29
30 to 34
35 to 39
40 to 44
45 to 49
50 to 54
55 to 59
60 to 65

1940
males
47,744
4,093
3,693
4,545
4,729
4,729
3,946
2,901
1,948
1,280
924

1940
females
59,519
5,093
6,919
7,297
6,323
5,893
4,354
3,039
2,243
1,500
1,037

1950
males
97,933
6,505
8,188
10,986
9,196
8,864
7,280
6,069
4,606
2,920
1,887

1950
females
115,124
7,638
12,404
14,227
11,953
10,956
8,220
6,621
4,718
3,050
2,270

change in
males
50,189
2,412
4,495
6,441
4,467
4,135
3,334
3,168
2,658
1,640
963

change in
females
55,605
2,545
5,485
6,930
5,630
5,063
3,866
3,582
2,475
1,550
1,233

total
change
105,794
4,957
9,980
13,371
10,097
9,198
7,200
6,750
5,133
3,190
2,196

change in
females
41,168
2,672
3,887
4,683
4,339
3,901
3,058
2,544
1,950
1,209
944

total
change
76,086
5,032
7,066
8,480
7,437
6,709
5,671
4,669
3,723
2,331
1,644

largest population increase
second largest population increase
third largest population increase

Table 1.12: Bronx Negro population change by Sex and Age
Ages
all ages
15 to 19
20 to 24
25 to 29
30 to 34
35 to 39
40 to 44
45 to 49
50 to 54
55 to 59
60 to 65

1940
males
11,048
957
916
941
1,037
1,170
1,002
789
568
326
230

1940
females
12,481
1,292
1,507
1,271
1,216
1,266
922
706
455
349
214

largest population increase
second largest population increase
third largest population increase

1950
males
45,966
3,317
4,095
4,738
4,135
3,978
3,615
2,914
2,341
1,448
930

1950
females
53,649
3,964
5,394
5,954
5,555
5,167
3,980
3,250
2,405
1,558
1,158

change in
males
34,918
2,360
3,179
3,797
3,098
2,808
2,613
2,125
1,773
1,122
700
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Table 1.13: Manhattan Census Tract Statistics for 1940 and 1950
Census Tract Statistics, Volume III 1950 Census Chapter 37 - New York, NY Census
tract#
negro 1950
white 1950
negro 1940 white 1940
20
2,052
10,741
133
1,099
7,921
1,405
7,129
151
1,838
3,363
164
5,634
7,868
3,639
9,131
181
1,193
13,509
367
14,170
182
4,128
8,204
1,278
10,940
184
11,798
4,545
11,695
49,200
186
7,534
1,266
190
9,325
495
196
1,561
5,543
295
6,060
197
3,822
95
198
3,727
1,628
2,814
3,405
200
6,546
220
4,990
833
201
6,935
95
202
1,068
2,385
666
2,704
204
2,072
1,355
824
2,714
206
8,157
305
208
13,339
143
11,877
252
210
8,315
150
212
13,002
65
12,835
124
214
1,284
2
1
1,706
216
16,472
265
14,796
942
218
12,964
233
13,379
495
220
13,031
118
12,241
199
226
13,064
71
11,340
44
227
6,657
235
227
2,610
15
228
11,652
49
11,826
24
230
16,659
77
16,257
94
231
8,935
135
231
3,790
15
232
15,414
38
16,198
19
233
6,627
2,799
74
9,378
234
8,779
21
8,282
15
235
7,919
75
235
3,943
12
243
5,305
521
2,164
3,860
236
5,579
65
6,060
33
237
4,585
4,704
32
9,128
239
3,833
41
2,926
1,113
241
3,010
5,140
57
8,240
245
3,390
12,255
91
17,071

Census tracts with populations that changed from predominately white to predominately Negro.
Census tracts that were predominately Negro and remained predominately Negro.
NOTE: the above stats are for tracts with a significant Negro population (over 1000).
Those entries without stats from the 1940 census are new tracts that did not appear 10 years prior.
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Table 1.14: Brooklyn Census Track Statistics for 1940 and 1950
Census Tract Statistics, Volume III 1950 Census Chapter 37 - New York, NY Census
tract#
negro 1950
white 1950
negro 1940 white 1940
71
1,777
5,128
175
3,879
127
1,789
2,511
1,620
2,913
179
1,640
950
1,681
1,172
185
1,268
6,827
21
5,474
199
1,460
2,571
1,064
2,181
201
2,858
1,956
1,322
2,583
221
2,347
2,456
895
2,958
227
5,158
187
3,182
891
229
3,878
1,011
1,494
2,788
231
5,152
1,713
2,587
2,700
233
1,839
3,068
801
3,651
243
4,045
1,365
1,581
3,005
245
5,198
850
1,896
2,657
247
2,324
670
1,137
1,740
249
5,343
334
1,850
2,265
251
4,413
1,442
1,917
3,132
255
3,410
3,764
469
3,666
257
1,344
5,474
383
5,926
263
1,218
1,501
384
2,316
265
5,634
353
3,430
2,203
267
5,939
173
4,192
1,499
269
4,589
151
2,218
1,753
271
1,982
428
161
1,540
271
1,918
278
1,497
424
273
4,328
66
3,512
699
275
5,804
144
852
4,548
277
4,662
248
2,629
2,372
279
3,282
2,330
2,015
4,313
291
4,786
1,484
1,433
3,715
293
4,461
737
1,513
3,106
295
5,176
551
2,699
2,102
297
4,718
311
2,809
1,673
299
3,008
1,429
1,870
2,553
301
1,976
3,410
1,371
4,045
303
2,016
5,633
1,025
7,360
305
3,118
3,088
1,858
3,454
307
2,112
2,332
1,179
1,564
311
4,636
666
2,675
2,736
313
3,569
2,695
1,002
3,733
377
2,040
3,590
160
5,153
381
4,152
926
1,421
3,582
383
4,494
1,510
914
4,585
385
2,370
2,988
43
5,021
387
1,324
3,439
52
4,398
487
2,145
3,187
1,234
3,605

287
906
910

2,304
2,392

2,833
1,970

1,359
838

4,158
4,076

Census tracts with populations that changed from predominately white to predominately Negro.
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Table 1.15: Bronx Census Track Statistics for 1940 and 1950
Census Tract Statistics, Volume III 1950 Census Chapter 37 - New York, NY Census
tract#
negro 1950 white 1950
negro 1940 white 1940
1
1,055
1,662
1,007
2,023
75
1,653
10,633
138
11,235
77
2,270
5,230
233
6,665
79
1,139
9,216
490
8,958
85
1,462
8,654
75
9,335
87
5,769
11,210
1,706
15,730
125
2,018
5,492
73
7,721
129
3,219
7,793
1,170
9,262
131
6,061
4,930
2,719
8,743
133
6,875
2,346
1,336
7,292
135
8,513
352
994
7,122
137
9,683
1,370
134
10,049
139
2,313
3,374
596
5,211
145
3,090
3,467
52
6,779
147
5,944
2,382
1,024
8,337
149
3,535
3,438
34
7,982
151
9,536
933
1,568
8,223
153
2,805
12,513
135
17,275
155
1,149
6,026
407
7,583
169
4,659
5,929
1,346
10,064

Census tracts with populations that changed from predominately white to predominately Negro.
Census tracts with populations that became integrated.
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Figure 1.1: 1940 Manhattan Census Tracts and Demographic Change

The shaded areas on this map represent census tracts that changed from having a predominately
white population to having a predominately African American population.
In this map the outlined area is the Central Harlem health district.
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Figure 1.2: 1940 Brooklyn Census Tracts and Demographic Change

The shaded areas on this map represent census tracts that changed from having a predominately
white population to having a predominately African American population.
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Figure 1.3:
3: Map of Brooklyn Neighborhoods from Kenneth Jackson , ed., The
Neighborhoods of Brooklyn (New
ew Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.)
1998
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Figure 1.4: 1940 Bronx Census Tracts and Demographic Change

The shaded areas on this map represent census tracts that changed from having a predominately
white population to having a predominately African American population.

Table 3.1: Summary Table615

Place of
Hearing

Total
employment
Summer ,
1942

Total Employment
Number of
Total
Percent Number
Employment Increase of Firms establishments
Winter,
Reporting Reporting
42 / 43-44
42
/ 43-44
1943-44

Non –white
employment
Summer,
1942

Non-White Employment
Non- Non-white
Non- Percent
white Employment white increase
% of Winter,
% of
total, 1943-44
total
1942
194344

Los
Angeles

419,228

618,557

47.6

6

6

48

68

15,729

3.8

44,899

7.3

185.5

Chicago

70,106

98,933

41.1

8

8

18

19

963

1.4

3,831

3.9

297.8

New York

149,087

295,291

98.1

6

6

21

21

3,754

2.5

19,215

6.5

411.9

Birmingham

37,903

59,353

56.6

4

4

4

5

3,379

8.9

9,245

15.5

173.6

Total

676,324

1,072,134

58.5

24

24

91

111

23,375

3.5

77,190

7.2

230.2

615

Summary Table, “Compliance Data on All Establishments Throughout the Country of Firms Involved in Old Committee Hearings. FEPC Papers, Entry 75,
Box 546, Folder – Statistics.3
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Table 3.2 - Firms Appearing before FEPC at New York Hearings (all reporting establishments included)616
Total Employment
Non-White Employment
Total
Non –white NonNon-white
Total
Percent Number of
NonPlace of
employment Employment Increase establishments employment white
Employment white
Hearing
Summer ,
Winter,
Reporting
Summer,
% of
Winter,
% of
42
/
43-44
1942
total,
1943-44
total
1942
1943-44
1942
194344
Babcock
and Wilcox
544
677
22.6
1
1
0
0.0
31
4.6
Co.
BectonDickinson &
1,100
1,476
3.4
1
1
5
.5
14
.9
Co.
Curtiss
Wright
100,216
227,020
126.5
9
9
2,995
2.6
16,155
7.1
Corp.
Fairchild
Aviation
9,786
14,482
48.0
3
3
17
.2
341
2.4
Corporation
Sperry Corp.
(w/ Ford
35,776
47,581
32.9
6
6
1,083
3.2
1,874
3.9
Instruments.)
Titeflex
Metal Hose
1,665
4,065
144.1
1
1
54
3.2
800
19.7
Company
Total
149,087
295,291
98.1
21
21
3,754
2.5
19,215
6.5

Percent
increase

3000.0

180.0

522.5

1905.8

73.0

1381.4
411.9

616

Table 3 - Firms Appearing before FEPC at New York Hearings (all reporting establishments included). “Compliance Data on All Establishments Throughout
the Country of Firms Involved in Old Committee Hearings. FEPC Papers, Entry 75, Box 546, Folder – Statistics.

294

Table 3.3 - Workers Employed in Eight Firms Appearing before FEPC at New York hearings, February 16 and 17, 1942617
Name of Plant

February 1942
(date of hearing)
Total
Non-white
Empl.
Empl.

Nonwhite %
of total

August 1942
(6 months after hearing)
Total
Non-white Non-white
Empl
Empl.
% of total

December 1942
(10 months after hearing)
Total
Non-white
NonEmpl
Empl
white %
of total

January 1944
(23 months after hearing)
Total
Non-white NonEmpl
Empl
white %
of total

525

0

0.0

544

0

0.0

599

0

0.0

667

31

4.6

1,002

0

0.0

1,100

5

.5

1,275

3

.2

1,476

14

.9

Fairchild Aviation
Corp.

1,749

4

.2

2,411

6

.2

2,857

10

.3

4,206

102

2.4

Ford Instrument
Company

5,076

65

1.3

6,681

110

1.6

7,488

261

3.5

7,385

405

5.5

805

0

0.0

1,401

30

2.1

1,299

INA

Sperry Gyroscope
Inc.

14,184

21

.1

21,752

395

1.8

24,060

389

1.6

28,316

911

3.2

Titeflex Metal
Hose Company

1,350

65

4.8

1,665

54

3.2

2,237

175

7.8

4,065

800

19.7

Wright
Aeronautical

22,263

78

.4

26,203

273

1.0

29,405

750

2.6

40,599

3,797

6.9

Total

46,954

233

.5

61,757

873

1.4

67,921

1,588

2.3

86,714

5,060

5.8

Babcock and
Wilcox Co.
Becton, Dickinson
and Co.

Isolantite, Inc.

617

Table 3 - Total and Non-white Workers Employed in Eight Firms Appearing before FEPC at New York hearings, February 16 and 17, 1942 “Compliance
Data on All Establishments Throughout the Country of Firms Involved in Old Committee Hearings. Papers of the Fair Employment Practices Committee, Record
Group 228, , Entry 75, Box 546, Folder – Statistics.
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Table 3.4 - Total and Non-White Workers Employed in Skilled, Semi-skilled, unskilled, and other categories by 6 Firms
appearing before the FEPC at New York Hearings618
Name of
Plant
Fairchild
Aviation

Ford
Instrument

Isolantite
Inc.

Sperry
Gyroscope

Titeflex
Metal Hose

0

May 1942
SemiUnskilled
skilled
0
5

270

242

308

676

2,096

0

0

110

0

110

2

101

240

0

343

3,282

936

468

1,294

5,980

2,059

2,902

1,227

2,070

8,258

0

0

0

0

0

2

7

383

1

393

65

0

819

87

971

117

725

1,073

341

2,257

0

100

376

0

476

1

285

305

10

681

701

10,560

3,120

4,000

18,381

8,620

5,247

8,587

8,375

30,829

171

7

12

488

7

514

2,576

250

350

2,800

665

4,065

Skilled
Nonwhite
Total
Nonwhite
Total
Nonwhite
Total
Nonwhite
Total

Other

total

0

5

NonWhite
Total

Wright
Aeronautical
Corp.

Nonwhite
Total

Totals for
the 6 Plants

Nonwhite
Total

Skilled

Semiskilled

May 1943
Unskilled

other

Total

16

15

241

1

273

75

816

798

14

1,703

4,000

8,000

4,000

8,441

24,441

5,890

12,210

6,214

11,073

35,387

16

115

732

1

1,035

87

1,221

2,294

32

3,634

8,318

19,738

9,315

14,498

54,445

16,936

21,435

19,901

22,524

80,796

618

Table 7 - Total and Non-White Workers Employed in Skilled, Semi-skilled, unskilled, and other categories by 6 Firms appearing before the FEPC at New
York Hearings “Compliance Data on All Establishments Throughout the Country of Firms Involved in Old Committee Hearings. FEPC Papers, Entry 75, Box
546, Folder – Statistics.
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Table 4.1 Non-White Workers Employed in Skilled, Semi-skilled, unskilled and other categories by Sperry Company Inc.
May-42
Semiskilled

Skilled
Ford Instruments

Sperry Company
Inc.

Combined
company figures

Non-White
Total
% Non-White
Non-White

0
3282
0.00
0

0
936
0.00
100

Unskilled
110
468
23.50
376

Total
% Non-White
Non-white

701
0.00
0

10560
0.95
100

Total
% Non-White

3983
0.00

11496
0.87

May-43
Other

2
2059
0.10
1

Semiskilled
101
2902
3.48
285

Unskilled
240
1227
19.56
385

0
1294
0.00
0

Total
110
5980
1.84
476

Skilled

3120
12.05
486

4000
0.00
0

18381
2.59
586

8620
0.01
3

5247
5.43
386

3588
13.55

5294
0.00

24361
2.41

10679
0.03

8149
4.74

Other
0
2070
0.00
10

Total
343
8258
4.15
681

8587
4.48
625

8375
0.12
10

30829
2.21
1024

9814
6.37

10445
0.10

39087
2.62

January
1944
(22
months
later)
Total

Nonwhite

%

Table 4.2 Total and Non-White Workers Employed by Sperry Company Inc. (February 1942- January 1944)

Ford
Instruments
Sperry
Company Inc.
company totals

February
1942
(Date of
Hearing)
Total

Nonwhite

5076

65

1.3

6681

110

1.6

7488

261

3.5

7385

405

5.5

14184
19260

21
86

0.1
0.45

21752
28433

395
505

1.8
1.78

24060
31548

389
650

1.6
2.06

28316
35701

911
1316

3.2
3.69

%

August
1942 (6
months
later)
Total

Nonwhite

%

December
1942 (10
months
later)
Total

Nonwhite

%

Information in Table 4.1 taken Table 7 – Total and Non-White Workers Employed in Skilled, Semi-Skilled, Unskilled, and “Other” Categories for Six Firms
Appearing Before the FEPC at New York Hearings”. Information in Table 4.2 taken from “Table 3 – Total and Non-White Workers Employed in 8 Firms
Appearing Before the FEPC at New York Hearings, February 16th and 17th, 1942”. Both documents in Compliance Data for Firms Involved in Old Committee
Hearings. FEPC Papers, Entry 75, Box 546, Statistics Folder.
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Figure 5.1: Neighborhood Map of the Bronx619

619

Map taken from “Intersections: Grand Concourse Beyond 100”, a project of The Bronx Museum of the Arts
with the Design Trust for Public Space. Accessed June 24, 2011. http://grandconcourse100.org/brief/maps
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Figure 5.2: Bronx Street Map620

620

AccessMaps.com, http://www.aaccessmaps.com/show/map/bronx Accessed June 24, 2011.
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